MIGUEL BAUMGARTNER

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Budapeste depois de Orbán

Orbán caiu. E a União Europeia, se quiser mesmo aprender com Budapeste, deve perceber isto: os populismos não são derrotados apenas com sermões sobre valores, liberalismo ou união, mas quando deixam de conseguir esconder a corrupção, a mediocridade e o desgaste de um poder demasiado longo.

“𝙼𝚊𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚟𝚎́𝚖 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚒𝚗𝚏𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚣𝚊𝚛 𝚘 𝚖𝚘𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘. 𝙿𝚎́𝚝𝚎𝚛 𝙼𝚊𝚐𝚢𝚊𝚛 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚜𝚞𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚞 𝚍𝚘 𝚗𝚊𝚍𝚊, 𝚗𝚎𝚖 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚎𝚞 𝚍𝚎 𝚗𝚎𝚗𝚑𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚖𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚕𝚒𝚋𝚎𝚛𝚊𝚕 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚝𝚊́𝚋𝚞𝚊𝚜 𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚟𝚊𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚎𝚖 𝚕𝚎𝚝𝚛𝚊 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎ɪ́𝚜𝚝𝚊. 𝙴́ 𝚞𝚖 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚍𝚞𝚝𝚘 𝚝𝚊𝚛𝚍𝚒𝚘 𝚍𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚘́𝚙𝚛𝚒𝚘 𝚜𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚎𝚖𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊𝚐𝚘𝚛𝚊 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚖𝚎𝚝𝚎 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚖𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚛.”

𝖧𝖺́ 𝗆𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝗁𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝖺𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗋𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗀𝗈𝗌. “𝖳𝗁𝖾 𝗐𝗈𝗋𝗅𝖽 𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗅𝗈𝗌𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝗂𝗇, 𝖽𝗂𝖽 𝗒𝗈𝗎 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝗍𝗁𝗂𝗇𝗄 𝗍𝗁𝖺𝗍 𝗐𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗎𝗅𝖽 𝖻𝖾 𝗌𝗈 𝖼𝗅𝗈𝗌𝖾, 𝗅𝗂𝗄𝖾 𝖻𝗋𝗈𝗍𝗁𝖾𝗋𝗌?”, 𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝖲𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗉𝗂𝗈𝗇𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖶𝗂𝗇𝖽 𝗈𝖿 𝖢𝗁𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖾, 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝗌𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗀𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈. 𝖠 𝗏𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖯𝖾́𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖬𝖺𝗀𝗒𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗂𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗉𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗋𝗎𝗉𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖾́𝗉𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗅𝗈𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗂𝖼𝗅𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝖺 𝗌𝗂 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈.

𝖠𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗓𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋, 𝖵𝗂𝗄𝗍𝗈𝗋 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗎𝗅𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝗈𝗎 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝗋𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌. 𝖥𝗈𝗂 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖺, 𝖽𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗋𝗈𝗌𝖺 𝖾, 𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈, 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗊𝗎ı́𝗏𝗈𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗉𝗍𝗈 𝖾 𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅.

𝖠 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́, 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗅𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾́𝖼𝗂𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅. 𝖡𝗋𝗎𝗑𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅ı́𝗏𝗂𝗈, 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝖺𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝖿𝖺𝗆ı́𝗅𝗂𝖺 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 “𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈” 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗂𝗍𝖾 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝗋𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾. 𝖬𝖺𝗌 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗋𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅.

𝖠 𝗏𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖯𝖾́𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖬𝖺𝗀𝗒𝖺𝗋 𝖾́, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝗎́𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝖺, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗍𝗈 𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺. 𝖨𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝗎𝖼𝗈. 𝖭𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗂𝗓𝗈𝗎 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗅𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌, 𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗈 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖻𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗁𝖺 𝖾́, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗌𝗂 𝗌𝗈́, 𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗁𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖼𝗈.

𝖬𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾́𝗆 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈. 𝖯𝖾́𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖬𝖺𝗀𝗒𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝗋𝗀𝗂𝗎 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺𝖽𝖺, 𝗇𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗎 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗍𝖺́𝖻𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗅𝖾𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾ı́𝗌𝗍𝖺. 𝖤́ 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖽𝗎𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖽𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋. 𝖥𝗈𝗂 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇, 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗎 𝖺𝗈 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖥𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗓, 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗎 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗆𝖺́𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖾 𝗌𝗈́ 𝗋𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗎 𝖾𝗆 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦, 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖺̂𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗅𝗈 𝖾 𝖾𝗋𝗈𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾.

𝖨𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗆𝖻ı́𝗀𝗎𝖺. 𝖠 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝖻𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈. 𝖤𝗆 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗍𝗈𝗌, 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖾 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝖽𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 “𝗀𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗋”, 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝖽ı́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝖾́𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈.

𝖤 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺ı́ 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗂𝗎 𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖠𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝖻𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗀𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺, 𝗇𝖾𝗆 𝖺 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖺 𝖿𝗂𝗅𝗈𝗌𝗈́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺. 𝖤𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗆, 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗈, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈. 𝖮 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝗅𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗋, 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗌𝖺𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗆𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾: 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗉𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗀𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝗂𝖼̧𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌, 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗎𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗊𝗎𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺.

𝖠 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗎 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝖾́𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖺𝗎́𝖽𝖾 𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅, 𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖬𝖺𝗀𝗒𝖺𝗋 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎ı́𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈, 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗃𝗎𝖽𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗉𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗎𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖾𝗅𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌.

𝖨𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗌𝗂𝖺 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗎𝗌𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖡𝗋𝗎𝗑𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌: 𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝗈𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗈𝗅𝗈́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈́-𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗎 𝗇𝖺 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺. 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝖼𝖺𝗂𝗎 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖿𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎ı́𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗓𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾, 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖼ı́𝗇𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝖾𝖼𝗁𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌. 𝖠 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗎, 𝗌𝗂𝗆, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖻𝗅𝗈𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗏𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗃𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗋, 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅, 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖡𝗋𝗎𝗑𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌. 𝖴𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾́𝖼𝗂𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝖺𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖻𝖺́𝗌𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝖺.

𝖤́ 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗎𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺. 𝖯𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝖺, 𝖾́ 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗅𝗎𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗌𝗈. 𝖯𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺, 𝖾́ 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖻𝗈𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗍ı́𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝖻𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝖺. 𝖠 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗀𝖺 𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅-𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾.

𝖠 𝖠𝖿𝖣 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺 𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝖠𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺, 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖾 𝖫𝖾 𝖯𝖾𝗇 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺 𝖺 𝗈𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝖥𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺, 𝗈 𝖵𝗈𝗑 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖾𝗆 𝖤𝗌𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺, 𝖬𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗂 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖨𝗍𝖺́𝗅𝗂𝖺, 𝖥𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖤𝗌𝗅𝗈𝗏𝖺́𝗊𝗎𝗂𝖺, 𝖡𝖺𝖻𝗂š 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗎 𝖺𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝖾́𝗊𝗎𝗂𝖺, 𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝖢𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖫𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗂𝖺, 𝗆𝗂𝗀𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖾 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺. 𝖠𝗅𝗂𝖺́𝗌, 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖺𝗂 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈-𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖾 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗆𝖺-𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺. 𝖮𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖳𝗂𝗌𝗓𝖺 𝖾 𝖥𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗓, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗎́𝖼𝗅𝖾𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗓 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗈𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗈𝗅𝗈́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌.

𝖳𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗈 𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖾 𝖩.𝖣. 𝖵𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾 𝗌𝖺𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖺𝗊𝗎𝗂 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗅𝗂𝗊𝗎𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌. 𝖵𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾 𝖿𝖾𝗓 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝖾 𝗈 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝖬𝖠𝖦𝖠 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝖡𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝗅𝖺𝖻𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈, 𝖾𝗋𝗈𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗋. 𝖠 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼ı́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈𝗅𝖺 𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝖺́𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗈𝗌𝖺. 𝖬𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗀𝖾́𝗇𝗎𝗈 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗈𝗅𝗈́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝗈. 𝖮 𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎. 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗋 𝗎́𝗍𝗂𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗎𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆, 𝗆𝖾́𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝖾 𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗀𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋.

𝖱𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺, 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌, 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈. 𝖠 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗅𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗎𝗇𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖡𝗋𝗎𝗑𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝗎́𝖻𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝖻𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗂𝗌𝗈𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝗈𝗎 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌𝗂𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗈. 𝖬𝖺𝗀𝗒𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗎 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗌, 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗑𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖭𝖠𝖳𝖮, 𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗋 𝖺̀ 𝖯𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗌 “𝖼𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗄𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝖽 𝖻𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗌” 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌. 𝖳𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈. 𝖬𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗂𝗌.

𝖮 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗅 𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗀𝗂𝖺. 𝖠𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎, 𝖺 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗌𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖿𝖾𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺 𝖺 𝖬𝗈𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗂𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝗀𝖾𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝖿𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝗈𝗎 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗋.

𝖲𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺, 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝗋𝗎𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗋𝗎𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖺 𝖺 𝟨𝟦% 𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝖺́𝗌 𝖺 𝟩𝟧%, 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗅𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌; 𝖺𝗅𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈, 𝖡𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝖼𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖯𝖺𝗄𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗋𝗎𝗌𝗌𝖺. 𝖨𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗅ı́𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅: 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗀𝖾𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖺 𝖬𝗈𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗏𝗈, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗂𝗌. 𝖠 𝖱𝗎́𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗈 𝖾𝗂𝗑𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈.

𝖤́ 𝖺𝗊𝗎𝗂, 𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖺́𝗌, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖯𝖾́𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖬𝖺𝗀𝗒𝖺𝗋. 𝖮 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗁𝖺. 𝖠𝗅𝗂𝖺́𝗌, 𝖼𝖺𝖻𝖾 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗌, 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝗂𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌, 𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗀𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗑𝗂𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺, 𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖬𝗈𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗏𝗈. 𝖨𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖾𝗎 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖡𝗋𝗎𝗑𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌.

𝖤 𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗎́𝗍𝗂𝗅 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺: 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗏𝗂𝗈 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗏𝗂𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝗎𝗋𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗈𝗅𝗈́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖺, 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂-𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗉𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗈 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗁𝗎́𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗈.

𝖮𝗋𝖻𝖺́𝗇 𝖼𝖺𝗂𝗎. 𝖬𝖺𝗌 𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗅 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗋 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗁𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺. 𝖠 𝖧𝗎𝗇𝗀𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖼̧𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺́𝗌 𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗋ı́𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝖾𝖼𝗁𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗃𝖾𝖼𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺. 𝖤 𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺, 𝗌𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖡𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾, 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝖻𝖾𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈: 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗅𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗈𝗎 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗉𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗈𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾 𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗀𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌𝗂𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝗈.

𝖤́ 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗎, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗏𝖾𝗓𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗌.

* Gestor e Comentador de Política Internacional

IN "O JORNAL ECONÓMICO" - 14/04/26 .