.
Qual o objetivo
da modernização
acelerada do PLA?
Não parece que a China se prepare ou tenha a intenção de iniciar um
conflito militar em larga escala, mas indica que os dirigentes chineses
consideram esse conflito muito provável e talvez inevitável, algures no
final da década de 2020/início da década de 2030.
𝖯𝗈𝗋 𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖻𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝟫𝟫 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖤𝗑𝖾́𝗋𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖯𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖫𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (𝖯𝖫𝖠) 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 (𝟣 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗈) 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖾𝖻𝖾𝗋 𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗍𝗋𝖺́𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈 𝖿𝖾𝗓 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗂𝗅𝗁𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎ı́𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖿𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗇𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗎ı́𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗋𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗎́𝗅𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾́𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺.
𝖭𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 – 𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 𝖾 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝖱𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌: 𝖤𝗑𝖾́𝗋𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈, 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖾 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖠𝖾́𝗋𝖾𝖺, 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝖯𝗈𝗅ı́𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖯𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 (𝖯𝖠𝖯) 𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝗂𝗅ı́𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 –, 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖾𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖫𝗂𝗏𝗋𝗈𝗌 𝖡𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗎𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖯𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗆 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗌𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖺̀𝗌 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾 𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖾𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝗍𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗀𝗈, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗅, 𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́ 𝗇𝖺 𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠, 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺.
𝖠 𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 𝗌𝗎𝗋𝗀𝗂𝗎-𝗆𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟤, 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺 𝖭𝖠𝖳𝖮 𝖺 𝖯𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗆, 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖾𝗂 𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖤𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈-𝖬𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖬𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺 𝖭𝖠𝖳𝖮 𝖾 𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 (𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟨 𝗍𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗅𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝟫.ª 𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖺). 𝖮 𝖽𝗂𝖺́𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗅 (𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖿𝖿-𝗍𝗈-𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖿𝖿) 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗈 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈-𝖬𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖬𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺 𝖭𝖠𝖳𝖮 𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗆-𝗌𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟢, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗎𝗇𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗂𝗌, 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖭𝖠𝖳𝖮, 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗎𝗉𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗈𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗎 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝗈𝗏𝗂𝖽.
𝖣𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗆𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝖺𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗌: 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗆 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗉𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝖫𝖢𝖣 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗍𝗈 𝖺 𝗅𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝗏𝗈; 𝖾 𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝗃𝗈𝖼𝗈𝗌𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆 𝖺𝗈 𝖾𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺, 𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝗂𝗀𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟣𝟫𝟪𝟫, 𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎ı́𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗇𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗌𝗈 𝖾𝗑𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖺̀ 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺, 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗁𝗈𝗃𝖾, 𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗂𝖺𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖴𝖼𝗋𝖺̂𝗇𝗂𝖺, 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗈 𝖾𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗋𝗀𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝗏𝗂𝗀𝗈𝗋.
𝖠𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟧
𝖤𝗆 𝟣𝟨 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟥, 𝗈 𝖦𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾̂𝗌 𝗉𝗎𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖫𝗂𝗏𝗋𝗈 𝖡𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺̀𝗌 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 («𝖠 𝖴𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖣𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺»), 𝖼𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝖷𝗂 𝖩𝗂𝗇𝗉𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝗅ı́𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝗆𝖺́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝗎𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 (𝖯𝖢𝖢), 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗉𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗉𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈.
𝖠𝗌 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗌, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗇𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠, 𝗂𝗇𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆-𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟧, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗈𝖻𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗓𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗆. 𝖠𝗅𝗀𝗈 𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝟣𝟫𝟧𝟢. 𝖥𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺, 𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈𝗅𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖢𝖢 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌, 𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗌 (𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗌 𝖱𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌), 𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗎𝗋𝗌𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗇𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈.
𝖢𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗆𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖺𝗅 (𝟥𝟢𝟢 𝗆𝗂𝗅 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟤,𝟥 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝟤 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗁𝗈̃𝖾𝗌) 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝖤𝗑𝖾́𝗋𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 (𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗈𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝖻𝗌𝗈𝗅𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗌); 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗅 (𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗀𝗈𝗌 𝟦 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖣𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖦𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 (𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈-𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋, 𝗉𝗈𝗅ı́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗅𝗈𝗀ı́𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈) 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎ı́𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝟣𝟧 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌/𝖺𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺̀ 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖬𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖢𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗅; 𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖦𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝗈 𝖤𝗑𝖾́𝗋𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺, 𝖽𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺 𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗅-𝗀𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗈 (𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌).
𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖬𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗆 𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗍𝗈 𝖾 𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗀𝖺 “𝖲𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺” 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝗆ı́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝖼𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌; 𝖽𝖺 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖠𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅, 𝖼𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖾́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗍𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗀𝗇𝖾́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅; 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗆𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌 (𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗀𝖺𝗌 𝟩 𝖱𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖬𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎ı́𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝟧 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝖾𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗈 (𝖫𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾, 𝖲𝗎𝗅, 𝖮𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾, 𝖭𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖾 𝖢𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗈) 𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖼ı́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 (𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖾𝗑𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗈, 𝗈 𝖢𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖫𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇).
𝖴𝗆 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗅𝗁𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖱𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 (𝖤𝗑𝖾́𝗋𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈, 𝖬𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖾 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖠𝖾́𝗋𝖾𝖺). 𝖨𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺, 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗅𝗈𝗇𝗀𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗋𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗂𝗋𝖺𝗌, 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 (𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇, 𝖬𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝗈 𝖲𝗎𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺, 𝖾𝗍𝖼.). 𝖤𝗆 𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝖽𝖾 𝖣𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 (𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝗅𝖾𝗑ı́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌). 𝖠 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟨 𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟪, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟢.
𝖮 𝖫𝗂𝗏𝗋𝗈 𝖡𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟫
𝖤𝗆 𝗃𝗎𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟫, 𝖯𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗆 𝗉𝗎𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝗎𝗆 𝗇𝗈𝗏𝗈 𝖫𝗂𝗏𝗋𝗈 𝖡𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗎𝗆 𝗍ı́𝗍𝗎𝗅𝗈 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝗎𝗀𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈: «𝖠 𝖣𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖭𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖭𝗈𝗏𝖺 𝖤𝗋𝖺», 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟥 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟧. 𝖮 𝖽𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝖺𝗏𝖺-𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝖫𝗂𝗏𝗋𝗈 𝖡𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟥 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗓, 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗈𝖻𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 «𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗌» 𝗌𝗈𝖻 𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖢𝖢: 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅, 𝗈𝗎𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 (𝖺𝗃𝗎𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗍𝖺́𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗈𝖿𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌, 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾, 𝖾𝗍𝖼.), 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 (𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖾𝗑𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗈, 𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗍𝖺, 𝖾𝗏𝖺𝖼𝗎𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌, 𝖾𝗍𝖼.) 𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖻𝖾𝗇𝗌 𝗉𝗎́𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝗀𝗅𝗈𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗌 (𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗎𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝖽𝖺 𝖮𝖭𝖴, 𝖺𝗃𝗎𝖽𝖺 𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗍𝖺́𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗈𝖿𝖾𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈).
𝖮 𝖽𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗂𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝖺 “𝖭𝗈𝗏𝖺 𝖤𝗋𝖺”, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝗎𝗇𝗁𝖺-𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗏𝗈, 𝗉𝖺𝖼ı́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖾 𝖻𝖾𝗇𝖾́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗀𝗅𝗈𝖻𝖺𝗅, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖺𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠, 𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗎𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖬𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝗈 𝖲𝗎𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺, 𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇.
𝖠 𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗎𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝗎𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖾𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗂𝗌 (𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇) 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝗎𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟣𝟥, «𝖠 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗋𝖾𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺», 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖯𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗈 𝗎𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺; «𝖮 𝖤𝗑𝖾́𝗋𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖯𝗈𝗉𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝖫𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗎𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖾 𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗏𝖺𝗀𝗎𝖺𝗋𝖽𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖺 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖼𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗈.» 𝖤 𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗍𝖺 𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 “𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺” («𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺-𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌») 𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗅ı́𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖾 𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖾 𝖺 𝗈𝖿𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅/𝗍𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺.
𝖮 𝖽𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗈𝖻𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗌: 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗂𝗋 𝖺 𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝗌𝖺𝗅𝗏𝖺𝗀𝗎𝖺𝗋𝖽𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 (𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇, 𝗈 𝖬𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖬𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖽𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖨𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗌 𝖣𝗂𝖺𝗈𝗒𝗎), 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗋-𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 (𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇, 𝖽𝗈 𝖳𝗂𝖻𝖾𝗍𝖾 𝖾 𝖽𝗈 𝖴𝗂𝗀𝗎𝗋𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺̃𝗈), 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗀𝖾𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅.
𝖮 𝖽𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗃𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗏𝖺 𝖺 𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗂𝖺, 𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗎 𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗎𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺: «𝖠 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝗇𝗎𝗇𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗂𝗋𝖺́ 𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗂𝗇𝗁𝗈 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗍𝗋𝗂𝗅𝗁𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗍𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝗁𝖾𝗀𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗂𝖺.» 𝖣𝖾𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖾 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝖺𝗓𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝗆𝖾𝖼𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗆ı́𝗇𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝖼𝖾𝗋𝖼𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟢, 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝟤𝟢𝟥𝟧, 𝖽𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖺̀ 𝖿𝗎𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗅-𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋, 𝖼𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗊𝗎𝗂 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌, 𝖺̀ «𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈» 𝖾 𝖺̀𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺, 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾.
𝖮𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗆 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖠𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗁𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝟤𝟢𝟥𝟢 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟣𝟢𝟢𝟢 𝗈𝗀𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝖼𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌, 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗆 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗈́𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝗍𝗋ı́𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝗎𝖼𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗋 (𝗆ı́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗌, 𝖻𝗈𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗋𝖽𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈𝗌). 𝖠 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 𝗃𝖺́ 𝖾́ 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗇𝗎́𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗇𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈𝗌. 𝖯𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗎𝗂 𝟥 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺-𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌, 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗆𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝖼𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝗆ı́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈. 𝖠 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖠𝖾́𝗋𝖾𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗎𝗂 𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟧.ª 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (𝖩-𝟤𝟢 𝖾 𝖺 𝖿𝖺𝗆ı́𝗅𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝖼̧𝖺𝗌 𝖩-𝟥𝟧/𝖩-𝟥𝟧𝖠) 𝖾 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗏𝗂𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟨.ª 𝗀𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 (𝖩-𝟥𝟨), 𝖽𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖠 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖾 𝗇𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗆ı́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖻𝖺𝗅ı́𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗋𝗎𝗓𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌 (𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗂𝗅 𝗆ı́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗂𝗋 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇 𝖾 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝖺̃𝗈), 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗍𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺𝗏𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 “𝖭𝗈𝗏𝗈𝗌 𝖣𝗈𝗆ı́𝗇𝗂𝗈𝗌” (𝖼𝗒𝖻𝖾𝗋, 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖺𝖼̧𝗈 𝖾 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗍𝗋𝗈́𝗇𝗂𝖼𝖺), 𝖺𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗇𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎ı́𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗈̂𝗌 𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅.
𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝗍𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝖾 𝗏𝗂𝗌𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗆 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗂𝗋 𝗈𝗎 𝗆𝖾𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝗇𝗈 𝖨𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝖯𝖺𝖼ı́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈. 𝖠 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗈̃𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌ı́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝖳𝖺𝗂𝗐𝖺𝗇, 𝖾𝗆𝖻𝗈𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗏𝖺𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝖿ı́𝖻𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗅𝗁𝖺 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗍𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝖿𝗂𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗑𝗈.
𝖮 𝖺𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗍𝖾. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝗌𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾 𝗈𝗎 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖾𝗆 𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝖺𝗅𝖺, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝗂𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖾 𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗏𝖾𝗓 𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾́𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟢/𝗂𝗇ı́𝖼𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾́𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟥𝟢, 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈, 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖺 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝖴𝖠.
𝖠 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗋𝖺́𝗉𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖯𝖫𝖠 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖾-𝗌𝖾 𝗇𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖺𝖻𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗀𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖾𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗓 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗋 𝖺 𝗌𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌, 𝖻𝗅𝗈𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗂𝗈𝗌, 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝖺𝗉𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖼𝖺𝗍𝖺́𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗈𝖿𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝖺 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗀𝗎𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺. 𝖮 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗏𝖺𝗂 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗎́𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖺ı́𝗌, 𝖺 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗌𝖺 𝖼𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗅 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗋𝖺𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗎𝗋𝖻𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗌, 𝖻𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅. 𝖳𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖺-𝗌𝖾, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖾𝗇𝖿𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗂𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌. 𝖯𝗈𝗋 𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈, 𝖿𝖺𝗓 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖶𝖺𝗌𝗁𝗂𝗇𝗀𝗍𝗈𝗇 𝖾 𝖾𝗆 𝖡𝗋𝗎𝗑𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝖼𝖺́𝗅𝖼𝗎𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗍𝖾́𝗀𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗆𝖻𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝖨𝗇𝖽𝗈-𝖯𝖺𝖼ı́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈.
* Major-general
IN "O JORNAL ECONÓMICO" -28/07/26 .
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