Cómo conocí
a tu padre
FONTE: 
08/10/2026
CARLOS MORGADO BRÁZ
.
A emergência permanente
que ninguém vai declarar
Von der Leyen tem razão ao afirmar que as instituições europeias foram concebidas para outro mundo. A pergunta que ficou sem resposta é o que a adaptação fará, por sua vez, às próprias instituições.
𝓗𝓸𝓾𝓿𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓯𝓻𝓪𝓼𝓮 𝓷𝓸 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓼𝓸 𝓼𝓸𝓫𝓻𝓮 𝓸 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓪 𝓤𝓷𝓲𝓪̃𝓸, 𝓪 𝟏𝟔 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓫𝓻𝓸, 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓽𝓮𝓻 𝓭𝓸𝓶𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓸 𝓭𝓮𝓫𝓪𝓽𝓮 𝓮𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓾, 𝓶𝓪𝓼 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓸𝓶𝓲𝓷𝓸𝓾. 𝓓𝓮𝓹𝓸𝓲𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓮𝓷𝓾𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓻 𝓬𝓲𝓫𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓽𝓪𝓺𝓾𝓮𝓼, 𝓼𝓪𝓫𝓸𝓽𝓪𝓰𝓮𝓶, 𝓲𝓷𝓬𝓮̂𝓷𝓭𝓲𝓸𝓼 𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓼𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓻𝓸𝓷𝓮𝓼, 𝓤𝓻𝓼𝓾𝓵𝓪 𝓿𝓸𝓷 𝓭𝓮𝓻 𝓛𝓮𝔂𝓮𝓷 𝓪𝓯𝓲𝓻𝓶𝓸𝓾 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪𝓼 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪𝓼 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓮𝓷𝓯𝓻𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓮𝓵𝓪 𝓔𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓪 𝓼𝓪̃𝓸 «𝓬𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓿𝓮𝔃 𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓸𝓼 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓮 𝓬𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓿𝓮𝔃 𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪𝓼». 𝓟𝓸𝓾𝓬𝓸𝓼 𝓶𝓲𝓷𝓾𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓽𝓪𝓻𝓭𝓮, 𝓪𝓬𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓬𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓾 𝓸 𝓭𝓲𝓪𝓰𝓷𝓸́𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓸 𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮𝓲𝓻𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓼𝓲𝓿𝓸, 𝓪𝓸 𝓼𝓾𝓼𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓮 «𝓪 𝓷𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓪 𝓭𝓸𝓾𝓽𝓻𝓲𝓷𝓪, 𝓪𝓼 𝓷𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓪𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓲𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓮 𝓸 𝓷𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓸 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓬𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓼𝓪̃𝓸 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓪𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓪𝓷𝓱𝓪𝓻𝓪𝓶 𝓪 𝓷𝓸𝓿𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮», 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓮 «𝓸𝓼 𝓷𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓸𝓼 𝓼𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓪𝓼 𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓪𝓶 𝓯𝓮𝓲𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓾𝓶 𝓶𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝓮𝓻𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮».
𝓓𝓪𝜾́ 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓾𝓵𝓽𝓸𝓾 𝓪 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓪. 𝓐 𝓔𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓪 𝓷𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓽𝓪𝓻𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶 𝓬𝓸𝓾𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻-𝓱𝔂𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭 𝓹𝓵𝓪𝔂𝓫𝓸𝓸𝓴 𝓹𝓻𝓸́𝓹𝓻𝓲𝓸 𝓮, 𝓼𝓸𝓫𝓻𝓮𝓽𝓾𝓭𝓸, 𝓭𝓪𝓺𝓾𝓲𝓵𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪 𝓟𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓲𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓪 𝓒𝓸𝓶𝓲𝓼𝓼𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓲𝓰𝓷𝓸𝓾 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓸 «𝓐𝓻𝓽𝓲𝓰𝓸 𝟒 𝓭𝓪 𝓔𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓪», 𝓾𝓶 𝓟𝓻𝓸𝓽𝓸𝓬𝓸𝓵𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓔𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓢𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓮, 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓾𝓶 𝓾́𝓷𝓲𝓬𝓸 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸-𝓜𝓮𝓶𝓫𝓻𝓸, 𝓸𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓰𝓪𝓻𝓲𝓪 𝓽𝓸𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓸𝓼 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓼 𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓾𝓷𝓲𝓻-𝓼𝓮 𝓮 𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓸𝓻𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓪𝓻 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓾𝓶 𝓪 𝓲𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓼 𝓼𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓫𝓪𝓲𝔁𝓸 𝓭𝓸 𝓵𝓲𝓶𝓲𝓪𝓻 𝓭𝓪 𝓪𝓰𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪̃𝓸 𝓪𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓭𝓪.
𝓣𝓸𝓭𝓪𝓿𝓲𝓪, 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓸𝓬𝓾𝓹𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓵𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓻𝓮𝓽𝓸́𝓻𝓲𝓬𝓪. 𝓝𝓪 𝓷𝓸𝓲𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓮 𝟒 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝟓 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓰𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓸, 𝓾𝓶 𝓭𝓻𝓸𝓷𝓮 𝓬𝓪𝓻𝓻𝓮𝓰𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓮𝔁𝓹𝓵𝓸𝓼𝓲𝓿𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓰𝓲𝓾 𝓾𝓶 𝓪𝓿𝓲𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓬𝓪𝓻𝓰𝓪 𝓾𝓬𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓲𝓪𝓷𝓸 𝓷𝓸 𝓪𝓮𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓛𝓮𝓲𝓹𝔃𝓲𝓰/𝓗𝓪𝓵𝓵𝓮, 𝓾𝓶 𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓷𝓸́𝓼 𝓬𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓭𝓪 𝓵𝓸𝓰𝜾́𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪 𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓪𝓭𝓪, 𝓼𝓮𝓶 𝓭𝓮𝓽𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓻 𝓷𝓮𝓶 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓭𝓮𝓽𝓮𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓹𝓮𝓵𝓪𝓼 𝓭𝓮𝓯𝓮𝓼𝓪𝓼. 𝓐 𝟏 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓫𝓻𝓸, 𝓸 𝓖𝓸𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓸 𝓪𝓵𝓮𝓶𝓪̃𝓸 𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓲𝓫𝓾𝓲𝓾 𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓵𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓪 𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓪̀ 𝓡𝓾́𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓪, 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓿𝓸𝓬𝓸𝓾 𝓸 𝓮𝓶𝓫𝓪𝓲𝔁𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓻 𝓮 𝓸𝓻𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓸𝓾 𝓸 𝓯𝓮𝓬𝓱𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓾𝓪𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓲𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓻𝓾𝓼𝓼𝓪𝓼. 𝓙𝓪́ 𝓮𝓶 𝓳𝓾𝓵𝓱𝓸, 𝓸 𝓘𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓽𝓸 𝓘𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓵 𝓭𝓮 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓾𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓽𝓮́𝓰𝓲𝓬𝓸𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓬𝓵𝓾𝓲𝓾 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓮𝓻𝓪 «𝓪𝓵𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓿𝓪́𝓿𝓮𝓵» 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓫𝓸𝓪 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓼𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓻𝓸𝓷𝓮𝓼 𝓷𝓪 𝓔𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓪 𝓽𝓲𝓿𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓮 𝓼𝓲𝓭𝓸 𝓸𝓻𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓜𝓸𝓼𝓬𝓸𝓿𝓸, 𝓮𝓶 𝓪𝓵𝓰𝓾𝓷𝓼 𝓬𝓪𝓼𝓸𝓼 𝓪 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓽𝓲𝓻 𝓭𝓮 𝓷𝓪𝓿𝓲𝓸𝓼 𝓭𝓪 𝓯𝓻𝓸𝓽𝓪-𝓼𝓸𝓶𝓫𝓻𝓪. 𝓔, 𝓶𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓼 𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓼, 𝓮𝓶 𝓶𝓪𝓻𝓬̧𝓸, 𝓸 𝓒𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓮𝓵𝓱𝓸 𝓭𝓪 𝓤𝓷𝓲𝓪̃𝓸 𝓔𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓲𝓪 𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓽𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓬𝓵𝓾𝓼𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓼𝓸𝓫𝓻𝓮 𝓪 𝓬𝓪𝓹𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓮𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓿𝓮𝓷𝓲𝓻, 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓼𝓾𝓪𝓭𝓲𝓻 𝓮 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓻 𝓪 𝓬𝓪𝓶𝓹𝓪𝓷𝓱𝓪𝓼 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼 «𝓲𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓪 𝓼𝓾𝓪 𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓰𝓮𝓶, 𝓮𝓼𝓬𝓪𝓵𝓪 𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓼𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮».
𝓐 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓾𝓷𝓽𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓵𝓮𝓿𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓮, 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓸, 𝓮𝓶 𝓼𝓪𝓫𝓮𝓻 𝓼𝓮 𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓮𝔁𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓮. 𝓔́ 𝓸𝓾𝓽𝓻𝓪, 𝓮 𝓫𝓪𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓬𝓸́𝓶𝓸𝓭𝓪. 𝓞 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓼𝓾𝓬𝓮𝓭𝓮 𝓪 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓶𝓸𝓬𝓻𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓪𝓵, 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝓾𝓼𝓪, 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓼𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓮 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝜾́𝓬𝓲𝓵 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓲𝓫𝓾𝓲𝓻 𝓹𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓪 𝓪 𝓸𝓻𝓰𝓪𝓷𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓻 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓪 𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓰𝓸𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪.ᐣ
𝓞 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓫𝓵𝓮𝓶𝓪 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪́ 𝓷𝓪 𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪, 𝓶𝓪𝓼 𝓷𝓪 𝓼𝓾𝓪 𝓪𝓾𝓼𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪
𝓒𝓸𝓷𝓿𝓮́𝓶 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓮𝓬̧𝓪𝓻 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓱𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪 𝓰𝓾𝓮𝓻𝓻𝓪 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓯𝓪𝔃 𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓪𝓽𝓮𝓰𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓶 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝜾́𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓪 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓶𝓸𝓭𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪. 𝓓𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓮́𝓬𝓪𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓰𝓾𝓲𝓶𝓸𝓼, 𝓪𝓲𝓷𝓭𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓲𝓶𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓯𝓮𝓲𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮, 𝓰𝓾𝓮𝓻𝓻𝓪 𝓮 𝓹𝓪𝔃, 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪 𝓮 𝓮𝔁𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪, 𝓬𝓻𝓲𝓶𝓮 𝓮 𝓪𝓰𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪̃𝓸. 𝓞𝓻𝓪, 𝓸 𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓪𝓬̧𝓸 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓿𝓸𝓵𝓿𝓮-𝓼𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓼𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓷𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓼 𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓮 𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓪𝓽𝓮𝓰𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓪𝓼. 𝓤𝓶 𝓪𝓽𝓪𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓾𝓶 𝓬𝓻𝓲𝓶𝓮, 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓰𝓮𝓶 𝓸𝓾 𝓾𝓶 𝓪𝓽𝓸 𝓱𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓵 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸. 𝓐 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓲𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓼𝓾𝓫𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮𝓵𝓮́𝓽𝓻𝓲𝓬𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓭𝓮 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓾𝓵𝓽𝓪𝓻 𝓭𝓮 𝓿𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓼𝓶𝓸, 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓪𝓫𝓸𝓽𝓪𝓰𝓮𝓶 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓹𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓸𝓪 𝓸𝓾 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓪 𝓹𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓸𝓬𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓽𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓰𝓮𝓲𝓻𝓪. 𝓤𝓶𝓪 𝓬𝓪𝓶𝓹𝓪𝓷𝓱𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓭𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓰𝓻𝓪𝓻 𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓯𝓻𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓷𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓵 𝓭𝓮 𝓲𝓭𝓮𝓲𝓪𝓼 𝓷𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓶𝓸𝓬𝓻𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓸𝓾 𝓯𝓪𝔃𝓮𝓻 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓽𝓮́𝓰𝓲𝓪 𝓸𝓻𝓰𝓪𝓷𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓯𝓮𝓻𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪. 𝓢𝓲𝓰𝓷𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓽𝓲𝓿𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮, 𝓸 𝓹𝓻𝓸́𝓹𝓻𝓲𝓸 𝓒𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓮𝓵𝓱𝓸 𝓪𝓭𝓶𝓲𝓽𝓮 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓼 𝓪𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓼𝓪̃𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓬𝓮𝓫𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓾𝓵𝓽𝓪𝓻 𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓽𝓮𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓻𝓮𝓶 𝓪𝓫𝓪𝓲𝔁𝓸 𝓭𝓸 𝓵𝓲𝓶𝓲𝓪𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓻𝓲𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓪𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓰𝓾𝓮𝓻𝓻𝓪.
𝓟𝓸𝓻 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮, 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝜾́𝓬𝓲𝓵 𝓮́ 𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓻 𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪, 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝜾́𝓬𝓲𝓵 𝓼𝓮 𝓽𝓸𝓻𝓷𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓮𝓿𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓮𝓬̧𝓪𝓻 𝓮, 𝓼𝓸𝓫𝓻𝓮𝓽𝓾𝓭𝓸, 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓮𝓿𝓮 𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓻 𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪. 𝓟𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓿𝓮𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓵, 𝓸 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓻𝓮𝓪𝓰𝓮 𝓪 𝓾𝓶 𝓪𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓲𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪́𝓿𝓮𝓵. 𝓟𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪, 𝓪 𝓮𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪́𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮, 𝓹𝓮𝓵𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓪́𝓻𝓲𝓸, 𝓭𝓪 𝓬𝓪𝓹𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓰𝓲𝓻 𝓬𝓸𝓶 𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓭𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪, 𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓸𝓵𝓱𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸, 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓽𝓲𝓵𝓱𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼, 𝓶𝓪𝓹𝓮𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓿𝓾𝓵𝓷𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓫𝓲𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮𝓼, 𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓬𝓸𝓼, 𝓪𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓪𝓷𝓱𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓲𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓬𝓮𝓷𝓪́𝓻𝓲𝓸𝓼. 𝓓𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓮 𝓶𝓸𝓭𝓸, 𝓪 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓵𝓸𝓬𝓪-𝓼𝓮 𝓭𝓸 𝓪𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓫𝓲𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓸 𝓪𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓮, 𝓬𝓸𝓶 𝓮𝓵𝓪, 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓵𝓸𝓬𝓪-𝓼𝓮 𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓫𝓮́𝓶 𝓪 𝓹𝓻𝓸́𝓹𝓻𝓲𝓪 𝓻𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓪 𝓰𝓸𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸.
𝓝𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓸 𝓮́ 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓲𝓻𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓷𝓸𝓿𝓸, 𝓮 𝓮́ 𝓳𝓾𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓲𝓼𝓼𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓿𝓮𝓻𝜾́𝓪𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓻 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓪𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓼𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪. 𝓝𝓾𝓶 𝓪𝓻𝓽𝓲𝓰𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓹𝓾𝓫𝓵𝓲𝓺𝓾𝓮𝓲 𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓶 𝓡𝓪𝓺𝓾𝓮𝓵 𝓭𝓪 𝓢𝓲𝓵𝓿𝓪 𝓷𝓪 “𝓒𝓻𝓲𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓵 𝓢𝓽𝓾𝓭𝓲𝓮𝓼 𝓸𝓷 𝓢𝓮𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓲𝓽𝔂”, 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪́𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓕𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓮 𝓟𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓾𝓰𝓪𝓵 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓻 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓻𝓪𝔃𝓪̃𝓸 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓶 𝓷𝜾́𝓿𝓮𝓲𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓻𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓻𝓪𝓭𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓵𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓬𝓪𝓫𝓪𝓶 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓿𝓸𝓵𝓿𝓮𝓻 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓼 𝓻𝓮𝓵𝓪𝓽𝓲𝓿𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓼. 𝓔𝓷𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓪́𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓭𝓸𝓲𝓼 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓼𝓸𝓼 𝓫𝓪𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝓮𝓻𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓼. 𝓔𝓷𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓸 𝓶𝓸𝓭𝓮𝓵𝓸 𝓯𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬𝓮̂𝓼 𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓸𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓸 𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓻𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓶𝓸 𝓪 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓮𝔁𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪𝓵 𝓪̀ 𝓲𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓻𝓮𝓹𝓾𝓫𝓵𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓷𝓪, 𝓯𝓪𝓿𝓸𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓼𝓮𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓲𝓽𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝓲𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓿𝓲𝓼𝜾́𝓿𝓮𝓵, 𝓸 𝓶𝓸𝓭𝓮𝓵𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓾𝓰𝓾𝓮̂𝓼 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓿𝓸𝓵𝓿𝓮𝓾-𝓼𝓮 𝓼𝓸𝓫𝓻𝓮𝓽𝓾𝓭𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓿𝓲𝓪 𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓷𝓸𝓬𝓻𝓪́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪, 𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓿𝓮́𝓼 𝓭𝓸 𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓷𝓱𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸, 𝓭𝓪 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓿𝓮𝓷𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮 𝓭𝓪 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓰𝓻𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓷𝓪𝓼 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓼 𝓮𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓲𝓪𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪.
𝓐 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓽𝓲𝓻 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝓮𝓻𝓮𝓷𝓬̧𝓪, 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓾𝓼𝓮𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓬𝓮𝓲𝓽𝓸 𝓭𝓮 “𝓰𝓸𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓲𝓷𝓰 𝓽𝓱𝓻𝓸𝓾𝓰𝓱 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓾𝓻𝓮”. 𝓞 𝓪𝓻𝓰𝓾𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓬𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓵 𝓼𝓾𝓼𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓸𝓼 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓼𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓶 𝓪𝓼 𝓼𝓾𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓪𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓮𝓷𝓯𝓻𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓶 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓭𝓲𝓻𝓮𝓽𝓪. 𝓕𝓪𝔃𝓮𝓶-𝓷𝓸 𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓫𝓮́𝓶 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪̃𝓸 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓮𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓮𝓶 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓼 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓭𝓾𝔃𝓮𝓶 𝓷𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓼, 𝓮𝔁𝓹𝓮𝓬𝓽𝓪𝓽𝓲𝓿𝓪𝓼, 𝓯𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸, 𝓪𝓿𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓪𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼, 𝓻𝓮𝓭𝓮𝓼 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓯𝓲𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓲𝓼, «𝓫𝓸𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓻𝓪́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓼» 𝓮 𝓬𝓾𝓼𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓻𝓮𝓹𝓾𝓽𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓮𝓶 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓼𝓮 𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓷𝓱𝓪. 𝓐 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓮𝓺𝓾𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓮́ 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓼𝓲𝓿𝓪, 𝓹𝓸𝓲𝓼 𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓭𝓮 𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮𝔁𝓹𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓲𝓻-𝓼𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓶 𝓳𝓪𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓼𝓪𝓻 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶 𝓶𝓸𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓮𝔁𝓬𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓵 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓵𝓮𝓰𝓲𝓽𝓲𝓶𝓮 𝓹𝓾𝓫𝓵𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪 𝓮𝔁𝓹𝓪𝓷𝓼𝓪̃𝓸. 𝓝𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮́ 𝓷𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪́𝓻𝓲𝓸, 𝓹𝓸𝓲𝓼 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓻𝓪𝓻 𝓾𝓶 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪, 𝓷𝓮𝓶 𝓶𝓸𝓫𝓲𝓵𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓻 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓾𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓪 𝓼𝓸𝓬𝓲𝓮𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓿𝓮́𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓷𝓪𝓻𝓻𝓪𝓽𝓲𝓿𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓮𝔁𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪𝓵. 𝓑𝓪𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓾𝓶 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓽𝓸𝓬𝓸𝓵𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸, 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓷𝓸𝓿𝓪 𝓫𝓪𝓼𝓮 𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼, 𝓾𝓶 𝓹𝓪𝓭𝓻𝓪̃𝓸 𝓽𝓮́𝓬𝓷𝓲𝓬𝓸 𝓸𝓾 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓶𝓮𝓽𝓸𝓭𝓸𝓵𝓸𝓰𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓿𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓬𝓸.
𝓤𝓶𝓪 𝓬𝓪𝓽𝓮𝓰𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓬𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓬𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓶 𝓵𝓲𝓶𝓲𝓽𝓮 𝓿𝓲𝓼𝜾́𝓿𝓮𝓵
𝓔́ 𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓫𝓮́𝓶 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪 𝓻𝓪𝔃𝓪̃𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪 𝓪𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓲𝓽𝓮𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪 𝓪𝓷𝓾𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓮𝓶 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓼𝓫𝓾𝓻𝓰𝓸 𝓮𝔁𝓲𝓰𝓮 𝓮𝓼𝓬𝓻𝓾𝓽𝜾́𝓷𝓲𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓸, 𝓮 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓪𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓪𝓼 𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓵. 𝓞 𝓰𝓾𝓪𝓻𝓭𝓪-𝓬𝓱𝓾𝓿𝓪 𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪𝓼 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓪𝓫𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓰𝓮, 𝓷𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓪𝓵𝓪𝓿𝓻𝓪𝓼 𝓭𝓸 𝓹𝓻𝓸́𝓹𝓻𝓲𝓸 𝓒𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓮𝓵𝓱𝓸, 𝓼𝓪𝓫𝓸𝓽𝓪𝓰𝓮𝓶 𝓭𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓻𝓪𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓻𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓼, 𝓬𝓲𝓫𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓽𝓪𝓺𝓾𝓮𝓼, 𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓲𝓹𝓾𝓵𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓵, 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓯𝓮𝓻𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓮𝓵𝓮𝓲𝓽𝓸𝓻𝓪𝓵 𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓵𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓪 𝓶𝓲𝓰𝓻𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸. 𝓣𝓪𝓵 𝓪𝓶𝓹𝓵𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓭𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓲 𝓼𝓲𝓶𝓾𝓵𝓽𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓪 𝓾𝓽𝓲𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓮 𝓸 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓲𝓰𝓸 𝓭𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓬𝓮𝓲𝓽𝓸. 𝓟𝓸𝓻 𝓾𝓶 𝓵𝓪𝓭𝓸, 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓲𝓽𝓮 𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓱𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓭𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓼𝓪́𝓻𝓲𝓸𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓪̂𝓷𝓮𝓸𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓫𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓶 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓶𝓲𝓵𝓲𝓽𝓪𝓻𝓮𝓼, 𝓮𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓸́𝓶𝓲𝓬𝓸𝓼, 𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓷𝓸𝓵𝓸́𝓰𝓲𝓬𝓸𝓼 𝓮 𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓸𝓼. 𝓟𝓸𝓻 𝓸𝓾𝓽𝓻𝓸 𝓵𝓪𝓭𝓸, 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓿𝓪𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓼𝓮 𝓽𝓸𝓻𝓷𝓪 𝓪 𝓬𝓪𝓽𝓮𝓰𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓪, 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓸𝓻 𝓮́ 𝓸 𝓾𝓷𝓲𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓼𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓹𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓪 𝓪 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓿𝓮́𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓵𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪.
𝓝𝓸 𝓷𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓸 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓾𝓭𝓸 𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪́𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪 𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓹𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓽𝓮, 𝓬𝓸𝓶 𝓸 𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓹𝓸, 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓮𝔁𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓸𝓻𝓭𝓲𝓷𝓪́𝓻𝓲𝓸𝓼 𝓮𝓶 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓬𝓮𝓭𝓲𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓷𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼. 𝓐 𝓼𝓮𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓲𝓽𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓮𝓲𝔁𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓻 𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓼𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓸 𝓮 𝓹𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓪 𝓪 𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓻 𝓹𝓮𝓵𝓪 𝓬𝓲𝓻𝓬𝓾𝓵𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓮𝔁𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓽𝓲𝓼𝓮 𝓮 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓼𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓪𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓭𝓸𝓶𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓽𝓮́𝓬𝓷𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓼. 𝓐 𝓰𝓾𝓮𝓻𝓻𝓪 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪 𝓪𝓰𝓻𝓪𝓿𝓪 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓵𝓱𝓮 𝓪𝓬𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓬𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪 𝓪 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓪 𝓲𝓷𝓬𝓮𝓻𝓽𝓮𝔃𝓪. 𝓢𝓮 𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓾𝓲 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓮𝓬̧𝓸 𝓲𝓭𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪́𝓿𝓮𝓵 𝓷𝓮𝓶 𝓵𝓲𝓶𝓲𝓪𝓻 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓼𝓾𝓪𝓵, 𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓫𝓮́𝓶 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓾𝓲 𝓯𝓲𝓶 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓻𝓪́𝓿𝓮𝓵. 𝓐 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮𝔁𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓸𝓻𝓭𝓲𝓷𝓪́𝓻𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓲𝔁𝓪, 𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪̃𝓸, 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓯𝓪𝓼𝓮 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓭𝓮 𝓪 𝓬𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓮 𝓮 𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓼𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪-𝓼𝓮 𝓷𝓸 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓷𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓵 𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓲𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼.
𝓥𝓪𝓵𝓮 𝓪 𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓪 𝓷𝓸𝓽𝓪𝓻, 𝓪 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓸́𝓼𝓲𝓽𝓸, 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓾𝓶 𝓟𝓻𝓸𝓽𝓸𝓬𝓸𝓵𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓔𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓢𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪́𝓿𝓮𝓵 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓵𝓺𝓾𝓮𝓻 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸-𝓜𝓮𝓶𝓫𝓻𝓸 𝓮́ 𝓮𝔁𝓪𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓸 𝓽𝓲𝓹𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓲𝓽𝓲𝓿𝓸 𝓬𝓾𝓳𝓪 𝓾𝓽𝓲𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓲𝓻𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓮 𝓺𝓾𝓮𝓶 𝓭𝓮𝓯𝓲𝓷𝓮 𝓸 𝓵𝓲𝓶𝓲𝓪𝓻. 𝓝𝓮𝓷𝓱𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪𝓼 𝓮𝓼𝓬𝓸𝓵𝓱𝓪𝓼 𝓮́ 𝓹𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓽𝓮́𝓬𝓷𝓲𝓬𝓪, 𝓮𝓶𝓫𝓸𝓻𝓪 𝓽𝓸𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓪𝓶 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓪𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓽𝓪𝓵. 𝓞 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓿𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓸𝓫𝓼𝓮𝓻𝓿𝓪𝓭𝓸, 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓶 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓬𝓸, 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓬𝓲𝓻𝓬𝓾𝓵𝓪, 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓲𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓰𝓪𝓷𝓱𝓪𝓶 𝓷𝓸𝓿𝓪𝓼 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓹𝓮𝓽𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪𝓼 𝓮 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓪 𝓲𝓷𝓬𝓮𝓻𝓽𝓮𝔃𝓪 𝓫𝓪𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓳𝓾𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓻 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓲𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓿𝓮𝓷𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓿𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓲𝓿𝓪 𝓼𝓪̃𝓸, 𝓽𝓸𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓮𝓵𝓪𝓼, 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓼𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓼.
𝓐 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓯𝓲𝓷𝓲𝓻𝓪́ 𝓪 𝓹𝓻𝓸́𝔁𝓲𝓶𝓪 𝓭𝓮́𝓬𝓪𝓭𝓪
𝓝𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓲𝓭𝓸, 𝓪 𝓯𝓻𝓪𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝓲𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓻𝓮𝓵𝓮𝓿𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓹𝓻𝓸́𝔁𝓲𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓷𝓸𝓼 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓼𝓮 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓫𝓮𝓵𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓻𝓪́ 𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓮 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼. 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓫𝓮𝓵𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓻-𝓼𝓮-𝓪́, 𝓶𝓾𝓲𝓽𝓸 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓿𝓪𝓿𝓮𝓵𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮, 𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓮 𝓾𝓶 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓬𝓪𝓹𝓪𝔃 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓹𝓪𝓻 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪𝓼 𝓮 𝓸𝓾𝓽𝓻𝓸 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓸𝓻𝓰𝓪𝓷𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓭𝓸 𝓮𝓶 𝓽𝓸𝓻𝓷𝓸 𝓭𝓪 𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓹𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪. 𝓐 𝓭𝓲𝓯𝓮𝓻𝓮𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓮 𝓼𝓾𝓫𝓽𝓲𝓵, 𝓶𝓪𝓼 𝓮́ 𝓯𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓪𝓵, 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓷𝓸 𝓹𝓻𝓲𝓶𝓮𝓲𝓻𝓸 𝓬𝓪𝓼𝓸 𝓪 𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓿𝓮𝓷𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓲𝓷𝓾𝓪 𝓪 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓾𝓶 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓭𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪, 𝓮𝓷𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓸 𝓷𝓸 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓼𝓮 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓽𝓮 𝓷𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓻𝓪𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓮 𝓰𝓸𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓸.
𝓥𝓸𝓷 𝓭𝓮𝓻 𝓛𝓮𝔂𝓮𝓷 𝓽𝓮𝓶 𝓻𝓪𝔃𝓪̃𝓸 𝓪𝓸 𝓪𝓯𝓲𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓻 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓲𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼 𝓮𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓲𝓪𝓼 𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓪𝓶 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓬𝓮𝓫𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓸𝓾𝓽𝓻𝓸 𝓶𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓸. 𝓐 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓾𝓷𝓽𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓸𝓾 𝓼𝓮𝓶 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓮́ 𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪 𝓪𝓭𝓪𝓹𝓽𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓯𝓪𝓻𝓪́, 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓼𝓾𝓪 𝓿𝓮𝔃, 𝓪̀𝓼 𝓹𝓻𝓸́𝓹𝓻𝓲𝓪𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓽𝓾𝓲𝓬̧𝓸̃𝓮𝓼. 𝓟𝓸𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪𝓼 𝓲𝓷𝓯𝓻𝓪𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓼 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓬̧𝓪 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓼𝓪̃𝓸 𝓪𝓹𝓮𝓷𝓪𝓼 𝓶𝓮𝓲𝓸𝓼 𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓿𝓮́𝓼 𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓺𝓾𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓸𝓼 𝓔𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓸𝓼 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓶 𝓪𝓸 𝓶𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓸. 𝓐𝓸 𝓵𝓸𝓷𝓰𝓸 𝓭𝓸 𝓽𝓮𝓶𝓹𝓸, 𝓬𝓻𝓲𝓪𝓶 𝓬𝓪𝓽𝓮𝓰𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓪𝓼, 𝓱𝓲𝓮𝓻𝓪𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓲𝔃𝓪𝓶 𝓹𝓻𝓲𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮𝓼, 𝓭𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓲𝓫𝓾𝓮𝓶 𝓻𝓮𝓬𝓾𝓻𝓼𝓸𝓼 𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓯𝓲𝓷𝓮𝓶 𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓭𝓮𝓿𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓿𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓶𝓸 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓲𝓰𝓸𝓼𝓸, 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓭𝓾𝔃𝓲𝓷𝓭𝓸, 𝓷𝓸 𝓯𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓸, 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓲𝓷𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓲𝓻𝓪 𝓭𝓮 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓬𝓮𝓫𝓮𝓻 𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓪𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓿𝓮́𝓼 𝓭𝓸 𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓬𝓸.
𝓐 𝓵𝓲𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓭𝓸 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓽𝓮𝓻𝓻𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓼𝓶𝓸 𝓮𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓮𝓾 𝓮́, 𝓪 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓵𝓾𝔃, 𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓱𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓭𝓪. 𝓜𝓮𝓭𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓳𝓾𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓯𝓲𝓬𝓪𝓭𝓪𝓼 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓬𝓲𝓻𝓬𝓾𝓷𝓼𝓽𝓪̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪𝓼 𝓮𝔁𝓬𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓷𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓽𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓶 𝓪 𝓼𝓸𝓫𝓻𝓮𝓿𝓲𝓿𝓮𝓻 𝓪𝓸 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓵𝓱𝓮𝓼 𝓭𝓮𝓾 𝓸𝓻𝓲𝓰𝓮𝓶. 𝓐 𝓵𝓲𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓷𝓸𝓿𝓪, 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓮́𝓶, 𝓮́ 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓬𝓸𝓷𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓽𝓪́𝓿𝓮𝓵, 𝓳𝓪́ 𝓺𝓾𝓮, 𝓷𝓪 𝓪𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓲𝓽𝓮𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪 𝓪𝓰𝓸𝓻𝓪 𝓮𝓶 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓱𝓸, 𝓭𝓮𝓲𝔁𝓸𝓾 𝓭𝓮 𝓼𝓮𝓻 𝓷𝓮𝓬𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓪́𝓻𝓲𝓪 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓵𝓲𝓶𝓲𝓽𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓭𝓮𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓬𝓪𝓭𝓮𝓪𝓻 𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓬𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓸. 𝓑𝓪𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓫𝓲𝓵𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓭𝓮 𝓭𝓪 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓬̧𝓪 𝓮 𝓮𝓵𝓪, 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓭𝓮𝓯𝓲𝓷𝓲𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸, 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓬𝓮.
𝓐 𝓔𝓾𝓻𝓸𝓹𝓪 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪́ 𝓪 𝓪𝓹𝓻𝓮𝓷𝓭𝓮𝓻 𝓪 𝓰𝓸𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪𝓻 𝓷𝓾𝓶 𝓶𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓸 𝓭𝓮 𝓪𝓶𝓮𝓪𝓬̧𝓪𝓼 𝓱𝜾́𝓫𝓻𝓲𝓭𝓪𝓼, 𝓮 𝓽𝓮𝓶 𝓭𝓮 𝓸 𝓯𝓪𝔃𝓮𝓻. 𝓕𝓪𝓵𝓽𝓪 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓬𝓮𝓫𝓮𝓻 𝓼𝓮, 𝓷𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓮 𝓹𝓻𝓸𝓬𝓮𝓼𝓼𝓸, 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓻𝓮𝓶𝓸𝓼 𝓲𝓰𝓾𝓪𝓵𝓶𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓪 𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓲𝓻 𝓪 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓽𝓻𝓪𝓷𝓼𝓯𝓸𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓫𝓪𝓼𝓽𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓶𝓪𝓲𝓼 𝓼𝓲𝓵𝓮𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓸𝓼𝓪, 𝓲𝓼𝓽𝓸 𝓮́, 𝓪̀ 𝓹𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓪𝓰𝓮𝓶 𝓭𝓮 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓹𝓸𝓵𝜾́𝓽𝓲𝓬𝓪 𝓪𝓼𝓼𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮 𝓷𝓪 𝓻𝓮𝓼𝓹𝓸𝓼𝓽𝓪 𝓪̀ 𝓮𝓶𝓮𝓻𝓰𝓮̂𝓷𝓬𝓲𝓪 𝓹𝓪𝓻𝓪 𝓾𝓶𝓪 𝓰𝓸𝓿𝓮𝓻𝓷𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓮𝓼𝓽𝓻𝓾𝓽𝓾𝓻𝓪𝓭𝓪 𝓹𝓮𝓵𝓪 𝓪𝓷𝓽𝓮𝓬𝓲𝓹𝓪𝓬̧𝓪̃𝓸 𝓹𝓮𝓻𝓶𝓪𝓷𝓮𝓷𝓽𝓮. 𝓔 𝓭𝓪 𝓼𝓮𝓰𝓾𝓷𝓭𝓪 𝓷𝓪̃𝓸 𝓼𝓮 𝓼𝓪𝓲 𝓹𝓸𝓻 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓻𝓮𝓽𝓸, 𝓹𝓸𝓻𝓺𝓾𝓮 𝓷𝓾𝓷𝓬𝓪 𝓯𝓸𝓲 𝓭𝓮𝓬𝓵𝓪𝓻𝓪𝓭𝓪.
* Professor da Universidade Europeia
IN "O JORNAL ECONÓMICO" - 07/10/26 .
.
4548.UNIÃO
EUROPEIA
ESPANHA
VERGONHA À MADRILENA
“Adios Maricarmen”, centenas protestam
em Madrid após morte de pensionista
(Casa Real, governo de Sanchez
e justicialismo espanhol, até que
enfim podem respirar de alívio)..
FONTE: 
putin HUYLO
trump is also a killer
of innocent people Ukrainians
Agora também activo russo
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