FERNANDA CÂNCIO

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SE É MULHER OBRIGATÓRIO LER

SE É HOMEM TAMBÉM DEVE LER

SE O GÉNERO É OUTRO IMPERDÍVEL LER

MAIS QUE OBRIGATÓRIO DIVULGAR

Do aborto e da liberdade

Na proclamada terra dos livres, o Supremo votou um acórdão que recusa debater se a decisão de abortar tem alguma coisa a ver com liberdade, não referindo sequer os direitos das mulheres. Há até juízes que defendem que a Constituição americana não dá garantias sobre liberdade. Só a de andar armado, pelos vistos.

𝑁𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟽 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝘩𝑜, 𝑃𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑎 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜. 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝘩𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑢 𝑛𝑎 𝑗𝑢𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑒𝑠 (𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝘩𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑜), 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒 - 𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚 - 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑟, 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚, 𝑛𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎̃𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑏𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑛𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑎, 𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐̧𝑎. 𝐴 𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑧: "𝐸́ 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒".

𝐴 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜, 𝑜𝑢 𝑚𝑒𝑙𝘩𝑜𝑟, 𝑎 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑧 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑟𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑙𝘩𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜, 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑐𝑜 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑢́𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑜. 𝑂𝑠 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑠 "𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜 𝑒́ 𝑚𝑒𝑢", "𝐴 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎 𝑒́ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝘩𝑎" (𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑚 "𝐸𝑢 𝑠𝑜𝑢 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝘩𝑎"), 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 "𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑠" 𝑒 "𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠".

𝑂 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑧 𝑒𝑚 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑙 (𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑢 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠, 𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜, 𝑎 𝟸𝟾 𝑑𝑒 𝑗𝑢𝑛𝘩𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟷𝟿𝟿𝟾, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 "𝑁𝑎̃𝑜" 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑎𝑛𝘩𝑜𝑢) 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎 𝑠𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑜𝑢 𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑜́ 𝑑𝑖𝑧 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎, 𝑎𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑖́𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖́𝑑𝑢𝑜; 𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑒́ 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑎 𝑚𝑎́, 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑎. 𝑂 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑠 𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑎𝑢́𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑢́𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎: 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑣𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑜 𝑎𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑟/𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟, 𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑜.

𝑀𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝘩𝑜𝑢𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑧𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑎 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑜, 𝑎 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜-𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜-𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑒, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟 - 𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟 𝑠𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟, 𝑜𝑢 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑜́ 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑎𝑡𝑒́ 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑜: 𝑑𝑜𝑟, 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑜, 𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑟, 𝑜𝑢 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝘩𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎, 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑖 𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜-𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚, 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑟 𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑧 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜, 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝘩𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜, 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑜𝑢 𝑠𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑜 "𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑟".

𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖 𝑒𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑎 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑙𝑖 𝑜 𝐴𝑐𝑜́𝑟𝑑𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑎-𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝘩𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑠, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑔𝑎 𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑜𝑒 𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦, 𝑑𝑒 𝟷𝟿𝟽𝟹 𝑒 𝟷𝟿𝟿𝟸. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑒, 𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑏𝑟𝑎𝘩𝑎𝑚 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑛 - "𝑆𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑜 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑎" - 𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠.

"𝑂𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑅𝑜𝑒 𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦 𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑒́ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑜", 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑜 𝐴𝑐𝑜́𝑟𝑑𝑎̃𝑜. "𝑅𝑜𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑢-𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑢-𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟 "𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑙𝘩𝑎𝑠 𝑖́𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑎𝑖𝑠" 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 "𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑎𝑖𝑠"." 𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑟 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝟷𝟺ª 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑛𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎 "𝐶𝑙𝑎́𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒", 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑠 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟷𝟿𝟿𝟸: "𝑁𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑟 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎, 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜, 𝑑𝑜 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜 𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝘩𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎".

𝑀𝑎𝑠, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒, 𝑛𝑜 𝐴𝑐𝑜́𝑟𝑑𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑎̀ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒 𝑎̀ 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑑𝑒𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑜 𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 "𝑛𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝟷𝟺ª 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑡𝑟𝑒̂𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝘩𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑧 𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒̂-𝑙𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒." 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑖 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑠, 𝑎 𝟷𝟺ª 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎, 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑜́𝑠 𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑚 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 (𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝟷𝟾𝟼𝟻) 𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎̃𝑜𝑠, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑢 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑜 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝘩𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒; 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑛𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 "𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑑𝑜" 𝑛𝑎 "𝘩𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜" 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑎 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑎 𝘩𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑠, 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙), 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝘩𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑜.

𝐽𝑎́ 𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑎, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜 - 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑔𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑒́𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑢 𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑛𝘩𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑗𝑢𝑖𝑧 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑜, 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎 "𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎̃𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎" (𝑜𝑢 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎, 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑜 𝐴𝑐𝑜́𝑟𝑑𝑎̃𝑜 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑗𝑢𝑖́𝑧𝑒𝑠) - 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑙𝘩𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑜𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑓𝑢́𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑎, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑎 𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎. 𝑁𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒́𝑐𝑖𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎, "𝑎̀ 𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎", 𝑑𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜. 𝑄𝑢𝑒, 𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 - 𝑠𝑒 𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑢 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 -, 𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎 𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑎 "𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜" 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑐𝘩𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝐻𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑛, 𝑢𝑚 𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑜 (𝑛𝑎 𝑒́𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑎 𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑎 𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝘩𝑜𝑗𝑒 𝑜 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑠) 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒́𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑋𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖́𝑑𝑖𝑜.

𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒 "𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑠, 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒́ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎̀ 𝑑𝑜 𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑚", 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝐴𝑐𝑜́𝑟𝑑𝑎̃𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎. 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑠 𝑠𝑒 𝘩𝑎́ 𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑜́𝑟𝑑𝑎̃𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑧 𝑒́ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠, 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑖́𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒́𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑋𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼. 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑎 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑎 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑜́𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑇𝘩𝑒 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑑"𝑠 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑛𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑚 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑧𝑎 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑚𝑎́𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑢 𝑛𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝐴𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐, 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜, 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑛𝘩𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑜, 𝑒 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 - 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑎 𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑒́𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑎.

𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑠, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑑, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑎𝑛𝘩𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑟, 𝑒𝑚 𝟷𝟿𝟸𝟶, 𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒́𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙, 𝘩𝑜𝑢𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 "𝑖𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎" 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙. 𝐸 𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑖: 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜 𝑗𝑢𝑖́𝑧𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑜, 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 - 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑜́ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝟻𝟹 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑅𝑜𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑖-𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ "𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑎 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜".

𝐷𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑐𝑖́𝑛𝑖𝑜, 𝑜𝑢 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎-𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠: 𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑒̂𝑚 "𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜", 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝘩𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝘩𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠?

𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐̧𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑜, 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑚 𝑛𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑎. 𝐸𝑚 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑜̃𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑒́𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜 𝑋𝑋𝐼, 𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝘩𝑎𝑚 𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 (𝟷𝟶 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟 𝑒 𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑚) 𝑎𝑡𝑒́ 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑒́𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜, 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑒́ 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟹. 𝐴𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜, 𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑠. 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑠, 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙, 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑅𝑜𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜: 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒. 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑠 𝑜 𝑗𝑢𝑖𝑧 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑠, 𝑛𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑜 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒) 𝑒𝑚 𝐷𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑠, 𝑗𝑎́ 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑢 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒, "𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜" 𝑅𝑜𝑒 𝑣𝑠. 𝑊𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑟, 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝟷𝟿𝟿𝟷 𝑛𝑜 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜, 𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑢 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑚𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝘩 𝑝𝑎𝑖, 𝑇𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝘩𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟹 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑜, 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑎 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒 𝑎̀ 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒.

𝑃𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟-𝑠𝑒-𝑎́ 𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 - 𝑒́ 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝐴𝑐𝑜́𝑟𝑑𝑎̃𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑧 𝑒 𝑇𝘩𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒 - 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑜𝑒 𝑣𝑠. 𝑊𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑎𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑜 (𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟻) 𝑒 𝑎̀ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑢́𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 (𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛, 𝟷𝟿𝟻𝟺), 𝑜 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ "𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑠" 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟, 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠, 𝑜𝑢 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠.

𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑜 𝑛𝑢́𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖́𝑑𝑢𝑜, 𝑎̀ 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑖́𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑠, 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑢 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 (𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑎́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑢 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎), 𝑜 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑠𝑜́ 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝘩𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑒 𝑎 𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝘩𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑟 𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 - 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜, 𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠, 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑎́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑟, 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑎, 𝑎 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑖𝑠 - 𝑎̀ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒-𝑠𝑒, 𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑜 (𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎 𝑙𝑒𝑖 𝑑𝑜 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑣𝑎 𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑎 𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑢́𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑜).

𝐸𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎 𝑠𝑒 𝑜 𝟼 𝑑𝑒 𝑗𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟷 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑜𝑢 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑟 𝑎 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑎, 𝑜 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢 𝑑𝑒 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟.

* Jornalista

IN "DIÁRIO DE NOTÍCIAS" - 29/06/22 . .