ÓSCAR AFONSO

 .

O estreito corredor da

governação: do ‘guião’ de Marcelo

à ‘dança do tango’ a três

Diz-se que a política é a arte do possível, pelo que me proponho aplicar esta máxima na análise das reais condições atuais para uma governação estável e bem-sucedida, tendo em conta o discurso do Presidente da República na tomada de posse do novo governo liderado pelo Primeiro-ministro Luís Montenegro, que comanda a coligação vencedora das eleições (AD-Aliança Democrática). O sucesso do País depende de uma governação reformista, mas para tal precisamos de estabilidade de políticas, que é dificultada pelo quadro parlamentar fragmentado.

𝖮𝗌 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺, 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝖺́𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 – 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝗎𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗈 –, 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝖾 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺, 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗓, 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗂𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌.

𝖠 𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖾 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗁𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗈 𝗆𝖺́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌. 𝖤𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗂́𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝗈 ‘𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖺̃𝗈’ 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺 – 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺̀ 𝖿𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 – 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗎𝗆𝖺 “𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗑𝗂𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺̀𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌”. 𝖵𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗂 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖽𝗈.

𝖤𝗑𝗂𝗀𝖾-𝗌𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖺 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗃𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝗃𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝗉𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗍𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 ‘𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺-𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗉𝖺𝗌’, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗈 𝗉𝖾́𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺.

𝖠 𝖺𝗇𝖺́𝗅𝗂𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝗋𝖾̂𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌.

𝟣. 𝖮 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈

𝖯𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝖻𝖾𝗋 𝗆𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗋 𝖺 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖼̧𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗅𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗌𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖺, 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 (𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝖻𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈).

(𝗂) 𝖮𝗌 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗂𝖿𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆-𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗌𝖿𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗎́𝗅𝗍𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 – 𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗈 𝖡𝖤 𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝖣𝖴, 𝗇𝗈 𝖺̂𝗆𝖻𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 ‘𝗀𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗈𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺’ –, 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺, 𝖾𝗇𝖼𝖺𝖻𝖾𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈-𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖠𝖣 (𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖲𝖣 𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝖣𝖲 𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖯𝖬, 𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗂𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗀𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅).

(𝗂𝗂) 𝖮𝗌 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗌𝖿𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖻𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗎 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝟧𝟢 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝖾 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋.

𝖣𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈, 𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺, 𝗈 𝖯𝖲𝖣 𝖾 𝗈 𝖯𝖲, 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗆 𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗇𝗎𝗇𝖼𝖺 𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗆𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗎 𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈. 𝖱𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗌𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗈𝗎 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅, 𝖾́ 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖾𝗆 𝗃𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗑𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾.

𝖮 𝗁𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖡𝖤 𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝖣𝖴, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈, 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝗍𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌, 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗏𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋. 𝖥𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗈, 𝖺 ‘𝗀𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗈𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺’ 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝖽𝖾 𝖠𝗇𝗍𝗈́𝗇𝗂𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝖻𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝗍𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗉𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 ‘𝖼𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖻𝗈’ 𝖽𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟤. 𝖮𝗎 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺, 𝖡𝖤 𝖾 𝖢𝖣𝖴 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 ‘𝖾𝗌𝗏𝖺𝗓𝗂𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌’ 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗈 𝖼𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖻𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗃𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗍𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 ‘𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺-𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗉𝖺𝗌’ 𝖽𝗈 𝗁𝖺́𝖻𝗂𝗅 𝖠𝗇𝗍𝗈́𝗇𝗂𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖻𝖾𝗆 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗂𝖺̃𝗈.

𝖠𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗆, 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝗂𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗈. 𝖯𝗈𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝗅𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈, 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗎𝗆𝗂𝗋 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 – 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗁𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖠𝗇𝖽𝗋𝖾́ 𝖵𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺, 𝗈 𝗅𝗂́𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 – 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗋 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗆𝖺́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅. 𝖢𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗋𝖺́, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈, 𝗈 𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖻𝗈𝖺 𝖿𝖾́ 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈, 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝗁𝖺𝗃𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖣 – 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖾́ 𝖺 𝗎́𝗇𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗃𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 –, 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖯𝖲. 𝖣𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗌𝖼𝖺𝗅 𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖨𝖱𝖲 𝖾 𝖨𝖱𝖢, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂́𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺. 𝖲𝗈́ 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗌𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖺𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗎𝗓 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗎𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖺𝗂́𝗌 𝖾́ 𝖺 𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈. 𝖲𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈, 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗍𝖺𝗅. 𝖮 𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖺 𝖾́ 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗈 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗎𝗆𝗂𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗏𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌, 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋-𝗅𝗁𝖾 𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝖡𝖤 𝖾 𝖺̀ 𝖢𝖣𝖴. 𝖬𝖺𝗌, 𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾, 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈, 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝗂𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈.

𝖤𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺, 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗋 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅, 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗍𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗎𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌, 𝖽𝖾 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗋 𝗈𝗎 𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗋, 𝗈𝗎 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗁𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈 𝖼𝗎𝗆𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗋, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗎 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗉𝗂𝗌𝗈́𝖽𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗅-𝗌𝗎𝖼𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖠𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖡𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺.

𝖤𝗆𝖻𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝖠𝗇𝖽𝗋𝖾́ 𝖵𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗁𝖺́𝖻𝗂𝗅 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗍𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗓𝗂𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗓𝖺𝗀𝗎𝖾𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗈 𝗌𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗎𝗆𝗉𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌, 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌. 𝖤𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗋𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗌 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖺𝗉𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗂́𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗏𝗂𝗎 𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖡𝖤 𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝖣𝖴.

𝖯𝗈𝗋 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗓, 𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗃𝗎𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝖠𝖣 (𝗇𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗌 ‘𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾’), 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝖾 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈. 𝖠 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗎 𝗏𝖾𝗋, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝖾 𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗃𝗎𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗎́𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖣.

𝖣𝗈 𝗅𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖣, 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗋 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖺 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖻𝗈𝖺-𝖿𝖾́ 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌, 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝖺𝗈 𝗆𝖺́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝗎𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗈. 𝖲𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝖻𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗂𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝗈𝗎, 𝖽𝖾 𝖻𝗈𝖺-𝖿𝖾́, 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈 𝖾 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗎𝖻𝖺𝖽𝗈.

𝖵𝖾𝗃𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗋𝖺, 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖾, 𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝗈 ‘𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖺̃𝗈’ 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗅𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗇𝖺́𝗅𝗂𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋.

(𝖺) 𝖮 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 “𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺 (…), 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖠𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾: 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺, 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺, 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺, 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝗎𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗈𝗎 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌.”

𝖤𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗈, 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 ‘𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺’, 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖯𝖲, 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾́ 𝖺 𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺.

(𝖻) “𝖯𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌, 𝗇𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝗂́𝗇𝗂𝗈𝗌, 𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝖺́𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾. 𝖯𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗈𝗎 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖾́ 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈 𝖿𝗈̂𝗅𝖾𝗀𝗈.”

𝖭𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈, 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝗈 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝗈𝗎 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗌 – 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗈, 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝗂𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝗁𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗓𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗁𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 – 𝗈𝗎 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 (𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾), 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗃𝗎𝗂́𝗓𝗈, 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖨𝖫, 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖣, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋 𝗇𝗎́𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺 𝗎𝗆 ‘𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗒𝖾𝗋’ 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗈 𝖯𝖲.

(𝖼) “𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈, 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗅𝗁𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗎 𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌, 𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗂𝖺𝗌, 𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝗓 𝗆𝖾𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗈”. “𝖠 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈, 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈, 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝗈́ 𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾”. 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗎𝖽𝗂𝗎 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗁𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗃𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂́𝖼𝗂𝗅 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝗂𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗋: “𝖾𝗆 𝖣𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌” (𝖲𝖺𝗅𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖹𝖾𝗇𝗁𝖺); 𝖾 “𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝗌𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾-𝗌𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌, 𝗈𝗎 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗆𝖻𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗂𝗅𝗎𝗌𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌” (𝖥𝗋𝖾𝗂 𝖬𝖺𝗇𝗎𝖾𝗅 𝖡𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗌, 𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖺 𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗋 𝖽𝖾 “𝖮 𝖯𝖺̃𝗈 𝖯𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝖯𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗌”). 𝖣𝖾𝗎 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗌 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗈 𝗇𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 (“𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗋”, 𝖺𝗈 𝗇𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌) 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 (“𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖻𝗈𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖾”).

𝖲𝖾 𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝖻𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗁𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗊𝗎𝗂 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗎𝖼𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 ‘𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝗂𝖼̧𝗈’ (𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝟤 𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝗈) 𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 (𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝟥), 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗂𝗋 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈, 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝖠𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺

𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖾 ‘𝖼𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖻𝗈’ 𝖽𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟧, 𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝖠𝖣 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖾𝗆 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌. 𝖭𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈, 𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟧 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝗎𝗈𝖽𝖾́𝖼𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗌. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝖺𝗅, 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗎 𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗁𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺.

𝖢𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗀𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗅𝗎𝗆𝖻𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝖾𝗆 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈, 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗋 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈, 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗂𝗎 𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗍𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗇𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗂́𝖼𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗈. 𝖤́ 𝖺 𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈.

𝖲𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝗈𝗎 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖻𝗈𝖺-𝖿𝖾́ 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗅𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗉𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗎𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗎 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖾 ‘𝗌𝖺𝗂𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖺’. 𝖢𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝖾𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗓 𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝖺́𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗈, 𝗇𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗎 𝗇𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 – 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗎́𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗈𝗎 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖺𝗓𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 –, 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝗈, 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗁𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌.

𝖤́, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗋 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾́ 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖾 𝖻𝗈𝖺-𝖿𝖾́ 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗓𝖾𝗆 𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾 𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌. 𝖤́ 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌.

𝖣𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈, 𝖺 𝖻𝗈𝖺 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝗈𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗂𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌 “𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌” 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗋 “𝗎𝗆 𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈” 𝖾́ 𝖺𝗉𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗈́ 𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗂𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗌𝗂, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝖺̀𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗈, 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗎 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝖻𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌, 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌.

𝖮𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌, 𝗎𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋.

𝟤. 𝖬𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗈𝗎𝖼𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈

𝖮 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 “𝖾́ 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌. 𝖭𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾́ 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗎𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺, 𝖾́ 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗍𝗈.”

𝖠 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗓𝗈, 𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝗈𝗌 𝗏𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗎𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺́𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗌: 𝖲𝖺𝗎́𝖽𝖾 (“𝖯𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺”); 𝖤𝖽𝗎𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (“𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈”), 𝖧𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (“𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝗂𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝖲𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅, 𝖺𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺̀𝗌 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝖾́𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝗁𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺”); 𝖾𝗑𝖾𝖼𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎𝗌 (“𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖱𝖱 𝖾 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝖼𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗅 𝟤𝟢𝟥𝟢”); 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌 (“𝗅𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝖾𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗈, 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖳𝖠𝖯 𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗏𝗂𝖺”); 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗉𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (“𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖾𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺́𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖤𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺”).

𝖥𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗎 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗈𝗌, 𝗇𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 “𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋” (“𝗎𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺”), 𝗈 “𝖿𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗋𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗏𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺” 𝖾 “𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼̧𝖺”.

𝖭𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗌𝖼𝖺𝗅, 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗎𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺̀ 𝖿𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈.

𝟥. 𝖠𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈

𝖭𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺, 𝖺 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈𝗆𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝗈𝖿𝗋𝖾𝗋, 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦 (𝟢,𝟤% 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖨𝖡 𝗈𝗎 𝟨𝟨𝟦 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗌, 𝖬€) 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈.

𝖠𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖡𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗅 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝟤% (𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖺 𝟣,𝟧% 𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖮𝖤 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦), 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾, 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖿𝗂𝗌𝖼𝖺𝗅, 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋 𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝗈𝗍𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝖽𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝖺 – 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖿𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝖺 𝖠𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 –, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖺𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗅𝗂́𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅.

𝖯𝗈𝗋 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝗅𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖺𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗓, ‘𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝖿𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗁𝖾𝗂𝗈𝗌’. 𝖭𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝖺̀ 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 ‘𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝖾𝗂𝗈𝗌’ 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺̀ 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟥 𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝟣𝟦 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝗇𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈́𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗎𝗂́𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝟧,𝟩% 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟤 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝟦,𝟥% 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖨𝖡 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟥, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾́ 𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟢𝟫 – 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝖺́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟣𝟨,𝟣% 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖨𝖡 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈́𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟦, 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗎𝗍𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝗌𝖺𝗂́𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖠𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖤𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝖥𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖳𝗋𝗈𝗂𝗄𝖺; 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝖽𝗈.

𝖮 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟥 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗌𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗌𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖾𝗆 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂́𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖬𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖬𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗆𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 (𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗌 ‘𝗏𝗈𝗈𝗌’ 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌’) 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝖺́𝖼𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂́𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟣𝟢𝟢%, 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗍𝖺 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗄𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖺𝗅, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗎𝗅𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗁𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎 𝗌𝗈́ 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗌𝗊𝗎𝗂𝖺 (𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈, 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗉𝗋𝖾, 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖺́𝖼𝗂𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋, 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟪𝟢%). 𝖲𝖾 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖲𝖣 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗆 𝟣𝟤𝟢𝟢 𝖬€ 𝖾𝗆 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟥, 𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗈𝗎𝖼𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋, 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗈 𝗋𝖺́𝖼𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗂́𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗂́𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅, 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖺, 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖺̀𝗌 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖺𝗑𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗃𝗎𝗋𝗈.

𝖮 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗂𝗌.

𝖮𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝖾𝖼𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦 𝖽𝖺 𝖣𝖦𝖮 (𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺) 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗆, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗃𝖺́, 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗈 (𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝟩𝟪𝟧 𝖬€, 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝟤𝟥𝟦𝟣 𝖬€ 𝗇𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗂́𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟥), 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅.

𝖮 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗌 ‘𝖿𝗈𝗅𝗀𝖺𝗌’ 𝖽𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟦 𝗁𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖽𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝖬𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 (𝟧𝟢𝟢 𝖬€) 𝖾 𝖺 “𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖽𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖢𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗅” (𝟦𝟩𝟦,𝟨 𝖬€). 𝖲𝗈́ 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝗎𝖻𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗅𝗀𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝟣𝟢𝟢𝟢 𝖬€, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖾́ 𝗎𝗆 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝖦𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖺̀𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗀𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌. 𝖱𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖺𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝖣 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌.

𝖮 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾́ 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗋, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗃𝖺́, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 (𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌) 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝖿𝖺𝗌𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝗇𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖺𝗅𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗎 𝖻𝖾𝗇𝖾𝖿𝗂́𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗀𝗋𝗎𝗉𝗈𝗌.

𝖤𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗆𝗈, 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈, 𝗎𝗆 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗍𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖺 𝖠𝖣, 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝖽𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗌𝗂 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖣𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈, 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖯𝖲 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗈 𝗅𝗂́𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗏𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾, 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗎́𝗅𝗍𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌), 𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗎𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖺 𝖾́ 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗌𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈.

𝖠 𝗆𝖾𝗎 𝗏𝖾𝗋, 𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝗋𝖾̂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖾̂𝗆 𝖽𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗈𝗉𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌: 𝗈𝗎 𝗃𝗈𝗀𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗃𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝖽𝗈 ‘𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺-𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗉𝖺𝗌’, 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾 (𝗌𝗈́ 𝖺𝖽𝗂𝖺 𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈, 𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺) 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌, 𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖾́ 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖾𝗆 𝗃𝗈𝗀𝗈.

𝖠𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈, 𝗈 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋, 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝗈 ‘𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖺̃𝗈’ 𝖽𝖾 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗅𝗈, ‘𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝖻𝖾𝗆 𝗈 𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗀𝗈 𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖾̂𝗌’ 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌): 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖺 𝖽𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖺̀ 𝗏𝖾𝗓, 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖺 ‘𝗆𝗎́𝗌𝗂𝖼𝖺’ – 𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾 ‘𝗉𝖺𝗋’ 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗍𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗁𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺 𝗀𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝗎́𝗌𝗂𝖼𝖺 –, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖿𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗓𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗌.

* Diretor da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, Professor Catedrático e sócio fundador do OBEGEF

IN "DINHEIRO VIVO" -06/04/24 .