.
O "singing in the rain" nuclear
O guarda-chuva nuclear americano não desapareceu de um dia para o outro e, formalmente, ainda existe. Mas um guarda-chuva em que ninguém confia não protege, só adia a chuva. A questão não é se a Europa deve reduzir esta dependência. É se ainda tem tempo para o fazer antes que uma crise decida por ela.
𝒟𝓊𝓇𝒶𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝑜𝒾𝓉𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶 𝒶𝓃𝑜𝓈, 𝒶 𝓈𝑒𝑔𝓊𝓇𝒶𝓃𝒸̧𝒶 𝒹𝒶 ℰ𝓊𝓇𝑜𝓅𝒶 𝒶𝓈𝓈𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜𝓊 𝓃𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝒻𝒶𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓈𝒾𝒶 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝒻𝑜𝓇𝓉𝒶́𝓋𝑒𝓁: 𝓈𝑒 𝓊𝓂 𝒾𝓃𝒾𝓂𝒾𝑔𝑜 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇 𝒶𝓉𝒶𝒸𝒶𝓈𝓈𝑒 𝓊𝓂 𝒶𝓁𝒾𝒶𝒹𝑜 𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓃𝑜, 𝒲𝒶𝓈𝒽𝒾𝓃𝑔𝓉𝑜𝓃 𝓇𝑒𝓈𝓅𝑜𝓃𝒹𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝓉𝓊𝒹𝑜 𝑜 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓉𝑒𝓂, 𝓂𝑒𝓈𝓂𝑜 𝒶𝓇𝓇𝒾𝓈𝒸𝒶𝓃𝒹𝑜 𝒩𝑜𝓋𝒶 ℐ𝑜𝓇𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝓈𝒶𝓁𝓋𝒶𝓇 ℬ𝑒𝓇𝓁𝒾𝓂. ℰ𝓈𝓈𝒶 𝒻𝒶𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓈𝒾𝒶 𝒶𝒸𝒶𝒷𝑜𝓊. 𝒩𝒶̃𝑜 𝒹𝑒𝓈𝒶𝓅𝒶𝓇𝑒𝒸𝑒𝓊 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝓊𝓂 𝒶𝓃𝓊́𝓃𝒸𝒾𝑜 𝓈𝑜𝓁𝑒𝓃𝑒, 𝓂𝑜𝓇𝓇𝑒𝓊 𝓁𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒, 𝑒𝓃𝑔𝑜𝓁𝒾𝒹𝒶 𝓅𝑒𝓁𝒶 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝓅𝑜𝓁𝜄́𝓉𝒾𝒸𝒶, 𝓅𝑒𝓁𝒶 𝓉𝑒𝒸𝓃𝑜𝓁𝑜𝑔𝒾𝒶 𝑒 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝒸𝓁𝒶𝓈𝓈𝑒 𝓅𝑜𝓁𝜄́𝓉𝒾𝒸𝒶 𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓃𝒶 𝒸𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝓋𝑒𝓏 𝓂𝑒𝓃𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓅𝑜𝓈𝓉𝒶 𝒶 𝓅𝒶𝑔𝒶𝓇 𝑜 𝓅𝓇𝑒𝒸̧𝑜 𝒹𝒶 𝒻𝒾𝒹𝑒𝓁𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝒶𝓁𝒽𝑒𝒾𝒶. ℰ 𝒶 ℰ𝓊𝓇𝑜𝓅𝒶 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓃𝓊𝒶 𝒶 𝒶𝑔𝒾𝓇 𝒸𝑜𝓂𝑜 𝓈𝑒 𝓃𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝓉𝒾𝓋𝑒𝓈𝓈𝑒 𝓂𝓊𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑜, 𝑜 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝑒́, 𝒶 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒶 𝒶𝓁𝓉𝓊𝓇𝒶, 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝓃𝑒𝑔𝓁𝒾𝑔𝑒̂𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓉𝑒́𝑔𝒾𝒸𝒶.
𝒜 𝓁𝑜́𝑔𝒾𝒸𝒶 𝒹𝒶 𝒢𝓊𝑒𝓇𝓇𝒶 ℱ𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝑒𝓇𝒶 𝒷𝓇𝓊𝓉𝒶𝓁 𝑒 𝑒𝒻𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓏: 𝒶𝓈 𝒶𝓅𝑜𝓈𝓉𝒶𝓈 𝑒𝓇𝒶𝓂 𝑒𝓍𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶𝒾𝓈, 𝓁𝑜𝑔𝑜 𝑒𝓇𝒶 𝒸𝓇𝜄́𝓋𝑒𝓁 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝑜𝓈 ℰ𝒰𝒜 𝒻𝑜𝓈𝓈𝑒𝓂 𝓈𝒶𝒸𝓇𝒾𝒻𝒾𝒸𝒶𝒹𝑜𝓈 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓊𝓂 𝒶𝓁𝒾𝒶𝒹𝑜. ℋ𝑜𝒿𝑒 𝒿𝒶́ 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝒽𝒶́ 𝒶𝓅𝑜𝓈𝓉𝒶𝓈 𝑒𝓍𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶𝒾𝓈, 𝒽𝒶́ 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓅𝓊𝓉𝒶𝓈 𝓇𝑒𝑔𝒾𝑜𝓃𝒶𝒾𝓈, 𝒻𝓇𝑜𝓃𝓉𝑒𝒾𝓇𝒶𝓈 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓉𝒶𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓈, 𝒾𝓁𝒽𝒶𝓈 𝓃𝑜 𝒫𝒶𝒸𝜄́𝒻𝒾𝒸𝑜. 𝒩𝑒𝓃𝒽𝓊𝓂 𝒫𝓇𝑒𝓈𝒾𝒹𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓃𝑜 𝓋𝒶𝒾 𝒶𝓇𝓇𝒾𝓈𝒸𝒶𝓇 𝓊𝓂 𝒶𝓉𝒶𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇 𝒶𝑜 𝓅𝓇𝑜́𝓅𝓇𝒾𝑜 𝓉𝑒𝓇𝓇𝒾𝓉𝑜́𝓇𝒾𝑜 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓃𝒹𝑒𝓇 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝒻𝓇𝑜𝓃𝓉𝑒𝒾𝓇𝒶 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒶 𝓂𝒶𝒾𝑜𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑜𝓈 𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓃𝑜𝓈 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝓈𝒶𝒷𝑒 𝓁𝑜𝒸𝒶𝓁𝒾𝓏𝒶𝓇 𝓃𝑜 𝓂𝒶𝓅𝒶.
ℰ 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒́ 𝓈𝑜́ 𝓅𝑒𝓇𝒸𝑒𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜. ℰ́ 𝒹𝑜𝓊𝓉𝓇𝒾𝓃𝒶 𝑒𝓈𝒸𝓇𝒾𝓉𝒶. 𝒜 ℰ𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓉𝑒́𝑔𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝒟𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶 𝒩𝒶𝒸𝒾𝑜𝓃𝒶𝓁 𝒹𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟼 𝓃𝑒𝓂 𝓈𝑒𝓆𝓊𝑒𝓇 𝓈𝑒 𝒹𝒶́ 𝒶𝑜 𝓉𝓇𝒶𝒷𝒶𝓁𝒽𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝓂𝑒𝓃𝒸𝒾𝑜𝓃𝒶𝓇 𝒶 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓈𝓊𝒶𝓈𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓃𝒹𝒾𝒹𝒶, 𝒶𝓅𝑒𝓃𝒶𝓈 𝒾𝓃𝓈𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑒 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝑜𝓈 𝒶𝓁𝒾𝒶𝒹𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝑒𝓋𝑒𝓂 𝒶𝓈𝓈𝓊𝓂𝒾𝓇 𝒶 "𝓇𝑒𝓈𝓅𝑜𝓃𝓈𝒶𝒷𝒾𝓁𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝓅𝓇𝒾𝓂𝒶́𝓇𝒾𝒶" 𝓅𝑒𝓁𝒶 𝓅𝓇𝑜́𝓅𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶. 𝒩𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒́ 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝒻𝓇𝒶𝓈𝑒 𝒾𝓈𝑜𝓁𝒶𝒹𝒶; 𝑒́ 𝒶 𝒻𝑜𝓇𝓂𝒶𝓁𝒾𝓏𝒶𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝓇𝑒𝓉𝒾𝓇𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓈𝑒 𝓋𝒾𝓃𝒽𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝓈𝑒𝓃𝒽𝒶𝓃𝒹𝑜 𝒽𝒶́ 𝒶𝓃𝑜𝓈.
𝒪 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓋𝑒𝓇𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒𝒾𝓇𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝓂𝒶𝓉𝑜𝓊 𝒶 𝒸𝓇𝑒𝒹𝒾𝒷𝒾𝓁𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝒹𝑜 𝑔𝓊𝒶𝓇𝒹𝒶-𝒸𝒽𝓊𝓋𝒶 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝒻𝑜𝒾 𝒶 𝓅𝑜𝓁𝜄́𝓉𝒾𝒸𝒶. ℱ𝑜𝒾 𝒶 𝓂𝒶𝓉𝑒𝓂𝒶́𝓉𝒾𝒸𝒶. 𝒫𝑒𝓁𝒶 𝓅𝓇𝒾𝓂𝑒𝒾𝓇𝒶 𝓋𝑒𝓏 𝒹𝑒𝓈𝒹𝑒 𝒶 𝒢𝓊𝑒𝓇𝓇𝒶 ℱ𝓇𝒾𝒶, 𝑜𝓈 𝒶𝒹𝓋𝑒𝓇𝓈𝒶́𝓇𝒾𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝑜𝓈 ℰ𝒰𝒜 𝓅𝑜𝒹𝑒𝓂 𝒶𝓉𝒾𝓃𝑔𝒾𝓇 𝑜 𝓅𝓇𝑜́𝓅𝓇𝒾𝑜 𝓈𝑜𝓁𝑜 𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓃𝑜. 𝒜 𝒞𝑜𝓇𝑒𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑜 𝒩𝑜𝓇𝓉𝑒 𝒿𝒶́ 𝓉𝑒𝓂 𝓂𝜄́𝓈𝓈𝑒𝒾𝓈 𝒾𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓇𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓃𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝒾𝓈 𝑜𝓅𝑒𝓇𝒶𝒸𝒾𝑜𝓃𝒶𝒾𝓈. 𝒜 𝒞𝒽𝒾𝓃𝒶 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒶́ 𝒶 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓈𝓉𝓇𝓊𝒾𝓇, 𝒶 𝓊𝓂 𝓇𝒾𝓉𝓂𝑜 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓈𝑜́ 𝓅𝑜𝒹𝑒 𝓈𝑒𝓇 𝒹𝑒𝓈𝒸𝓇𝒾𝓉𝑜 𝒸𝑜𝓂𝑜 𝑜𝒷𝓈𝑒𝓈𝓈𝒾𝓋𝑜, 𝑜 𝓂𝒶𝒾𝑜𝓇 𝒶𝓇𝓈𝑒𝓃𝒶𝓁 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇 𝒻𝑜𝓇𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝒲𝒶𝓈𝒽𝒾𝓃𝑔𝓉𝑜𝓃 𝑒 ℳ𝑜𝓈𝒸𝑜𝓋𝑜.
ℰ𝓂 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟺, 𝒶 𝒞𝒽𝒾𝓃𝒶 𝓉𝒾𝓃𝒽𝒶 𝒸𝑒𝓇𝒸𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝟺𝟷𝟶 𝑜𝑔𝒾𝓋𝒶𝓈. ℰ𝓂 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟻, 𝒿𝒶́ 𝑒𝓇𝒶𝓂 𝟼𝟶𝟶. 𝒜𝓉𝑒́ 𝟸𝟶𝟹𝟶, 𝒹𝑒𝓋𝑒𝓇𝒶́ 𝓊𝓁𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓅𝒶𝓈𝓈𝒶𝓇 𝒶𝓈 𝟷.𝟶𝟶𝟶 𝑒, 𝓈𝑒 𝒹𝑒𝒸𝒾𝒹𝒾𝓇 𝑒𝓆𝓊𝒾𝓅𝒶𝓇 𝑜𝓈 𝓈𝑒𝓊𝓈 𝓃𝑜𝓋𝑜𝓈 𝓈𝒾𝓁𝑜𝓈 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝑜𝑔𝒾𝓋𝒶𝓈 𝓂𝓊́𝓁𝓉𝒾𝓅𝓁𝒶𝓈, 𝓅𝑜𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝒽𝑒𝑔𝒶𝓇 𝒶̀𝓈 𝟺.𝟶𝟶𝟶 𝓃𝑜 𝒾𝓃𝜄́𝒸𝒾𝑜 𝒹𝒶 𝒹𝑒́𝒸𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝓈𝑒𝑔𝓊𝒾𝓃𝓉𝑒. 𝒥𝒶́ 𝒻𝑜𝓇𝒶𝓂 𝒾𝒹𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒾𝒻𝒾𝒸𝒶𝒹𝑜𝓈 𝓉𝓇𝑒̂𝓈 𝓃𝑜𝓋𝑜𝓈 𝒸𝒶𝓂𝓅𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓈𝒾𝓁𝑜𝓈, 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝓂𝒶𝒾𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝑒𝓂 𝓅𝑜𝓈𝒾𝒸̧𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝒸𝒶𝒹𝒶. 𝒫𝑒𝓆𝓊𝒾𝓂 𝒹𝑒𝓈𝑒𝓃𝓋𝑜𝓁𝓋𝑒 𝑜 𝒟ℱ-𝟺𝟷, 𝒸𝒶𝓅𝒶𝓏 𝒹𝑒 𝒹𝑒𝓏 𝑜𝑔𝒾𝓋𝒶𝓈, 𝓅𝓇𝑒𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝓊𝓂 𝓈𝓊𝒷𝓂𝒶𝓇𝒾𝓃𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝓃𝑜𝓋𝒶 𝑔𝑒𝓇𝒶𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒 𝒸𝑜𝓂𝓅𝓁𝑒𝓉𝒶 𝒶 𝓉𝓇𝜄́𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝒷𝑜𝓂𝒷𝒶𝓇𝒹𝑒𝒾𝓇𝑜𝓈 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓉𝑒́𝑔𝒾𝒸𝑜𝓈. ℰ́ 𝓉𝒶𝓂𝒷𝑒́𝓂 𝓁𝜄́𝒹𝑒𝓇 𝓂𝓊𝓃𝒹𝒾𝒶𝓁 𝑒𝓂 𝒶𝓇𝓂𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝒽𝒾𝓅𝑒𝓇𝓈𝑜̂𝓃𝒾𝒸𝑜, 𝒾𝓃𝒸𝓁𝓊𝒾𝓃𝒹𝑜 𝓊𝓂 𝓈𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓂𝒶 𝑜𝓇𝒷𝒾𝓉𝒶𝓁 𝒻𝓇𝒶𝒸𝒾𝑜𝓃𝒶𝒹𝑜 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓂𝓊𝓁𝓉𝒾𝓅𝓁𝒾𝒸𝒶 𝒶𝓈 𝓇𝑜𝓉𝒶𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒶𝓉𝒶𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝓇𝒶 𝑜𝓈 ℰ𝒰𝒜.
ℐ𝓈𝓉𝑜 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒́ 𝒶𝒸𝓊𝓂𝓊𝓁𝒶𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓋𝒶𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒. ℰ́ 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝒸𝑜𝑒𝓇𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝒸𝒶𝓁𝒸𝓊𝓁𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝒹𝒶𝓇 𝒶 𝒫𝑒𝓆𝓊𝒾𝓂 𝑜𝓅𝒸̧𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓈𝓊𝒶𝒹𝒶𝓂 𝓉𝑒𝓇𝒸𝑒𝒾𝓇𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒾𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓇𝓋𝒾𝓇 𝑒𝓂 𝒯𝒶𝒾𝓌𝒶𝓃, 𝓅𝓇𝑒𝒸𝒾𝓈𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝓅𝑜𝓇𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒲𝒶𝓈𝒽𝒾𝓃𝑔𝓉𝑜𝓃 𝓅𝒶𝓈𝓈𝒶 𝒶 𝓉𝑒𝓇 𝓂𝒶𝒾𝓈 𝒶 𝓅𝑒𝓇𝒹𝑒𝓇. 𝒬𝓊𝒶𝓃𝒹𝑜 𝒶𝓂𝒷𝑜𝓈 𝑜𝓈 𝓁𝒶𝒹𝑜𝓈 𝓅𝑜𝒹𝑒𝓂 𝒹𝑒𝓈𝓉𝓇𝓊𝒾𝓇-𝓈𝑒 𝒶𝑜 𝓃𝜄́𝓋𝑒𝓁 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓃𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓁, 𝒶 𝒸𝑒𝓇𝓉𝑒𝓏𝒶 𝓋𝒾𝓇𝒶 𝒸𝒶́𝓁𝒸𝓊𝓁𝑜 𝑒 𝒸𝒶́𝓁𝒸𝓊𝓁𝑜𝓈, 𝒶𝑜 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝓇𝒶́𝓇𝒾𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝑔𝒶𝓇𝒶𝓃𝓉𝒾𝒶𝓈, 𝓃𝑒𝑔𝑜𝒸𝑒𝒾𝒶𝓂-𝓈𝑒.
𝒢𝓁𝑜𝒷𝒶𝓁𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒, 𝑜 𝒶𝓇𝓈𝑒𝓃𝒶𝓁 𝓂𝓊𝓃𝒹𝒾𝒶𝓁 𝓇𝑜𝓃𝒹𝒶 𝒶𝓈 𝟷𝟸.𝟸𝟺𝟷 𝑜𝑔𝒾𝓋𝒶𝓈, 𝒸𝑜𝓂 ℛ𝓊́𝓈𝓈𝒾𝒶 𝑒 ℰ𝒰𝒜 𝒶 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝒸𝑒𝓃𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓂 𝟿𝟶% (𝒸𝑒𝓇𝒸𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝟻.𝟾𝟾𝟿 𝑒 𝟻.𝟹𝟸𝟾, 𝓇𝑒𝓈𝓅𝑒𝓉𝒾𝓋𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒). ℳ𝒶𝓈 𝒶 𝒞𝒽𝒾𝓃𝒶, 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝒶𝓈 𝓈𝓊𝒶𝓈 𝟼𝟶𝟶 𝑒 𝒶 𝒶𝒸𝑒𝓁𝑒𝓇𝒶𝓇, 𝒿𝒶́ 𝓊𝓁𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓅𝒶𝓈𝓈𝒶 ℱ𝓇𝒶𝓃𝒸̧𝒶 𝑒 ℛ𝑒𝒾𝓃𝑜 𝒰𝓃𝒾𝒹𝑜 𝒿𝓊𝓃𝓉𝑜𝓈 𝑒 𝒶 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓉𝒶̂𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶 𝑒𝓃𝒸𝓊𝓇𝓉𝒶 𝒶 𝓊𝓂 𝓇𝒾𝓉𝓂𝑜 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓃𝑒𝓃𝒽𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝑜𝓊𝓉𝓇𝒶 𝓅𝑜𝓉𝑒̂𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶 𝒶𝒸𝑜𝓂𝓅𝒶𝓃𝒽𝒶.
𝒰𝓂 𝓂𝜄́𝓈𝓈𝒾𝓁 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇 𝒷𝒶𝓁𝜄́𝓈𝓉𝒾𝒸𝑜 𝒾𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓇𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓃𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓁 𝓅𝑜𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝓊𝓈𝓉𝒶𝓇 𝒸𝑒𝓇𝒸𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟶ℳ 𝒹𝑜́𝓁𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓊𝓃𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒, 𝑒 𝒸𝒶𝓈𝑜 𝒶 ℰ𝓊𝓇𝑜𝓅𝒶 𝓆𝓊𝑒𝒾𝓇𝒶 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝒹𝑒 𝟷.𝟶𝟶𝟶 𝒶 𝓂𝑒́𝒹𝒾𝑜 𝓅𝓇𝒶𝓏𝑜 (𝟻-𝟾 𝒶𝓃𝑜𝓈), 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝓈𝑒 𝒸𝑜𝓂𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶𝓇 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝒶 𝒞𝒽𝒾𝓃𝒶, 𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒶𝓂𝑜𝓈 𝒶 𝒻𝒶𝓁𝒶𝓇 𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝑒𝓇𝒸𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟶.𝟶𝟶𝟶 ℳ 𝒹𝑜́𝓁𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒾𝓃𝓋𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒾𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜, 𝒶 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝓂𝑒́𝒹𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝟸𝟻 𝒶 𝟺𝟶.𝟶𝟶𝟶 ℳ 𝒹𝑜́𝓁𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝒶𝓃𝑜. ℛ𝑒𝒻𝒾𝓇𝒶-𝓈𝑒 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝑜 𝓋𝒶𝓁𝑜𝓇 𝓂𝒶𝒾𝑜𝓇 𝒹𝑒 𝟺𝟶.𝟶𝟶𝟶 ℳ 𝒹𝑜́𝓁𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝒶𝓃𝑜 𝑒𝓂 𝒾𝓃𝓋𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒾𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇 𝓇𝑒𝓅𝓇𝑒𝓈𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶 𝓊𝓂 𝒸𝑒𝓃𝒶́𝓇𝒾𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟺 𝑜𝓃𝒹𝑒 𝒶 𝒰𝓃𝒾𝒶̃𝑜 ℰ𝓊𝓇𝑜𝓅𝑒𝒾𝒶 𝑒 𝑜 ℛ𝑒𝒾𝓃𝑜 𝒰𝓃𝒾𝒹𝑜 𝑜𝓃𝒹𝑒 𝑜 𝒾𝓃𝓋𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒾𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝓃𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶 𝑒𝓇𝒶 𝟿,𝟿𝟸% 𝒹𝑜 𝒾𝓃𝓋𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒾𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝑒𝓂 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶, 𝑒 𝑜𝓃𝒹𝑒 𝒶 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒾𝒷𝓊𝒾𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝓊𝓈𝓉𝑜𝓈 𝓅𝑜𝒹𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝓈𝑒𝓇 𝟷𝟽𝟺 € / 𝒶𝓃𝑜 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓅𝑒𝓈𝓈𝑜𝒶 𝑒𝓂𝓅𝓇𝑒𝑔𝒶𝒹𝒶, 𝟷 𝟶𝟽𝟼 € / 𝒶𝓃𝑜 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝑒𝓂𝓅𝓇𝑒𝓈𝒶 𝒶𝓉𝒾𝓋𝒶 𝑒 𝟶,𝟶𝟾𝟻% 𝒹𝑜 𝓋𝒶𝓁𝑜𝓇 𝒹𝒶 𝒻𝒶𝓉𝓊𝓇𝒶𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝓉𝑜𝓉𝒶𝓁 𝒹𝒶𝓈 𝑒𝓂𝓅𝓇𝑒𝓈𝒶𝓈.
𝒫𝑜𝓇 𝑜𝓊𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓈 𝓅𝒶𝓁𝒶𝓋𝓇𝒶𝓈, 𝒶 𝒰𝓃𝒾𝒶̃𝑜 ℰ𝓊𝓇𝑜𝓅𝑒𝒾𝒶 𝑒 𝑜 ℛ𝑒𝒾𝓃𝑜 𝒰𝓃𝒾𝒹𝑜 𝓉𝑒̂𝓂 𝓈𝑒𝑔𝓊𝓇𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝓂𝑒𝒾𝑜𝓈 𝒻𝒾𝓃𝒶𝓃𝒸𝑒𝒾𝓇𝑜𝓈 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝒾𝓂𝓅𝓁𝑒𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓇, 𝓂𝒶𝓈 𝓉𝑒𝓇𝒶̃𝑜 𝓋𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝓅𝑜𝓁𝜄́𝓉𝒾𝒸𝒶.ᐣ
𝒜𝓈 𝓇𝑒𝓈𝓅𝑜𝓈𝓉𝒶𝓈 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒽𝑜𝒿𝑒 𝓈𝑒 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝒸𝓊𝓉𝑒𝓂 𝑒𝓂 ℒ𝑜𝓃𝒹𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝑒 𝒫𝒶𝓇𝒾𝓈 𝓈𝒶̃𝑜, 𝓃𝒶 𝓅𝓇𝒶́𝓉𝒾𝒸𝒶, 𝑜 𝓇𝑒𝒸𝑜𝓃𝒽𝑒𝒸𝒾𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝓉𝒶́𝒸𝒾𝓉𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒶 𝑒𝓇𝒶 𝒹𝑜 𝑔𝓊𝒶𝓇𝒹𝒶-𝒸𝒽𝓊𝓋𝒶 𝓊𝓃𝒾𝓁𝒶𝓉𝑒𝓇𝒶𝓁 𝓉𝑒𝓇𝓂𝒾𝓃𝑜𝓊, 𝓂𝑒𝓈𝓂𝑜 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓃𝒾𝓃𝑔𝓊𝑒́𝓂 𝑜 𝒶𝒹𝓂𝒾𝓉𝒶 𝑒𝓂 𝓅𝓊́𝒷𝓁𝒾𝒸𝑜. ℱ𝒶𝓁𝒶-𝓈𝑒 𝒹𝑒 𝓊𝓂 𝓈𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓂𝒶 𝒹𝑒 "𝓉𝓇𝑒̂𝓈 𝒸𝒽𝒶𝓋𝑒𝓈", 𝑒𝓂 𝓆𝓊𝑒 ℱ𝓇𝒶𝓃𝒸̧𝒶 𝑒 ℛ𝑒𝒾𝓃𝑜 𝒰𝓃𝒾𝒹𝑜, 𝒶𝓈 𝑜𝓊𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓈 𝓅𝑜𝓉𝑒̂𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶𝓈 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝒶 𝒜𝓁𝒾𝒶𝓃𝒸̧𝒶, 𝓉𝒶𝓂𝒷𝑒́𝓂 𝓅𝑜𝒹𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒶𝓂 𝒶𝓊𝓉𝑜𝓇𝒾𝓏𝒶𝓇 𝑜 𝓊𝓈𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝒶𝓇𝓂𝒶𝓈 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝓉𝒾𝓁𝒽𝒶𝒹𝒶𝓈, 𝓇𝑒𝒹𝓊𝓏𝒾𝓃𝒹𝑜 𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝓅𝑒𝓃𝒹𝑒̂𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝓊́𝓃𝒾𝒸𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝒸𝒾𝓈𝒶̃𝑜 𝓉𝑜𝓂𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝒶 𝓂𝒾𝓁𝒽𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓆𝓊𝒾𝓁𝑜́𝓂𝑒𝓉𝓇𝑜𝓈. 𝒜 𝒟𝑒𝒸𝓁𝒶𝓇𝒶𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝒩𝑜𝓇𝓉𝒽𝓌𝑜𝑜𝒹, 𝒹𝑒 𝒿𝓊𝓁𝒽𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟻, 𝒿𝒶́ 𝒶𝓅𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒶 𝓃𝑒𝓈𝓈𝒶 𝒹𝒾𝓇𝑒𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜. ℰ𝓂 𝟸𝟶𝟸𝟼, 𝒫𝒶𝓇𝒾𝓈 𝒶𝓃𝓊𝓃𝒸𝒾𝑜𝓊 𝓊𝓂𝒶 "𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓈𝓊𝒶𝓈𝒶̃𝑜 𝒶𝓋𝒶𝓃𝒸̧𝒶𝒹𝒶" 𝒶𝓁𝒶𝓇𝑔𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝒶𝑜𝓈 𝓋𝒾𝓏𝒾𝓃𝒽𝑜𝓈.
ℳ𝒶𝓈 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝒸𝒽𝒶𝓋𝑒 𝑒𝓍𝓉𝓇𝒶 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝒸𝑜𝓂𝓅𝑒𝓃𝓈𝒶 𝒹𝑒́𝒸𝒶𝒹𝒶𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓅𝓇𝑒𝑔𝓊𝒾𝒸̧𝒶 𝑜𝓇𝒸̧𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓁. 𝒜 ℰ𝓊𝓇𝑜𝓅𝒶 𝒶𝓇𝓇𝒶𝓈𝓉𝒶 𝓁𝒶𝒸𝓊𝓃𝒶𝓈 𝑔𝓇𝒶𝓋𝑒𝓈 𝑒𝓂 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶 𝒶𝑒́𝓇𝑒𝒶, 𝒶𝓇𝓉𝒾𝓁𝒽𝒶𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝑒 𝓂𝑜𝒷𝒾𝓁𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝓂𝒾𝓁𝒾𝓉𝒶𝓇, 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝓃𝑒𝒸𝑒𝓈𝓈𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒𝓈 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒾𝓂𝒶𝒹𝒶𝓈 𝑒𝓂 𝟻𝟶𝟶 𝓂𝒾𝓁 𝓂𝒾𝓁𝒽𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝑒𝓊𝓇𝑜𝓈 𝒶𝓉𝑒́ 𝟸𝟶𝟹𝟶. 𝒜 𝒩𝒜𝒯𝒪 𝓇𝑒𝒻𝑜𝓇𝒸̧𝒶 𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶 𝒶𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓂𝜄́𝓈𝓈𝒾𝓁 𝓃𝒶 ℛ𝑜𝓂𝑒́𝓃𝒾𝒶, 𝓃𝒶 𝒫𝑜𝓁𝑜́𝓃𝒾𝒶 𝑒 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝓃𝒶𝓋𝒾𝑜𝓈 𝒜𝑒𝑔𝒾𝓈 𝑒𝓂 ℰ𝓈𝓅𝒶𝓃𝒽𝒶, 𝓂𝒶𝓈 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝒶𝓇𝓆𝓊𝒾𝓉𝑒𝓉𝓊𝓇𝒶 𝓋𝑒𝓇𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒𝒾𝓇𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓉𝒾𝒻𝒾𝒸𝒶𝒹𝒶, 𝒸𝒶𝓅𝒶𝓏 𝒹𝑒 𝒶𝑔𝓊𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓇 𝓊𝓂 𝒶𝓉𝒶𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓇𝓊𝓈𝓈𝑜 𝒶 𝓈𝑒́𝓇𝒾𝑜, 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓃𝓊𝒶 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓈𝓉𝓇𝓊𝒾𝓇.
𝒮𝑒 𝒶 𝒶𝓂𝒷𝒾𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒́ 𝓇𝑒𝒶𝓁, 𝒶 𝒻𝒶𝓉𝓊𝓇𝒶 𝑒́ 𝑒𝓁𝑒𝓋𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝑒 𝒾𝓃𝒸𝑜́𝓂𝑜𝒹𝒶. 𝒫𝒶𝓈𝓈𝒶 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓈𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓂𝒶𝓈 𝒾𝓃𝓉𝑒𝑔𝓇𝒶𝒹𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶 𝒶𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓂𝜄́𝓈𝓈𝒾𝓁 𝒸𝑜𝓂𝑜 𝑜 𝒮𝒜ℳ𝒫/𝒯 𝑒 𝑜 𝒫𝒶𝓉𝓇𝒾𝑜𝓉; 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝒶𝓇𝓉𝒾𝓁𝒽𝒶𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝓁𝑜𝓃𝑔𝑜 𝒶𝓁𝒸𝒶𝓃𝒸𝑒 𝑒 𝓂𝓊𝓃𝒾𝒸̧𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓅𝓇𝑒𝒸𝒾𝓈𝒶̃𝑜 𝓃𝑜 𝒻𝓁𝒶𝓃𝒸𝑜 𝓁𝑒𝓈𝓉𝑒; 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓂𝑜𝒷𝒾𝓁𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝓂𝒾𝓁𝒾𝓉𝒶𝓇 𝑒 𝒸𝒶𝓅𝒶𝒸𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝒹𝑒 𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓃𝓈𝓅𝑜𝓇𝓉𝑒 𝒶𝑒́𝓇𝑒𝑜; 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓋𝒾𝑔𝒾𝓁𝒶̂𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶 𝑒 𝑔𝓊𝑒𝓇𝓇𝒶 𝑒𝓁𝑒𝓉𝓇𝑜̂𝓃𝒾𝒸𝒶 𝒸𝒶𝓅𝒶𝓏𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓈𝓊𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓃𝓉𝒶𝓇 𝓊𝓂 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝒻𝓁𝒾𝓉𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝒶𝓁𝓉𝒶 𝒾𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓃𝓈𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒.
𝒩𝑜 𝓅𝓁𝒶𝓃𝑜 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇, 𝓈𝒾𝑔𝓃𝒾𝒻𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓇𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝒸𝒾𝓈𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒽𝑜𝒿𝑒 𝓈𝒶̃𝑜 𝓉𝒶𝒷𝓊𝓈: 𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓃𝓈𝒾𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝒸𝒶𝒸̧𝒶𝓈 ℱ-𝟹𝟻𝒜 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝒶 𝒶𝓈 𝓂𝒾𝓈𝓈𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝓉𝒾𝓁𝒽𝒶 𝓃𝓊𝒸𝓁𝑒𝒶𝓇; 𝒷𝑜𝓂𝒷𝒶𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝑔𝓇𝒶𝓋𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝓂𝑜𝒹𝑒𝓇𝓃𝒾𝓏𝒶𝒹𝒶𝓈 𝓃𝑜 ℛ𝑒𝒾𝓃𝑜 𝒰𝓃𝒾𝒹𝑜; 𝓅𝑜𝓈𝓈𝜄́𝓋𝑒𝓁 𝑒𝓍𝓅𝒶𝓃𝓈𝒶̃𝑜 𝒹𝑜 𝒶𝓇𝓈𝑒𝓃𝒶𝓁 𝒻𝓇𝒶𝓃𝒸𝑒̂𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓂𝜄́𝓈𝓈𝑒𝒾𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝓇𝓊𝓏𝑒𝒾𝓇𝑜; 𝒾𝓃𝓈𝓉𝒶𝓁𝒶𝒸̧𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒶𝓇𝓂𝒶𝓏𝑒𝓃𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝑒𝓂 𝓉𝑒𝓇𝓇𝒾𝓉𝑜́𝓇𝒾𝑜 𝓅𝑜𝓁𝒶𝒸𝑜, 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒾𝒷𝓊𝒾𝓃𝒹𝑜 𝒶 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓈𝓊𝒶𝓈𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒 𝓉𝑜𝓇𝓃𝒶𝓃𝒹𝑜-𝒶 𝓂𝒶𝒾𝓈 𝓇𝑒𝓈𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝒶 𝓊𝓂 𝒶𝓉𝒶𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒹𝑒 𝒹𝑒𝒸𝒶𝓅𝒾𝓉𝒶𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜.
ℰ 𝒽𝒶́ 𝒶 𝑔𝓊𝑒𝓇𝓇𝒶 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝓈𝑒 𝓋𝑒̂ 𝓃𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝑒𝓈𝒻𝒾𝓁𝑒𝓈 𝓂𝒾𝓁𝒾𝓉𝒶𝓇𝑒𝓈: 𝒸𝒾𝒷𝑒𝓇𝓈𝑒𝑔𝓊𝓇𝒶𝓃𝒸̧𝒶, 𝒶𝓉𝓇𝒾𝒷𝓊𝒾𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝒾𝒷𝑒𝓇𝒶𝓉𝒶𝓆𝓊𝑒𝓈, 𝓅𝓇𝑜𝓉𝑒𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝒸𝒶𝒷𝑜𝓈 𝓈𝓊𝒷𝓂𝒶𝓇𝒾𝓃𝑜𝓈 𝑒 𝓇𝑒𝒹𝑒𝓈 𝑒𝓁𝑒́𝓉𝓇𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓈. 𝒫𝒶𝓈𝓈𝒶 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝓇𝑒𝒹𝓊𝓏𝒾𝓇 𝒶 𝒹𝑒𝓅𝑒𝓃𝒹𝑒̂𝓃𝒸𝒾𝒶 𝒹𝑒 𝓈𝑒𝓂𝒾𝒸𝑜𝓃𝒹𝓊𝓉𝑜𝓇𝑒𝓈 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓃𝑔𝑒𝒾𝓇𝑜𝓈 𝑒 𝓅𝑜𝓇 𝒾𝓃𝓋𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒾𝓇 𝑒𝓂 𝒹𝓇𝑜𝓃𝑒𝓈, 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶𝓈 𝒶𝓃𝓉𝒾-𝒹𝓇𝑜𝓃𝑒, 𝒹𝑒𝒻𝑒𝓈𝒶𝓈 𝒽𝒾𝓅𝑒𝓇𝓈𝑜́𝓃𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓈 𝑒 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓈𝓉𝑒𝓁𝒶𝒸̧𝑜̃𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝓈𝒶𝓉𝑒́𝓁𝒾𝓉𝑒𝓈 𝓇𝑒𝒹𝓊𝓃𝒹𝒶𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓈. 𝒯𝓊𝒹𝑜 𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑜 𝒹𝑒𝒸𝒾𝒹𝒾𝓇𝒶́ 𝓊𝓂 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝒻𝓁𝒾𝓉𝑜 𝒹𝑜 𝓈𝑒́𝒸𝓊𝓁𝑜 𝒳𝒳ℐ 𝓉𝒶𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝓆𝓊𝒶𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝑜𝓈 𝓂𝜄́𝓈𝓈𝑒𝒾𝓈 𝒹𝑒𝒸𝒾𝒹𝒾𝓇𝒶𝓂 𝑜 𝓈𝑒́𝒸𝓊𝓁𝑜 𝒳𝒳.
𝒩𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝒹𝒾𝓈𝓉𝑜 𝑒́ 𝓇𝒶́𝓅𝒾𝒹𝑜, 𝒷𝒶𝓇𝒶𝓉𝑜 𝑜𝓊 𝓅𝑜𝓁𝒾𝓉𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝒻𝑜𝓇𝓉𝒶́𝓋𝑒𝓁. ℰ𝓍𝒾𝑔𝑒 𝒹𝑒́𝒸𝒶𝒹𝒶𝓈 𝒹𝑒 𝒾𝓃𝓋𝑒𝓈𝓉𝒾𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜, 𝒸𝑜𝑜𝓇𝒹𝑒𝓃𝒶𝒸̧𝒶̃𝑜 𝑒𝓃𝓉𝓇𝑒 𝒸𝒶𝓅𝒾𝓉𝒶𝒾𝓈 𝒸𝑜𝓂 𝒾𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓇𝑒𝓈𝓈𝑒𝓈 𝒹𝒾𝓋𝑒𝓇𝑔𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒𝓈 𝑒 𝑒𝓈𝒸𝑜𝓁𝒽𝒶𝓈 𝒹𝑜𝓁𝑜𝓇𝑜𝓈𝒶𝓈 𝓈𝑜𝒷𝓇𝑒 𝓈𝑜𝒷𝑒𝓇𝒶𝓃𝒾𝒶 𝓅𝒶𝓇𝓉𝒾𝓁𝒽𝒶𝒹𝒶. ℳ𝒶𝓈 𝒶 𝒶𝓁𝓉𝑒𝓇𝓃𝒶𝓉𝒾𝓋𝒶 𝑒́ 𝓅𝒾𝑜𝓇: 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓉𝒾𝓃𝓊𝒶𝓇 𝒶𝑔𝒶𝓇𝓇𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝒶 𝓊𝓂𝒶 𝑔𝒶𝓇𝒶𝓃𝓉𝒾𝒶 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝑜𝓈 𝓅𝓇𝑜́𝓅𝓇𝒾𝑜𝓈 𝒹𝑜𝒸𝓊𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑜𝓈 𝑒𝓈𝓉𝓇𝒶𝓉𝑒́𝑔𝒾𝒸𝑜𝓈 𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓇𝒾𝒸𝒶𝓃𝑜𝓈 𝒿𝒶́ 𝓃𝒶̃𝑜 𝓈𝑒 𝒹𝒶̃𝑜 𝒶𝑜 𝓉𝓇𝒶𝒷𝒶𝓁𝒽𝑜 𝒹𝑒 𝓇𝑒𝒶𝒻𝒾𝓇𝓂𝒶𝓇, 𝑒𝓃𝓆𝓊𝒶𝓃𝓉𝑜 𝑜𝓈 𝓈𝑒𝓊𝓈 𝒶𝒹𝓋𝑒𝓇𝓈𝒶́𝓇𝒾𝑜𝓈 𝒸𝑜𝓃𝓈𝓉𝓇𝑜𝑒𝓂, 𝒶 𝓇𝒾𝓉𝓂𝑜 𝓋𝑒𝓇𝓉𝒾𝑔𝒾𝓃𝑜𝓈𝑜, 𝑒𝓍𝒶𝓉𝒶𝓂𝑒𝓃𝓉𝑒 𝒶 𝒸𝒶𝓅𝒶𝒸𝒾𝒹𝒶𝒹𝑒 𝓆𝓊𝑒 𝒶 𝓉𝑜𝓇𝓃𝒶 𝒸𝒶𝒹𝒶 𝓋𝑒𝓏 𝓂𝑒𝓃𝑜𝓈 𝒸𝓇𝑒𝒹𝜄́𝓋𝑒𝓁.
* Formação em Ciência Política e experiência em Relações Públicas Institucionais
IN "NASCER DO SOL" -14/09/26 .
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