CARLOS BRANCO

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Uma semana de guerra

no Irão

Com o ataque ao Irão, Trump envolveu-se simultaneamente em duas crises estratégicas. No início do século XXI, Washington evidenciou uma enorme dificuldade em lidar ao mesmo tempo com o Afeganistão e o Iraque. Os resultados dessas decisões são conhecidos.

𝖠𝗉𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖻𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝖻𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗌𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺, 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌ı́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗃𝖺́, 𝖼𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌.

𝖯𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈, 𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗂𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂 𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾, 𝗈𝗎 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺, 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝖾𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗏𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 — 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖺, 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖺, 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 — 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾, 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺. 𝖠𝗉𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖫ı́𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖲𝗎𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝖺𝗍𝗈𝗅𝖺 𝖠𝗅𝗂 𝖪𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗂 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌, 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗎 𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗎. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗈𝖽𝗂𝗎, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖶𝖺𝗌𝗁𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗍𝗈𝗇. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗆 𝖿𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗀𝗋𝗎𝗉𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝖾𝗌𝗈, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌, 𝗇𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗉𝗅𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗌, 𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝗎𝖽𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗅𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́. 𝖮𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖭𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗒𝖺𝗁𝗎 𝖾 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖺𝗂𝗋 𝖺̀𝗌 𝗋𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗎𝖻𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆. 𝖮 𝗉𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗋𝗎𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝖾 𝗀𝗋𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 “𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺̀𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌! 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈! 𝖦𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌!”.

𝖮 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖫ı́𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖲𝗎𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈, 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈 𝖱𝖺𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈. 𝖠𝗅𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗆𝖺́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖪𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗂 𝖾𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗅ı́𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝗂𝗀𝗂𝗈𝗌𝗈 𝖼𝗎𝗃𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗌𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗋𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗑𝗂𝗂𝗍𝖺. 𝖶𝖺𝗌𝗁𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗍𝗈𝗇 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗎, 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝖽𝖺, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗈́ 𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝖺 “𝖴𝗆𝗆𝖺𝗁” 𝗑𝗂𝗂𝗍𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝗇𝗂𝗍𝖺. 𝖤𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝖿ı́𝖼𝗂𝗅 𝖿𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝗂𝗈𝗋. 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺. 𝖯𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗅𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗅𝗁𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖭𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖲𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖲𝖾𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖺, 𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖭𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖲𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋, 𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝖻𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖾́ 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗈. 𝖴𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖺𝗌𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗈 𝖥𝖡𝖨 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗎 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆 𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖾̂ 𝖽𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈.

𝖠 𝖺𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗀𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖣𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅𝖽 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉 – 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 – 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖾-𝗅𝗁𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗏𝖺𝗂 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗁𝖾𝗋 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌: “𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗌 [𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗂𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌] 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗆 𝗇𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗎𝖾́𝗆 𝗅𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗇𝗈́𝗌”, “𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈. 𝖮 𝖿𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖪𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗂 𝖾́ 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗈 𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖾. 𝖮 𝖿𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖪𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗂 𝖾́ 𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝗂𝗆,” “𝖾𝗎 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝖣𝖾𝗅𝖼𝗒 𝗇𝖺 𝖵𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗓𝗎𝖾𝗅𝖺”, “𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗋, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈́𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝖾𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾́ 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝖾́𝗆 𝗋𝖺𝗓𝗈𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌.” 𝖭𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉, 𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖯𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖾𝗎 𝖾𝗑𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖪𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗂 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗅𝗁𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗋.

𝖲𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈, 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝗈𝗎-𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖲𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗌, 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗓𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖮𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 “𝖥𝗎́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖤́𝗉𝗂𝖼𝖺” 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝗎𝗅𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖺𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝗌𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝖻𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝗈́ 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖺 𝖼𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗓𝗈. 𝖲𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉, 𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝖻𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖺-𝗌𝖾, 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝖺̀ 𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝖾𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈, “𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝖽𝖺”. 𝖮 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗉𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺𝗌 ‘𝖬𝗂𝖽𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖼𝗍𝗂𝗈𝗇𝗌’, 𝖾𝗆 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗎𝖻𝗋𝗈, 𝗇𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌, 𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈.

𝖮𝗌 𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎ı́𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖺. 𝖮 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝗈 𝗎𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗅-𝗀𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅, 𝖾 𝗈 𝖣𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖣𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝗌 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝟣𝟢𝟢 𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗌. 𝖲𝗎𝗋𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗈 “𝖧𝖺𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗓” 𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗓𝖾𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 “𝖨𝗌𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗅 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗋𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈.”

𝖳𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖺 𝖠𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉 𝗅𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝗈𝗎-𝗌𝖾 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺. 𝖲𝖾 𝗇𝖺 𝖯𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝖦𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾 (𝟣𝟫𝟫𝟢), 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝟣𝟫𝟢𝟢 𝖺𝖾𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗌, 𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺-𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌; 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝟥𝟢𝟢 𝖺𝖾𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝟤 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺-𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌. 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗍 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝖺𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺-𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾̂𝗌 𝖢𝗁𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖾𝗌 𝖣𝖾 𝖦𝖺𝗎𝗅𝗅𝖾, 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗅𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝖬𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝖾𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺-𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖦𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅𝖽 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖽, 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗅𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝖬𝖺𝗋 𝖠𝗋𝖺́𝖻𝗂𝖼𝗈. 𝖤𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗇𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺-𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗍𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖯𝗋ı́𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖦𝖺𝗅𝖾𝗌.

𝖠 𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈, 𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗋 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗀𝗂𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖺 𝟣𝟤 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖠 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖤𝗆 𝟤𝟢𝟢𝟥, 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺 𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝟣𝟩𝟢.𝟢𝟢𝟢 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌.

𝖯𝗈𝗋 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝗅𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗇𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖠𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗅𝖾𝗌. 𝖲𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗇𝗌 𝗍𝗂𝗉𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗈́ 𝗈𝖿𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗎𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖺𝖾́𝗋𝖾𝖺. 𝖮 𝖯𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺́𝗀𝗈𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖺𝗎𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 “𝗅𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗋” 𝟧𝟢 𝗆𝗂𝗅 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗈́𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝖺 𝖿𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗋 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖺̃𝗈𝗌. 𝖠 𝖠𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗉𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗎 𝖺̀𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝖺𝗉𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈.

𝖰𝗎𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗎-𝗌𝖾 𝗌𝗂𝗆𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝗇𝖾𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌. 𝖭𝗈 𝗂𝗇ı́𝖼𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾́𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗈 𝖷𝖷𝖨, 𝖶𝖺𝗌𝗁𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗍𝗈𝗇 𝖾𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗎 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖠𝖿𝖾𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 (𝟤𝟢𝟢𝟣) 𝖾 𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾 (𝟤𝟢𝟢𝟥). 𝖮𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌. 𝖠 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝗏𝖺𝗂 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝖿𝗂𝗆 𝖺̀ 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺, 𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖯𝗈𝖽ı́𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗑𝖺 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝖢𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖻𝖾 — 𝖵𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗓𝗎𝖾𝗅𝖺, 𝖢𝗎𝖻𝖺 𝖾 𝖬𝖾́𝗑𝗂𝖼𝗈 — 𝖾 𝗇𝖺 𝖭𝗂𝗀𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺, 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇. 𝖳𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗉 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾 𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖾́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝗎́𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖺 𝖾 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗂𝖺𝗇𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖶𝖺𝗌𝗁𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗍𝗈𝗇 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈. 𝖭𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗆𝖺, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖿𝖺𝗏𝗈𝗋𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖺 𝖶𝖺𝗌𝗁𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗍𝗈𝗇 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝖿𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝗎𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖾𝗆𝗈́𝗇𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌.

𝖰𝗎𝗂𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝖬𝖾́𝖽𝗂𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈 𝖦𝗈𝗅𝖿𝗈 𝖯𝖾́𝗋𝗌𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗌𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝖿𝖾𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗇𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈𝗌, 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝖿ı́𝖼𝗂𝗅. 𝖮𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 (𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗈𝗌, 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈́𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍ı́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝖾𝗍𝖼.). 𝖮𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝗈 𝖦𝗈𝗅𝖿𝗈 𝖯𝖾́𝗋𝗌𝗂𝖼𝗈. 𝖭𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖾́𝖽𝗂𝗍𝖺, 𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗈𝗎 𝗇𝖺 𝗈𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖮𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 “𝖤𝗉𝗂𝖼 𝖥𝗎𝗋𝗒”. 𝖯𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗓 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖺𝗈 𝗍𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖳𝖧𝖠𝖠𝖣 (𝖠𝖭/𝖥𝖯𝖲-𝟣𝟥𝟤 𝖡𝗅𝗈𝖼𝗄 𝟧, 𝖠𝖭/𝖳𝖯𝖸-𝟤, 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾), 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝗈𝗋. 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖦𝗈𝗅𝖿𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗆-𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗇𝗈 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝖺𝖼𝗎𝗌𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗁𝗈𝗇𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖺 𝖨𝗌𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗅.

𝖯𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈𝗌, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗋 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗈𝖽𝗂𝗋 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾, 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝖯𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 “𝖡”. 𝖠𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗎-𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗅𝗈 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 “𝖿𝗈́𝗋𝗆𝗎𝗅𝖺 𝖦𝖺𝗓𝖺”, 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗓𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗂𝗌, 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈́𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍ı́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖾𝗍𝖼. 𝖬𝖺𝗌 𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖾𝖽𝖺. 𝖤𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺, 𝖯𝖾𝗍𝖾 𝖧𝖾𝗀𝗌𝖾𝗍𝗁 𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗈 𝖾𝗅𝗎𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗋-𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖺𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗌. 𝖯𝗈𝗋 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗏𝗋𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗈 𝖣𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖦𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺. 𝖠 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗏𝖺𝗂 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝖾𝗋 𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈.

𝖤𝗆 𝟩 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝖼̧𝗈, 𝖨𝗌𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗅 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝖼𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝟥𝟢 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈́𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍ı́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗂𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝖾𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗅𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗌𝗍𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎ı́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖺𝗍𝗆𝗈𝗌𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖺, 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝗁𝗎𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖺́𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗆𝖻𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖮 𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗋𝗈́𝗅𝖾𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖺𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗎-𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝖾𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗈𝗎 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖿ı́𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗌. 𝖲𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝖺𝗎𝗌𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗂𝖺𝗇𝖺 𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗎𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖳𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗏𝖾, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖨𝗌𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗋 𝖺̀ 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝗇𝗎𝖼𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗋.

𝖱𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗂 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗋𝖺𝗉𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝖨𝗋𝖺̃𝗈.

* Major-general
IN "O JORNAL ECONÓMICO"- 10/03/26