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29/11/2022
CARLOS BRANCO
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As modulações da paz na Ucrânia
Mais recentemente, temos assistido a
intervenções de várias entidades apelando à obtenção de uma solução
política para o conflito, todas admitindo a possibilidade da amputação
territorial da Ucrânia.
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎, 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟻𝟶% 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎, 𝑎 𝑟𝑢𝑖́𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙, 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 (𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠) 𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑠, 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟹𝟹,𝟺% 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑃𝐼𝐵, 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠, 𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐̧𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑧. 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑎.
𝑁𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎́ 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑎 𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 “𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎̂𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎”, 𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑎 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎, 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑎̃𝑜 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑎 (𝑈𝐸) 𝑎̀ 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎, 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑒 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐̧𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠.
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝐾𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎, 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎-𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑜 𝐹𝑀𝐼, 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎𝑜 “𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡”, “𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑠𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜”. 𝐴 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢-𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑎: “𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎̂𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑢𝑚 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑜.” 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑙𝑎, 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑈𝐸 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑚, 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑜, 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒-𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑟, 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎, 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎.
𝐸𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑙𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟, 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑢 𝑑𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟 𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑟 𝑛𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛. 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑎́ 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖́𝑐𝑖𝑙, 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠, 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑢 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 “𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑡𝑒̂𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜”, 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑙.
𝐸𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑙𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟, 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎, 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑗𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑢, 𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎, 𝑒𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒, 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜 𝑎𝑜𝑠 ℎ𝑖𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑠. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑒́𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝐽𝑜𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑙𝑎𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑧 𝑞𝑢𝑒 “𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑟 𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎, 𝑜 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝟸 𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑟𝑎́ 𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑟”.
𝐸𝑚 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑟𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖́𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑠, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜́𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑜, 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎 𝑒 𝑝𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑎́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠. 𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑗𝑎́ 𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜 ℎ𝑎́ 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑢-𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎. 𝐴 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑜𝑢 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜.
𝐸, 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑜, 𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎, 𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒́𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎 𝑈𝐸, 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑒́𝑚 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎̀ 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑒́ 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑠. 𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑎̀ 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟-𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑧. 𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑎 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑎.
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑢 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑦 𝐴𝑠ℎ, “𝑜𝑠 𝟻,𝟼% 𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑐̧𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒-𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙. 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑎́𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖́𝑐𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 𝑎̀ 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑒́ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑧𝑖𝑟 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠.”
𝐴𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛
𝐴 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜, 𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑏𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒-𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠. 𝐴 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒-𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑎, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑙ℎ𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢 𝑍𝑏𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑤 𝐵𝑟𝑧𝑒𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 𝑎 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑎́𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑟 𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴. 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑈𝐸 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑜, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑢 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑜 𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑜 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙. 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖́𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎̀𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑠, 𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠, 𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑜 𝑢́𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜 (𝑎 𝑏𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎) 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑗𝑎́ 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟸.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑜, 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑎 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎. 𝐴𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎̀ 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑚-𝑠𝑒 𝑎̀ 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎. 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎̃ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑅𝑢̈𝑐𝑘𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑘 𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑘, 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑒́𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑋𝐼𝑋, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑏𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎, 𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟 𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑜. 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑢-𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑎, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑢 𝑒𝑚 𝟷𝟿𝟷𝟺 𝑒 𝟷𝟿𝟺𝟷. 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝐺𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑎, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑢 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑂𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡, 𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑒 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑜 𝑠𝑒́𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝟷𝟿𝟼𝟺, 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 “𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑑𝑒”.
𝐸́ 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜. 𝐹𝑜𝑖 𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑢, 𝑛𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎 𝐺𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑎, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑜 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟-𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎 𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑠, 𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑎 𝑒 𝑎 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂. 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑢́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑝𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑟. 𝑁𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑙𝑜́𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒́ 𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑢 𝑡𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑢𝑚 “𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎”. 𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎. 𝑈𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧 𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠, 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎-𝑠𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜.
𝑂𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎
𝐴 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑎, 𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑎́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑧 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝐾𝑖𝑒𝑣 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠, 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑘. 𝐷𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎, 𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎, 𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒́𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙, 𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚. 𝐴 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑖́𝑐𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟸 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝐾𝑖𝑒𝑣 𝑎 𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟. 𝐽𝑎́ 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐̧𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎, 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑒 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑐̧𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑜, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑚 𝑎𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑜, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑦𝑚𝑦𝑟 𝑍𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜.
𝑇𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑎 𝐼𝑧𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑐, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑏𝑜́𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑐̧𝑢𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠, 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑍𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑠. 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑜, 𝑒𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜, 𝑜𝑢 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜, 𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑜, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑠. 𝑄𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑚, 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠, 𝑉𝑎𝑛 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑢, 𝑁𝑎𝑗𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑎ℎ 𝑜𝑢 𝐴𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑓 𝐺ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖.
𝑈𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑠, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑟 𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑟, 𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑛𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑎̂𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐̧𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑛𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑧. 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴. 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐̧𝑜𝑢 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑟-𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑜, 𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑖́𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒-𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠.
𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜, 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑎, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑚 𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝐽𝑜𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑒̂𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑙. 𝑃𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜 𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑜, 𝑡𝑒𝑚 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒-𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑚 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑠. 𝐹𝑜𝑖 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝐽𝑜𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛, 𝑎 𝟿 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑟𝑜, 𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑎 𝐾𝑖𝑒𝑣 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑜.
𝑁𝑎̃𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠. 𝐷𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑠, 𝑎 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢 𝑎𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑚 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑜, 𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑉𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑟 𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛. 𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑜𝑣𝑛𝑎 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑡𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝟺 𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑏𝑟𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑖 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑎 𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛.
𝐴 𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑁𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝐽𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑛 𝑎 𝐾𝑖𝑒𝑣, 𝑒𝑚 𝟺 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑟𝑜, 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑢 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑍𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 “𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎” 𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎, 𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜, 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑎. 𝑁𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑍𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑢 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑜 𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛, 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑖 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑎.
𝐴𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑓𝑜́𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 𝑒 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑎𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒. 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐶𝐼𝐴 𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐̧𝑜 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠ℎ𝑘𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑚-𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝐴𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑎, 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝟷𝟺 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑟𝑜, 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑥𝑜𝑢 𝐾𝑖𝑒𝑣 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎, 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝐽𝑜𝑒 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑚 𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎. 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑙𝑒, 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠, 𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑠. 𝑍𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑎̃ 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑜 𝐴𝑓𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑠𝑒𝑚 𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑙.
𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑜, 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐾𝑢𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑡𝑒́ 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜. 𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑓𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜-𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐̧𝑎𝑠 𝐴𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑦, 𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑜 𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑏 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜, 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟-𝑠𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑧 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜, 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜̃𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜.
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝐾𝑖𝑒𝑣 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝐸𝑥𝑒́𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎. 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑙𝑒, “𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑎 𝑒́ 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑎 “. 𝐴𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙, 𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑖́𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑒 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑗𝑎́ 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖́𝑑𝑎. 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑧𝑒𝑠 𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚-𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑦, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑠 𝑆𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑈𝑅 𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑦 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑒 𝐽𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑠, 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜.
𝑆𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎, 𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝐾𝑖𝑒𝑣, 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑜. 𝑂 𝐶𝐸𝑀𝐺𝐹𝐴 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑍𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑧ℎ𝑛𝑦𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 “𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐̧𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑢 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜”. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑅𝑢́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠, 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑢𝑡𝑜́𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑧 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑍𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑦 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑛𝑎 𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝐺𝟸𝟶, 𝑎 𝟷𝟻 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑟𝑜, 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑧 𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠, 𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑎 𝑎 𝑠𝑎𝑖́𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑎̀ 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠. 𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑜 𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒-𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑓𝑒𝑧 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠.
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐̧𝑜𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑠 𝑒 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑎̀ 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑟 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜, 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑚-𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑔𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑎́ 𝑔𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎, 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑟-𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑢𝑗𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑎́ 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑜́ 𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑎, 𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟, 𝑛𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑎̀ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑎 𝑎̀ 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂. 𝑆𝑜́ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑧.
* Major-general e Investigador do IPRI-NOVA
IN "O JORNAL ECONÓMICO" - 25/11/22 .
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3̷0̷ A̷N̷O̷S̷, 3̷0̷ H̷I̷S̷T̷Ó̷R̷I̷A̷S̷
5- Pεƨcαɔσяεƨ ɔε Pεпıcнε εяαм ραɢσƨ ρεʟα
CEE ραяα ɔεıтαя ρεıхε ασ мαя εм 1992
* Que país éramos há 30 anos? E que país construímos desde então? Conheça as 30 histórias que foram notícia no primeiro ano de emissão da SIC e o que aconteceu aos seus protagonistas nas três décadas seguintes. Uma viagem no tempo com os dados da PORDATA. O quinto episódio desta série «30 anos, 30 histórias» é dedicado aos pescadores de Peniche.
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