JAMES MEADWAY

 .

Sim, a bolha da dívida

 chinesa pode estoirar

Mas temos problemas maiores

O colapso da chinesa Evergrande é parte de um problema bem maior, depois de uma década em que os empréstimos não pararam de aumentar. A economia chinesa cresceu à custa de dívidas astronómicas que se foram acumulando.

𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒, 𝑎 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎̀ 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑎. 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑎, 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑠. 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠, 𝑑𝑒 𝟻𝟸 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑢𝑥𝑜 𝐹𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐶𝑜. 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑢 𝑒𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒́𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟻 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎.

𝑀𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑡𝑒̂𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢́𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟾. 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝐿𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠, 𝑛𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐴𝑚𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑎 𝟷𝟻 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟾, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑢 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑠, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜.

𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑧ℎ𝑒𝑛, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑟, 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑠.

𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑗𝑎́ 𝑡𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 - 𝑎𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟹 𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟻, 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜 -, 𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑢𝑚 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝐽𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒.

𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚, 𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟, 𝑎𝑝𝑜́𝑠 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑒́𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒́𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑚, 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑎̀ 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎. 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑟-𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑒́ 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎.

𝑂 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑢́𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝟺𝟶 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑎 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑙, 𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑎 𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑝𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜-𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖́𝑛𝑖𝑜 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙.

𝑁𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐̧𝑜 𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜. 𝐶𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎́𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑠, 𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖́𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑙𝑒́𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑎̃𝑜 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜́𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑢 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒. 𝐴 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑢 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑐̧𝑜𝑢 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑧𝑖𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎.

𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢. 𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝟺𝟶𝟶 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑎𝑠 𝑔𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜 𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑙 (𝟷 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑎), 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑡𝑒̂𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑜𝑠, 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙. 𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜, 𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑢 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚 𝑛𝑢́𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠. 𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑎́𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎, 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑎 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠.

𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟾, 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐴𝑚𝑒́𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑜𝑢 𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑜 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑠. 𝑂 𝑟𝑎́𝑐𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑃𝐼𝐵, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝟸𝟽𝟶 %.

𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜, 𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎-𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑜 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟾. 𝐴 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒́𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝟻𝟸 % 𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙, 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑜 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜 (𝟷𝟻𝟶 %!) 𝑜𝑢 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑒́ 𝑢𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠. 𝐴𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖́𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜-𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟾, 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑒́ 𝑒𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑝𝑢́𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐̧𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑠 𝑙𝑖́𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑝𝑜́𝑠 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎.

𝑈𝑚𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜-𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑜

𝐴̀ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑢 𝑎𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟿 𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜𝑢 𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑢𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎, 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑢𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑎 𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑝𝑢́𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑜 𝑒 - 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑜 - 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑧𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑠.

𝐴 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑜, 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑚: 𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑢-𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒́𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜, 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝟿 % 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑜. 𝑃𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜, 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐̧𝑜𝑠.

𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑒́𝑚, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐̧𝑜. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜, 𝑜 𝑐𝑙𝑎́𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜. 𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑎𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢́𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑜 𝑎𝑐̧𝑜 - 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝟷𝟸 𝑣𝑒𝑧𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟻 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑒́ 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟼 -, 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑐̧𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑚 𝑜 𝑙𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑧𝑖𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑟. 𝑃𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧, 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑜𝑢 𝑜 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑐̧𝑜 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑢́𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟, 𝑛𝑎 𝐼𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎.

𝐸𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑙𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟, 𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑧 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒, ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑣𝑒 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑠. 𝐴 𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒́𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠.

𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒́𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑜𝑢 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒́𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑛𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑜́𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠.

𝑃𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜, 𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑜 - 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑠 - 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟻 % 𝑑𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎, 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟷, 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖́𝑎 𝑜 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑅𝑜𝑚𝑎 𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑠. 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑢 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜. 𝑈𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎 𝑒́ 𝑢𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑢 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑚-𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚, 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑚 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜, 𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑒́ 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 - 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐̧𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑜́𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑜 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐̧𝑜𝑠.

𝑂 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑒́ 𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑎𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖́𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎, 𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑡𝑒̂𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑠. 𝐸́ 𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝟻𝟺 𝑚𝑖𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑜 - 𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟻 𝑚𝑖𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑜. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚, 𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑧𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎.

𝑂 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝟹𝟶𝟶 𝑚𝑖𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑜 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝟸 % 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎. 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎-𝑠𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝟷 % 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜 𝑛𝑜 "𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑟𝑎" 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠, 𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜, 𝑛𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝟷𝟹 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠.

𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚, 𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑜́ 𝑒́ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝟺 % 𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎, 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧 𝑞𝑢𝑒 - 𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑧 - 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑢𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑙, 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜-𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟.

𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑎 𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒́𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠, 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑜 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜́𝑐𝑖𝑜 - 𝑜𝑢, 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎, 𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎̂𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑒 - 𝑛𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑎 𝑢́𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑒́𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎.

𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑎, 

𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑠

𝑀𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙, 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒́ 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑠 𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠. 𝐶𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒́𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠, 𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑚 𝑒𝑚 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑎̀ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑚.

𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑜 𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎, 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑐̧𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠. 𝐴 𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝐽𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑙𝑖́𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟸 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑎̀ "𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜" 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 - 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠, 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎 𝑛𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑟𝑒.

𝑁𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑑𝑎 𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑎 𝑛𝑜 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟹, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑐̧𝑜𝑢 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎, 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑜 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎. 𝐸𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎, 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑢 𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎̃𝑜, 𝑑𝑒𝑢 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑟𝑒.

𝑆𝑜𝑏 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝐽𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑢 𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑎 𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎 (𝑐𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 "𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑎 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜") 𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑢 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟 𝑛𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 (𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜) 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑛𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑒́𝑑𝑖𝑎 (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 "𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑚").

𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑖𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑋𝑖 𝐽𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑢-𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑠, 𝑒 𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚, 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜́𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑎̀ 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠. 𝐶𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑜 𝑚𝑎́𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑜, 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜, 𝑎𝑝𝑜́𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝐿𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟾, 𝑜𝑠 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚-𝑠𝑒 𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠.

𝐴 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑧𝑜, 𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠 𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒. 𝐹𝑜𝑖 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑎, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑖 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑖́𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙, 𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧, 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢 𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑎́𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑎.

𝑁𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖́𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐̧𝑜 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑟, 𝑎̀ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑒 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜, 𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑢́𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒́𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 - 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑚𝑎̃𝑜-𝑑𝑒-𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎 - 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎́ 𝑎 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑟 𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒.

𝐴𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜

𝐸́ 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑟 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜, 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑒́𝑑𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎 𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑎́𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠. 𝑂 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑜 𝑎 𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠, 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖́𝑜𝑑𝑜 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟷-𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟻, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑎 "𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜" 𝑑𝑒 "𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒".

𝑀𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎𝑟-𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑢́𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝟸𝟶 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠. 𝐸𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑒-𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠, 𝑚𝑎𝑠, 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑏𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑎, 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙.

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝐿𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠. 𝑂 𝑝𝑟𝑜́𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝐿𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑜𝑢 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑜𝑢 𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎. 𝑀𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑢𝑚 "𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙" - 𝑜𝑢 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒́ 𝑐𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒𝑚 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑜 "𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑜". 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑒́𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑢́𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑎 (𝑒 𝑎 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠) 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑢́𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑠.

𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑚-𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑀), 𝑛𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝟹,𝟼𝟻 𝑚𝑖𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑜́𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝐸𝑈𝐴 𝑒𝑚 𝟷𝟿𝟿𝟾 𝑒́ 𝑢𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜. 𝐴𝑝𝑜́𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜 𝑟𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑜 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑜, 𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑢́𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑠, 𝑎𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒́𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜 ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑢 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑒́𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒, 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑑𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟶𝟾.

𝑈𝑚 𝑗𝑜𝑔𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜

𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑠, 𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑢́𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑒̂𝑠 𝑑𝑒́𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠, 𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑡𝑒̂𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐̧𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎, 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑎́ 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒, 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜-𝑜𝑠 𝑎 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 - 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜. 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑟𝑎́𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜, 𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑡𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 - 𝑒 𝑒𝑚 𝑣𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑢́𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎 𝑑𝑒́𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑎, 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠.

𝑀𝑎𝑠, 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑜, 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑜 𝑎𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒̂𝑠 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜, 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 - 𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒, 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑧, 𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎 𝑛𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎. 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜, 𝑒́ 𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑐̧𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑒, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎, 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜.

𝐴𝑡𝑒́ 𝑣𝑒𝑟, 𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎-𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑎, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑚 𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑒. 𝑁𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑎́𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎, 𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑢-𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑒 𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑎̀ 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎-𝑠𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝟷,𝟼 𝑚𝑖𝑙ℎ𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑎̀ 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖́𝑑𝑎𝑠, 𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑎̃𝑜 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑒.

𝑀𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑒́𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑥𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚 𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒́𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑎̀ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑚, 𝑠𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎́𝑟𝑖𝑜. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜, 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎̃𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑠. 𝑂𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎̂𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝐴𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑎 𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑠 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑜-𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑈𝐵𝑆 𝑒 𝐻𝑆𝐵𝐶.

𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑐𝑜𝑠, 𝑛𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑜𝑢 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎, 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑙𝑎́𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑠 - 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑚 𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑢 ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜́𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑐𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑟? -, 𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑎̃𝑜 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑠. 𝑀𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑜 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑣𝑖́𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑐̧𝑜̃𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎.

𝐸́ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 - 𝑚𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑎̃𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 - 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑗𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑔𝑒́𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝐿𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑟 𝑑𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎 𝑑𝑎 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒. 𝑀𝑎𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑐̧𝑎̃𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐̧𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑠 𝑒𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎, 𝑒 𝑜𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑒 𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑎 - 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑧 𝑑𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐̧𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜 𝑔𝑎́𝑠 -, 𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚-𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟, 𝑒́ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑗𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑒̂𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑠.

𝐸 𝑐𝑜𝑚 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑖́𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖́𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑜 𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑖́𝑠, 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑖́𝑠𝑐𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑢𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒̂𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑜. 𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖-𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒̂𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑠 𝑠𝑜́ 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟 𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜.

𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒, 𝑜 𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑑𝑎 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑢𝑚𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑧𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑒́𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑚 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜 𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑟. 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑠, 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 𝑠𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑎 𝑒𝑚 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜, 𝑒́ 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒 𝑎 𝑟𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑧𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑎̃𝑜𝑠 𝑑𝑎 𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑎 𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑎𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑠 𝑎𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑎̃𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑠.

* Director do think-tank Progressive Economy Forum em Londres. Foi o principal consultor económico do governo sombra de Jeremy Corbyn e economista-chefe da fundação britânica New Economics Foundation.

Artigo originalmente publicado no britânico Novara Media

IN "SETENTA E QUATRO" - 22/10/21

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