VERA FERREIRA

 .

Da COP27 só

recordaremos as ocupações

Enquanto os militantes pela justiça climática foram obrigados a ficar à porta, os principais protagonistas do capitalismo fóssil continuaram a marcar presença nas Conferências do Clima. Têm acesso privilegiado às delegações políticas e conseguiram que os reatores nucleares, o gás natural e centrais a carvão com tecnologias de captura e armazenamento de carbono fossem equiparadas às energias renováveis.

“𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖺𝗎𝗍𝗈𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗋𝗎𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈 𝗉𝖾́ 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋”. 𝖰𝗎𝖾𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖿𝖾𝗋𝗂𝗎 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗏𝗋𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗆 𝖠𝗇𝗍𝗈́𝗇𝗂𝗈 𝖦𝗎𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌 (𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗎𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗎𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈), 𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝟤𝟩ª 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖮𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖭𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 (𝖢𝖮𝖯𝟤𝟩).

𝖮𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝖮𝖯𝟤𝟩 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝗋𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝗋𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗆. 𝖮 𝗁𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗋𝖺𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾́ 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗌𝗂𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗏𝖺𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖾𝗆 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗌𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌: 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝖮𝖯𝟣, 𝖾𝗆 𝟣𝟫𝟫𝟧, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗀𝖺𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗎𝖿𝖺 (𝖦𝖤𝖤) 𝗍𝖾̂𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖺𝗌𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 (𝖾𝗑𝖼𝖾𝗍𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝗂́𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗂𝖺). 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗇𝗈, 𝗇𝗈 𝖤𝗀𝗂𝗍𝗈, 𝖺𝗉𝗈́𝗌 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗋𝖺𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟣𝟥 𝖽𝗂𝖺𝗌, “𝗈 𝗇𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗇𝖾𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗏𝗂𝖼̧𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗋𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺”, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗎 𝗈 𝖲𝖾𝖼𝗋𝖾𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈-𝖦𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖭𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌. 𝖴𝗆𝖺 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗎 𝖯𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗂𝗋𝗂𝖺 “𝗉𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗇𝖾𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈”, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖿𝖾𝗓 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗋 𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗎𝖺𝗋 𝗎𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾́𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌. 𝖮𝗎𝗍𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗂𝗌𝖺 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗎𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗋𝗍 𝖽𝖾 𝗅𝗎𝗑𝗈 𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗂𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖢𝗈𝖼𝖺-𝖢𝗈𝗅𝖺.

𝖠𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗀𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗈𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝗈𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖾𝗀𝗂́𝗉𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝖮𝖯, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗈𝖻𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝗌𝖺𝖻𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗀𝖾𝗆 (𝗆𝗎𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗌 𝖻𝖾𝗆-𝗌𝗎𝖼𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌) 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖽𝗎𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗋𝗈́𝗅𝖾𝗈 𝖾 𝗀𝖺́𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅, 𝖾 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗀𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖻𝗅𝗈𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗅𝖾𝗑𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗀𝖾𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗋𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖿𝗈́𝗋𝗎𝗇𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌.

𝖮 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 “𝗁𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝖼𝗈” 𝖺𝗅𝖼𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗈 𝗎́𝗅𝗍𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖽𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺, 𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾̂ 𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗂́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖺𝖽𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗏𝗎𝗅𝗇𝖾𝗋𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌, 𝖽𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺 𝖺𝗎𝗌𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝗋 𝖽𝗋𝖺𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖦𝖤𝖤 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖾́𝖽𝗂𝖺 𝗀𝗅𝗈𝖻𝖺𝗅, 𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺 𝗎𝗍𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝗈́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌.

𝖠 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖾𝗓𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖺, 𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖺́𝗌, 𝗈 𝖿𝗋𝖺𝖼𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗉𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺̀𝗌 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌: 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗍𝖺́-𝗅𝖺𝗌, 𝗈𝗎 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗂𝗋 𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗎𝗌 𝗂𝗆𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝗀𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗀𝖺𝗆 𝗈 𝖿𝖺𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝗈𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 – 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗅𝖺𝗀𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼̧𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺. 𝖤𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖺, 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗂𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗂𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗋-𝗌𝖾-𝗂𝖺 𝖺̀ 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝗋𝖾𝗆𝗈𝗌. 𝖱𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗌𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗋 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗈́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝖺𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗈𝗎 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝗌𝗎𝖻𝗂𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗆𝖾́𝖽𝗂𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺́𝗀𝗎𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗋.

𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈, 𝗎𝗆 𝗈𝖻𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗍𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖺 𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 (𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖭𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝖬𝖾𝗂𝗈 𝖠𝗆𝖻𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖾 𝖣𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖾𝗆 𝟣𝟫𝟫𝟤) 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗈𝗎 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝗈𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗏𝖾𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖠𝗆𝖾́𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝖽𝖺 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖺̃𝗈 𝖤𝗎𝗋𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗂𝖺 (𝖴𝖤) 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝖺̀ 𝗎́𝗅𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺 𝗁𝗈𝗋𝖺. 𝖤 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺́, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗉𝖾𝖼𝗍𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝗂𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌: 𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗎 𝗇𝗈 𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 (𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌), 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 “𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈” 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗏𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖰𝗎𝖺𝖽𝗋𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖭𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾 𝖠𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖢𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟣𝟫𝟫𝟤.

𝖮𝗋𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖾́ 𝖿𝖺́𝖼𝗂𝗅 𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋, 𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖾𝗋𝖺 𝗎𝗆 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝖴𝖤 𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾. 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾𝗑𝗂𝗀𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗂 𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖽𝖺, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗀𝗎𝗇𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗂𝗌𝗈𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝗂𝗇𝖺 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗏𝖾́𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾 𝖽𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖦𝟩𝟩 (𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈), 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗃𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾. 𝖮 𝖺𝖼𝗈𝗋𝖽𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖼𝖾, 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗆, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗂𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 “𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈” 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖻𝗎𝗂𝗋 𝗇𝗎𝗆𝖺 𝖻𝖺𝗌𝖾 𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗎𝗇𝗍𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺.

𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗎𝗅𝗍𝖺, 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖽𝖺 𝗀𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗈𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖾 𝗌𝗈𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖾𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗆 𝖽𝗈 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗅𝗁𝗈 𝖺́𝗋𝖽𝗎𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗌𝗈𝖼𝗂𝖾𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗅, 𝖽𝖾 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼̧𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗎𝗇𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺 𝖽𝖺 𝖿𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾, 𝗆𝖺𝗌 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖻𝖾́𝗆 𝖽𝖺 𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖼𝖾𝗋𝗍𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝖽𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗌𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌.

𝖠𝗍𝖾́ 𝖺𝗈 𝗆𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝖾-𝗌𝖾 𝖺 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖽𝗈𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝗋𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗅 𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝗉𝗈𝗎𝖼𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝖾𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺́-𝗅𝗈. 𝖤́ 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺̀ 𝗌𝗎𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺, 𝗈𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗓𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈, 𝗇𝗈𝗆𝖾𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗈𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖻𝖾𝗇𝖾𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝗈𝗌, 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖺𝗅𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖾 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝖽𝗂𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝗈́ 𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗁𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺 𝖢𝖮𝖯𝟤𝟪, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗂𝗋𝖺́ 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗋 𝗇𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈́𝗑𝗂𝗆𝗈 𝖺𝗇𝗈, 𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖤𝗆𝗂𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖠́𝗋𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗌 𝖴𝗇𝗂𝖽𝗈𝗌 – 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗎𝗆 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗆𝗈𝖼𝗋𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈, 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖽𝗂𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗍𝗈𝗌 𝗁𝗎𝗆𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗆𝗈𝗍𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖺 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗀𝖾́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺.

𝖬𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝗆𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺, 𝗅𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖼𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖻𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗂́𝗌𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗏𝗈𝗅𝗏𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗌𝗈𝖻𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝖾𝗆, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗏𝖾𝗆 𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗁𝖺́𝖻𝗂𝗍𝗈, 𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗎𝗌𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗈𝗌 𝖿𝖺𝗅𝗁𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝗈𝗌. 𝖮𝗌 𝗉𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝖼𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝗋 𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖦𝖤𝖤 𝖺𝗍𝖾́ 𝟤𝟢𝟥𝟢 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗎𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗈 𝖺𝗎𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖺 𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝗆𝖾́𝖽𝗂𝖺 𝗀𝗅𝗈𝖻𝖺𝗅 𝖺 𝟣,𝟧 𝖢º, 𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗅𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝗇𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝖾́-𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗂𝗌 – 𝗈 𝗅𝗂𝗆𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗅𝖾𝖼𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝖼𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝖺𝗏𝗂𝖺, 𝗃𝖺́ 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗎𝗉𝗈̃𝖾 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗌𝖿𝗈𝗋𝗆𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗌𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗋𝖾. 𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝖾 𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝗈𝗎 𝗎𝗆 𝖺𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖿𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈, 𝗇𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝖺𝗆𝗉𝗈𝗎𝖼𝗈 𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗈 𝖿𝗂𝗋𝗆𝖾 𝖾 𝗂𝗇𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂́𝗏𝗈𝖼𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝖻𝗃𝖾𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈, 𝗍𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝖾𝗆 𝗆𝖾𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝗏𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗎𝗅𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗏𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌, 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗁𝖺́ 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗂𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈𝗌 𝖺 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗅𝖺𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖽𝖾 𝖺 𝖢𝖮𝖯𝟤𝟨, 𝖾𝗆 𝖦𝗅𝖺𝗌𝗀𝗈𝗐.

𝖢𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗈 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗃𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗅, 𝗈 𝖯𝗅𝖺𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖨𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖲𝗁𝖺𝗋𝗆 𝖾𝗅-𝖲𝗁𝖾𝗂𝗄𝗁 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝗌𝗂𝗍𝗎𝖺 𝗈 𝗉𝗂𝖼𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖦𝖤𝖤 𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟧, 𝗇𝖾𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗉𝗎𝗅𝖺 𝗈 𝖺𝖻𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈𝗇𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝖿𝗂𝗇𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗏𝗈 (𝗈𝗎 𝗌𝖾𝗊𝗎𝖾𝗋 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗀𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗏𝗈) 𝖽𝖾 𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝗈́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌. 𝖤́ 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝖾𝗍𝗂𝖽𝗈 𝗈 𝖺𝗉𝖾𝗅𝗈 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝗂𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾 𝖦𝗅𝖺𝗌𝗀𝗈𝗐 𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺 “𝗋𝖾𝖽𝗎𝗓𝗂𝗋 𝗀𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗎𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾” 𝗈 𝗎𝗌𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗏𝖺̃𝗈. 𝖠 𝖼𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗃𝖺 𝗇𝗈 𝗍𝗈𝗉𝗈 𝖽𝗈 𝖻𝗈𝗅𝗈: 𝖺𝗌 𝖼𝗁𝖺𝗆𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 “𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗀𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖻𝖺𝗂𝗑𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌”, 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗉𝗈𝖽𝖾𝗆 𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗅𝗎𝗂𝗋, 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝖾𝗑𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗅𝗈, 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗍𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗌 𝗇𝗎𝖼𝗅𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖾𝗌, 𝗀𝖺́𝗌 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗅 (𝗎𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖿𝗈́𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗅, 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗌𝗊𝗎𝖾𝖼̧𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗌) 𝖾 𝖼𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖺 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝗏𝖺̃𝗈 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝗍𝖾𝖼𝗇𝗈𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖺 𝖾 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖺𝗓𝖾𝗇𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾 𝖼𝖺𝗋𝖻𝗈𝗇𝗈, 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾𝗊𝗎𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺̀𝗌 𝖾𝗇𝖾𝗋𝗀𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗈𝗏𝖺́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌.

𝖭𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗌𝗎𝗋𝗉𝗋𝖾𝖾𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝖺 𝗂𝗇𝖽𝗎́𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗂𝖺 𝖿𝗈́𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗅 𝗌𝖾 𝖿𝖾𝗓 𝗋𝖾𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝗈𝗋 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝟨𝟢𝟢 𝗅𝗈𝖻𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 (𝗍𝗈𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝗆𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌, 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝗌𝖾𝗀𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗂𝗈𝗋 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝖺̃𝗈 𝗇𝖺 𝖢𝖮𝖯). 𝖲𝗂𝗆, 𝗈𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗌 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗀𝗈𝗇𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖼𝖺𝗉𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗌𝗆𝗈 𝖿𝗈́𝗌𝗌𝗂𝗅, 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝖺 𝖡𝖯, 𝖺 𝖢𝗁𝖾𝗏𝗋𝗈𝗇 𝗈𝗎 𝖺 𝖤𝗑𝗑𝗈𝗇 𝖬𝗈𝖻𝗂𝗅, 𝖼𝗈𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗎𝖺𝗆 𝖺 𝗆𝖺𝗋𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝗉𝗋𝖾𝗌𝖾𝗇𝖼̧𝖺 𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖢𝗈𝗇𝖿𝖾𝗋𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝗈 𝖢𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺, 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗅𝖾𝗀𝗂𝖺𝖽𝗈 𝖺̀𝗌 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌, 𝖾𝗇𝗊𝗎𝖺𝗇𝗍𝗈 𝗈𝗌 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗅𝖺 𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼̧𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺 𝗌𝖺̃𝗈 𝗈𝖻𝗋𝗂𝗀𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖺 𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝖺̀ 𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺.

𝖢𝗈𝗆𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗋𝖺́ 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅 𝖾𝗏𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝖺𝗌 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝖽𝖺𝗇𝗈𝗌 𝗊𝗎𝖾 𝗇𝖾𝖼𝖾𝗌𝗌𝖺𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗋𝖺̃𝗈 𝖽𝖺𝗌 𝖺𝗅𝗍𝖾𝗋𝖺𝖼̧𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖺𝗍𝖺𝖼𝖺𝗋 𝖺 𝗋𝖺𝗂𝗓 𝖽𝗈 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝖻𝗅𝖾𝗆𝖺, 𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗈 𝖾́, 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗍𝖺𝗋 𝗋𝖺𝖽𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝖾𝗆𝗂𝗌𝗌𝗈̃𝖾𝗌 𝖽𝖾 𝖦𝖤𝖤 𝖾 𝗌𝖾𝗆 𝗋𝖾𝗇𝗎𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗋 𝗍𝗈𝗍𝖺𝗅𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆𝖻𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗂𝗌 𝖿𝗈́𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗂𝗌? 𝖠 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗍𝖺 𝖾́ 𝗌𝗂𝗆𝗉𝗅𝖾𝗌: 𝗇𝖺̃𝗈 𝖾́ 𝗉𝗈𝗌𝗌𝗂́𝗏𝖾𝗅. 𝖮𝗌 𝗃𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗇𝗌 – 𝗉𝖾𝗋𝖿𝖾𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗁𝖺𝖽𝗈𝗌 𝖼𝗈𝗆 𝖺 𝖼𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝗅𝗂𝗆𝖺́𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗇𝗈𝗍𝖾-𝗌𝖾 – 𝗊𝗎𝖾, 𝖽𝗎𝗋𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝗆𝖺𝗇𝖺𝗌 𝖽𝖺 𝖢𝖮𝖯𝟤𝟩, 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝖺𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝗈𝖼𝗎𝗉𝖺𝗋𝖺𝗆 𝖾𝗌𝖼𝗈𝗅𝖺𝗌 𝗌𝖾𝖼𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖺́𝗋𝗂𝖺𝗌 𝖾 𝗎𝗇𝗂𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗌𝗂𝖽𝖺𝖽𝖾𝗌 𝖾𝗆 𝖯𝗈𝗋𝗍𝗎𝗀𝖺𝗅, 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗋𝗋𝖾𝗇𝖽𝗈 𝗅𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗆𝖺𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍𝖾 𝖺̀ 𝖽𝖾𝗌𝗈𝖻𝖾𝖽𝗂𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝖼𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗅 𝖾 𝖺̀ 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗂𝗌𝗍𝖾̂𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺 𝗉𝖺𝖼𝗂́𝖿𝗂𝖼𝖺, 𝗌𝖺𝖻𝖾𝗆-𝗇𝗈 𝖻𝖾𝗆.

* Doutoranda em Alterações Climáticas e Políticas de Desenvolvimento Sustentável no Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, onde integra o SHIFT - Grupo de Investigação Ambiente, Território e Sociedade.É mestre em Relações Internacionais (2017), na especialidade de Estudos da Paz e da Segurança, pela Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra, e é licenciada em Relações Internacionais (2015) pela mesma faculdade.

IN "SETENTA E QUATRO" - 01/12/22 .