ÓSCAR AFONSO

 .

       O Relatório Draghi:

Diagnóstico certeiro,

       soluções irrealistas

              e omissões críticas

Começo este artigo por endereçar os sinceros parabéns a Mário Draghi pelo extenso relatório que produziu, encomendado pela Comissão Europeia, onde acerta nas principais falhas de competitividade da União Europeia (UE) e aponta caminhos para a sua resolução, que aqui discuto de forma crítica.

𝖮 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟦𝟢𝟢 𝗉𝖺́𝗀𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗌, 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗆𝗎́𝗅𝗍𝗂𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌, 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖣𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗁𝗂 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝗎𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖡𝖢𝖤, 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗅 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖿𝗈𝗋 ‘𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗏𝖺𝗋’ 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈 – 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝖺𝖻𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖿𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗎𝗍𝗈𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗌𝖿𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗂𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖾́𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺.

𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈, 𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗋 𝗍𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗌𝗍𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈, 𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝖻𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈. 𝖣𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗇𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂́𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝖾 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝗂́𝗇𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗏𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖾́𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂́𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗎𝗆, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 – 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝖽𝗈 – 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝖽𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗂 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝗈.

𝖮 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈̃𝖾 𝗍𝗋𝖾̂𝗌 𝖺́𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈:

(𝗂) 𝖤𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖽𝖾́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝖾 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺, 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗇𝖺̂𝗆𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖻𝖺𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗉𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗇𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺;

(𝗂𝗂) 𝖴𝗆 𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖻𝗈𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼̧𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗀𝗂𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗀𝗂𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗌, 𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗎́𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗇𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗅, 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺;

(𝗂𝗂𝗂) 𝖮 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌, 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌-𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗇𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗋𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗂𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤.

𝖯𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝖺𝗅, 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝖽𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖺𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗆𝗂́𝗇𝗂𝗆𝗈, 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈, “𝖽𝖾 𝟩𝟧𝟢 𝖺 𝟪𝟢𝟢 𝗆𝗂𝗅 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗌”, 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝟦,𝟦% 𝖺 𝟦,𝟩% 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖨𝖡 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖾𝗆 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟥, 𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝟣% 𝖺 𝟤% 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖨𝖡 𝗇𝗈 𝖯𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝗌𝗁𝖺𝗅𝗅, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝖺 𝟤ª 𝖦𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝖦𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗈, 𝗌𝗎𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗎 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈. 𝖮 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝖯𝖨𝖡 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟤% 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝟤𝟩%, 𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗎́𝗅𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾́𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈𝗆𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺𝗌.

𝖮 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈, 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺 𝗆𝗂𝗆, 𝖾́ 𝖽𝗂𝗓𝖾𝗋 ‘𝗈𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗌’ 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖺̃𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎𝗌, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗅𝗂́𝗇𝗂𝗈 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈, 𝖺 ‘𝖻𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖴𝖤’, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗏𝗂𝗋𝗍𝗎𝖽𝖾𝗌 – 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 –, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖿𝗂𝗅𝖺 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 ‘𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗂𝖽𝖺’ 𝗇𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗑𝖺 ‘𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺’ 𝗀𝖾𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗋𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝗀𝗅𝗈𝖻𝖺𝗅, 𝖺𝗋𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾́𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗆 𝗌𝖾 ‘𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝗈𝗎𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝖺’.

𝖮 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖾́ 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂́𝖼𝗂𝗅, 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖣𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗁𝗂 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈̃𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗅𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 – 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 – 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗈. 𝖠𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋, 𝗏𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝖾 𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺:

𝖤𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝗅𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗋, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗇𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗀𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗁𝖺́ 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖾, 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗉𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝖺 𝟤𝟩 𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖾𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗅𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗏𝖾𝗓𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗀𝗈𝗂́𝗌𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌. 𝖵𝖾𝗃𝖺-𝗌𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖾𝗑𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗈, 𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖬𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖴́𝗇𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖢𝖺𝗉𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 (𝖬𝖴𝖢), 𝖼𝗎𝗃𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖽𝗈, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝖾𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗎́𝗇𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈́𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖤, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗋𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖭𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 ‘𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈́𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌’ 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖻𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖲𝗎𝗅, 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝖺𝗅, 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖺 𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈. 𝖲𝖾 𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗈, 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖻𝗈𝗆, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖿𝗎𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖻𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖾́ 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗎𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖬𝖴𝖢 – 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖻𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺̃𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗓𝖻𝖺𝗇𝗄 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖼𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗂𝗍 𝖽𝗂𝗓 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖬𝖴𝖢 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝖿𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺 –, 𝗇𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖣𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗁𝗂 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖤. 𝖣𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖺́𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌, 𝖽𝗎𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝖽𝗂𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌.

𝖤𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗅𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗋, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝖽𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈, 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗎𝗅𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝗌𝗁𝖺𝗅𝗅 – 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾́𝗆 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋 – 𝖾 𝗇𝗎𝗇𝖼𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗅𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟣% 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖭𝖡 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌-𝗆𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂́𝖼𝗂𝗅 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖾 𝖥𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝗎𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺́. 𝖠𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗆, 𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌, 𝖺 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂́𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈 – 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝖺 𝖺́𝗋𝖾𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺, 𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈, 𝗉𝗈𝗎𝖼𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖽𝗎𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 – 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗁𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝖾𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗅, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌, 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺, 𝖻𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖺́𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌.

𝖤𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝗅𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗋, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝖻𝗈 – 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈, 𝗉𝖾𝖼̧𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝗂𝗃𝖺𝗆 –, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂́𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺. 𝖠 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗁𝖺𝗃𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗋𝖺-𝖴𝖤 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗈𝗌 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝖾𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝗂𝗀𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺, 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝖾𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗂́ 𝖺𝗅𝗈𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 – 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖺𝗋𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗍𝖾𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗃𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺̀𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖿𝖺𝖼𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗇𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖺𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌.

𝖤𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗈 𝗅𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗋, 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝖽𝖺, 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖾 𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝖺 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈𝗆𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖾 𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌 – 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗁𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖾 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖾, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗏𝖾̂ 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖻𝖺 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺̃𝗈 –, 𝖺𝗅𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗈. 𝖠 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺́, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈, 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗍𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖿𝖾𝖼𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾-𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗌, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝖾́ 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖾𝗆 𝗃𝗈𝗀𝗈. 𝖲𝖾𝗆 𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗇𝖾𝖺𝗋 𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖤, 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖺̀ 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝗌𝗈𝖻 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗍𝖺𝗋𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌𝗈𝗋, 𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈𝗆𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺.

𝖤𝗆 𝗌𝗎𝗆𝖺, 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖣𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗁𝗂, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖺̀ 𝖻𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 (𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅) 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺 𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾́ 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝖻𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖺 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗈́𝗌-𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺, 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 (𝖯𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝗌𝗁𝖺𝗅𝗅). 𝖲𝖾 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖾, 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗀𝖾 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗋, 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗓𝗈, 𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝖮𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 – 𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂́𝖼𝗂𝗅 𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖠𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖾 𝗇𝖺 𝖥𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 –, 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺 𝖽𝗂́𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗉𝖺𝗀𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝖼𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝖾𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖻𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖺́𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖠 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝗈𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖻𝗅𝗈𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖺 𝟤𝟩 𝖾, 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌.

𝖳𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝖽𝗂𝗓𝖾𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗌𝖾 𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗎𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝗋𝖺́𝗉𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 – 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈-𝗆𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝖺𝖽𝗈 – 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗋𝖺-𝖴𝖤 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖣𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗁𝗂 𝖾 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺, 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗈𝗇𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌-𝗆𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗌, 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺. 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗎𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖺̀ 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌, 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾́ 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈-𝗆𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈 𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌-𝗆𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗋𝗈𝗌, 𝖼𝗎𝗃𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺. 𝖠𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖿𝖾𝗇𝗈́𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌, 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖠𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖾 𝖥𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺, 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺 𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝖺𝗋𝗋𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖾 𝖺 𝖻𝗅𝗈𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗎𝗆 𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗋𝖺́𝗉𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅.

𝖮𝗎 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈𝗆𝗂𝖺 𝖾 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗃𝗎𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗈𝗆𝗂𝖺 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗅𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖾𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖾𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖣𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗁𝗂.

𝖯𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗀𝗇𝗈́𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖼𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈, 𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖣𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗁𝗂 𝖾́ 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖾 𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝖽𝗈𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌, 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝖺𝗊𝗎𝗂. 𝖮 𝗂𝗋𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖾́ 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖿𝖺𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 (𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗌) 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗋 𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗎𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗎𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝖤, 𝗎𝗌𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗂́𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖺̃𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎𝗌.

* Diretor da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, Professor Catedrático e sócio fundador do OBEGEF

IN "DINHEIRO VIVO" -05/10/24 .