JOÃO ABEL DE FREITAS

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O iminente desastre

ecológico da europa

A ausência de uma estratégia europeia para a energia, que é o problema de fundo, vai manter-se por muitos anos, devido a divergências profundas entre França e Alemanha que ninguém tenta desbloquear.

𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚎 𝚝𝚒́𝚝𝚞𝚕𝚘 𝚎́ 𝚛𝚘𝚞𝚋𝚊𝚍𝚘 𝚊 𝚞𝚖 𝚊𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚐𝚘 𝚛𝚎𝚌𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝙹𝚎𝚊𝚗 𝙿𝚒𝚜𝚊𝚗𝚒-𝙵𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚢, 𝚞𝚖 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚎𝚒𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚍𝚘 𝙿𝚛𝚘𝚏𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚘𝚛 𝚍𝚎 𝙴𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚘𝚖𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚊 𝚄𝚗𝚒𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚜𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎 𝚂𝚌𝚒𝚎𝚗𝚌𝚎𝚜 𝙿𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝙿𝚊𝚛𝚒𝚜 𝚎 𝚗𝚊 𝙷𝚎𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚎 𝚂𝚌𝚑𝚘𝚘𝚕 𝚍𝚎 𝙱𝚎𝚛𝚕𝚒𝚖, 𝚙𝚞𝚋𝚕𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚘 𝚗𝚘 𝙿𝚛𝚘𝚓𝚎𝚌𝚝 𝚂𝚢𝚗𝚍𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚝𝚎. 𝙿𝚒𝚜𝚊𝚗𝚒-𝙵𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚢, 𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚘𝚖𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚏𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚎̂𝚜, 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚟𝚊́𝚛𝚒𝚘𝚜 𝚕𝚒𝚟𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚎 𝚊𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚐𝚘𝚜 𝚜𝚘𝚋𝚛𝚎 𝚙𝚘𝚕𝚒́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊 𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚘́𝚖𝚒𝚌𝚊 𝚎 𝚙𝚘𝚕𝚒́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚒𝚊, 𝚏𝚘𝚒 𝚏𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚛 𝚍𝚘 𝙸𝚗𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚝𝚞𝚝𝚘 𝙱𝚛𝚞𝚎𝚐𝚎𝚕 𝚎 𝚜𝚎𝚞 𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚒𝚍𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚊𝚝𝚎́ 𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟹, 𝚊𝚕𝚎́𝚖 𝚍𝚎 𝙳𝚒𝚛𝚎𝚌𝚝𝚘𝚛 𝚍𝚎 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚖𝚊 𝚎 𝚒𝚍𝚎𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚊 𝚙𝚛𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚒𝚛𝚊 𝚌𝚊𝚖𝚙𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚒𝚍𝚎𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚕 𝚍𝚎 𝙴𝚖𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚞𝚎𝚕 𝙼𝚊𝚌𝚛𝚘𝚗 (𝟸𝟶𝟷𝟽).

𝟷. 𝚂𝚎 𝚋𝚎𝚖 𝚕𝚒 𝚘 𝚊𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚐𝚘, 𝙿𝚒𝚜𝚊𝚗𝚒-𝙵𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚢 𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚒𝚏𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚏𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚊 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚒𝚕𝚞𝚜𝚊̃𝚘 𝚙𝚎𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚊 𝚒𝚗𝚌𝚊𝚙𝚊𝚌𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎 𝚍𝚘𝚜 𝚕𝚒́𝚍𝚎𝚛𝚎𝚜 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚞𝚜 𝚎𝚖 𝚜𝚎 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚛𝚎𝚖 𝚎𝚖 𝚖𝚊𝚝𝚎́𝚛𝚒𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊. 𝙰𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚊 𝚗𝚊 𝚌𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚒𝚛𝚊 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚒𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝟸𝟶/𝟸𝟷, 𝚎𝚖 𝙾𝚞𝚝𝚞𝚋𝚛𝚘, 𝚕𝚘𝚗𝚐𝚊𝚜 “𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚜𝚊𝚜” 𝚖𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎𝚌𝚒𝚜𝚘̃𝚎𝚜 𝚜𝚒𝚐𝚗𝚒𝚏𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚟𝚊𝚜, 𝚣𝚎𝚛𝚘. 𝙰𝚗𝚞𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚛𝚊𝚖 “𝚒𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚗𝚜𝚒𝚏𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚛” 𝚊𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚙𝚛𝚊𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚓𝚞𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 – 𝚝𝚎𝚖𝚊, 𝚊𝚕𝚒𝚊́𝚜, 𝚑𝚊́ 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚘𝚜𝚝𝚘 𝚙𝚘𝚛 𝙴𝚜𝚙𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 –, 𝚍𝚎𝚌𝚒𝚜𝚊̃𝚘 𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚊 𝚒𝚗𝚌𝚊𝚙𝚊𝚌𝚒𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚙𝚎𝚕𝚊𝚜 𝚖𝚞́𝚕𝚝𝚒𝚙𝚕𝚊𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚛𝚟𝚊𝚜 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚎́𝚖, 𝚘 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚜𝚎 𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚍𝚞𝚣𝚒𝚞 𝚊𝚝𝚎́ 𝚊𝚐𝚘𝚛𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚒𝚣𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘.

𝚁𝚎𝚏𝚎𝚛𝚎 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚒𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚕𝚒𝚐𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚘𝚕𝚒́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚜 𝚗𝚊 𝚄𝚗𝚒𝚊̃𝚘 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚒𝚊 𝚜𝚊̃𝚘 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎, 𝚖𝚊𝚜 𝚊𝚚𝚞𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚍𝚘 𝙲𝚘𝚟𝚒𝚍-𝟷𝟿, 𝙵𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚎 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚛𝚊𝚖-𝚜𝚎 𝚎𝚖 𝚝𝚛𝚎̂𝚜 𝚖𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚜 𝚎, 𝚍𝚘𝚒𝚜 𝚖𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚜 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚜, 𝚘𝚜 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚜-𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚝𝚒𝚗𝚑𝚊𝚖 𝚊𝚌𝚘𝚛𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚘 𝚘 𝚜𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚎𝚖𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚖𝚙𝚛𝚎́𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚖𝚘𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚜 𝚎 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚑𝚘𝚞𝚟𝚎 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚘𝚛 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚙𝚛𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚓𝚞𝚗𝚝𝚊 𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚟𝚊𝚌𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚜 𝚎 𝚊 𝚜𝚞𝚊 𝚍𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚛𝚒𝚋𝚞𝚒𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚏𝚘𝚛𝚖𝚊 𝚎𝚚𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚊𝚝𝚒𝚟𝚊, 𝚗𝚊 𝚋𝚊𝚜𝚎 𝚍𝚊 𝚙𝚘𝚙𝚞𝚕𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘.

𝚀𝚞𝚊𝚜𝚎 𝚗𝚘𝚟𝚎 𝚖𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚜 𝚊𝚙𝚘́𝚜 𝚊 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚊𝚜𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚊 𝚄𝚌𝚛𝚊̂𝚗𝚒𝚊, 𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊 𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚊𝚜𝚝𝚊-𝚜𝚎 𝚎 𝙵𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚎 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 “𝚎𝚗𝚌𝚊𝚛𝚗𝚊𝚖 𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚊 𝚒𝚗𝚌𝚊𝚙𝚊𝚌𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚘𝚛𝚍𝚊𝚛 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚞𝚖 𝚛𝚎𝚐𝚒𝚖𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚖”. 𝙾𝚛𝚊, 𝚗𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚌𝚛𝚒𝚜𝚎, “𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚒𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚜𝚎 𝚕𝚒𝚖𝚒𝚝𝚊𝚖 𝚊𝚙𝚎𝚗𝚊𝚜 𝚊 𝚍𝚎𝚌𝚕𝚊𝚛𝚊𝚌̧𝚘̃𝚎𝚜 𝚙𝚞́𝚋𝚕𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚜 𝚎 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚙𝚘𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚘𝚜𝚜𝚒́𝚟𝚎𝚒𝚜. 𝙾𝚜 𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚕𝚊𝚖 𝚎𝚗𝚘𝚛𝚖𝚎𝚜 𝚍𝚒𝚏𝚎𝚛𝚎𝚗𝚌̧𝚊𝚜 𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚘́𝚖𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚜 𝚜𝚞𝚋𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚎 𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚊𝚒́𝚜𝚎𝚜-𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚍𝚊 𝚄𝙴”, 𝚛𝚎𝚏𝚎𝚛𝚎 𝙿𝚒𝚜𝚊𝚗𝚒-𝙵𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚢. 𝙿𝚘𝚛 𝚎𝚡𝚎𝚖𝚙𝚕𝚘, 𝚊 𝚒𝚗𝚏𝚕𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚊𝚗𝚞𝚊𝚕𝚒𝚣𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚊 𝚂𝚎𝚝𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘 𝚞́𝚕𝚝𝚒𝚖𝚘 𝚎𝚛𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝟼,𝟸% 𝚎𝚖 𝙵𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝟸𝟺,𝟷% 𝚗𝚊 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚘́𝚗𝚒𝚊.

𝙿𝚘𝚛 𝚘𝚞𝚝𝚛𝚘 𝚕𝚊𝚍𝚘, 𝚊 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚊𝚟𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚘𝚞 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚞𝚖 𝚎𝚗𝚟𝚎𝚕𝚘𝚙𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝟸𝟶𝟶 𝚖𝚒𝚕 𝚖𝚒𝚕𝚑𝚘̃𝚎𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚊𝚙𝚘𝚒𝚘 𝚊 𝚏𝚊𝚖𝚒́𝚕𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚎 𝚎𝚖𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚊𝚜, 𝚍𝚎𝚌𝚒𝚜𝚊̃𝚘 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚌𝚑𝚘𝚌𝚘𝚞 𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚌𝚎𝚒𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚒𝚝𝚊́𝚛𝚒𝚘𝚜. 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚖𝚎𝚍𝚒𝚍𝚊 𝚎́ 𝚟𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚘 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎𝚋𝚛𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚜𝚘𝚕𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚛𝚒𝚎𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎, 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚖𝚎𝚜𝚞𝚛𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚏𝚊𝚌𝚎 𝚊̀ 𝚌𝚊𝚙𝚊𝚌𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎 𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚎𝚒𝚛𝚊 𝚍𝚘𝚜 𝚘𝚞𝚝𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚊𝚒́𝚜𝚎𝚜 𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘𝚜. 𝙿𝚒𝚜𝚊𝚗𝚒-𝙵𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚢 𝚊𝚌𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚘𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚛𝚎𝚜 𝚝𝚎̂𝚖 𝚛𝚊𝚣𝚊̃𝚘: “𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚍𝚎𝚌𝚒𝚜𝚊̃𝚘 𝚎𝚖𝚒𝚝𝚎 𝚞𝚖 𝚖𝚊𝚞 𝚜𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚕 𝚗𝚞𝚖 𝚖𝚊𝚞 𝚖𝚘𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘, 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚎𝚟𝚒𝚍𝚎𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚊 𝚊𝚞𝚜𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚝𝚎́𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚖”. 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚎 𝚙𝚊𝚌𝚘𝚝𝚎 𝚙𝚎𝚛𝚖𝚒𝚝𝚎 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚘𝚜 𝚗𝚒́𝚟𝚎𝚒𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚜𝚞𝚋𝚜𝚒́𝚍𝚒𝚘𝚜 𝚟𝚊𝚛𝚒𝚎𝚖 𝚍𝚎 𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚘𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝟷% 𝚍𝚘 𝙿𝙸𝙱 𝚗𝚊 𝚂𝚞𝚎́𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚎 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚘́𝚗𝚒𝚊 𝚊𝚝𝚎́ 𝟽% 𝚗𝚊 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊.

𝙼𝚊𝚜, 𝚎𝚖 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘𝚜 𝚘𝚞𝚝𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚍𝚘𝚖𝚒́𝚗𝚒𝚘𝚜 𝚍𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊, 𝙵𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚎 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚜 𝚟𝚒𝚛𝚊𝚍𝚊𝚜. 𝙽𝚊 𝚏𝚒𝚡𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚌̧𝚘 𝚍𝚘 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚊 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚍𝚞𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚕𝚎𝚌𝚝𝚛𝚒𝚌𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎, 𝚙𝚘𝚛 𝚎𝚡𝚎𝚖𝚙𝚕𝚘, 𝚊 𝙵𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚊𝚙𝚘𝚒𝚊 𝚘 𝚌𝚑𝚊𝚖𝚊𝚍𝚘 “𝚛𝚎𝚐𝚒𝚖𝚎 𝚒𝚋𝚎́𝚛𝚒𝚌𝚘”, 𝚎𝚖 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚘 𝚐𝚘𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚗𝚘 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚋𝚎𝚕𝚎𝚌𝚎 𝚞𝚖 𝚕𝚒𝚖𝚒𝚊𝚛 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚌̧𝚘. 𝙰 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚘𝚙𝚘̃𝚎-𝚜𝚎 𝚊𝚕𝚎𝚐𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚝𝚊𝚕 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚌𝚎𝚍𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘 𝚝𝚘𝚛𝚗𝚊𝚛𝚒𝚊 𝚘 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚌𝚊𝚛𝚘 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚘𝚜 𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚞𝚜𝚝𝚛𝚒𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚎 𝚐𝚎𝚛𝚊𝚛𝚒𝚊 𝚟𝚎𝚗𝚌𝚎𝚍𝚘𝚛𝚎𝚜 𝚎 𝚟𝚎𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚍𝚘𝚜 𝚗𝚘𝚜 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚜-𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘𝚜.

𝙿𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝙿𝚒𝚜𝚊𝚗𝚒-𝙵𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚢 “𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚙𝚘𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚜 𝚝𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚒́𝚜𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚎𝚜 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚖 𝚜𝚎𝚛 𝚌𝚛𝚒𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚘𝚛 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚙𝚛𝚒𝚗𝚌𝚒́𝚙𝚒𝚘, 𝚖𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚒𝚏𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚊𝚍𝚎𝚚𝚞𝚊𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚎𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚞𝚖 𝚌𝚑𝚘𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚖”. 𝙷𝚊́ 𝚞𝚖 𝚖𝚎𝚛𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚞 𝚊𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚡𝚒𝚖𝚊𝚍𝚊𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚞𝚗𝚒𝚏𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚘 𝚎, 𝚗𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚡𝚝𝚘, 𝚊𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚙𝚘𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚒𝚊𝚖 𝚜𝚎𝚛 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚜, 𝚊𝚝𝚎́ 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎𝚌𝚒𝚜𝚘̃𝚎𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚞𝚖 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘 𝚊𝚏𝚎𝚌𝚝𝚊𝚖 𝚚𝚞𝚊𝚜𝚎 𝚎𝚖 𝚜𝚒𝚖𝚞𝚕𝚝𝚊̂𝚗𝚎𝚘 𝚘𝚜 𝚘𝚞𝚝𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚎 𝚚𝚞𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚘 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚘𝚛 𝚏𝚘𝚛 𝚘 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘, 𝚙𝚒𝚘𝚛, 𝚊𝚌𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘.

𝙰 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚒𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚖𝚎𝚍𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚜 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚘𝚕𝚒́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚜 𝚊𝚌𝚊𝚛𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚊 𝚙𝚎𝚜𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚌𝚊𝚛𝚐𝚘𝚜 𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚎𝚒𝚛𝚘𝚜, 𝚖𝚒𝚗𝚊 𝚊 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚏𝚒𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚎 𝚘𝚜 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚜-𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚎 𝚘 𝚛𝚒𝚜𝚌𝚘 𝚍𝚘 𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚊𝚛𝚐𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 𝚛𝚞𝚜𝚜𝚘 𝚌𝚊𝚞𝚜𝚊𝚛 𝚍𝚒𝚟𝚒𝚜𝚘̃𝚎𝚜 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚏𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚘 𝚍𝚊 𝚄𝚗𝚒𝚊̃𝚘 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚒𝚊 (𝚄𝙴) 𝚙𝚎𝚛𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚎𝚌𝚎 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘 𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚟𝚎, 𝚊𝚍𝚖𝚒𝚝𝚎 𝙿𝚒𝚜𝚊𝚗𝚒-𝙵𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚢.

𝚅𝚊𝚒 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚎 𝚊𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚐𝚘 𝚊̀ 𝚛𝚊𝚒𝚣 𝚍𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚘 𝚗𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊?

𝟸. 𝙾 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚗𝚍𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚎 𝚘𝚜 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚜-𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊𝚙𝚎𝚕𝚊 𝚘 𝚊𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚐𝚘 𝚜𝚎𝚛𝚒𝚊 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘 𝚙𝚘𝚜𝚒𝚝𝚒𝚟𝚘 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚖𝚒𝚗𝚘𝚛𝚊𝚛 𝚊 𝚜𝚒𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚊𝚕𝚊𝚋𝚛𝚘 𝚍𝚘𝚖𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚗𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊, 𝚘𝚗𝚍𝚎 𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚙𝚊𝚒́𝚜 𝚝𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊 “𝚊𝚝𝚊𝚌𝚊𝚛” 𝚊 𝚛𝚎𝚊𝚕𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚘𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚙𝚘𝚍𝚎. 𝙼𝚊𝚜 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚘𝚕𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚒𝚊 𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚛𝚊𝚒𝚣.

𝙰 𝚊𝚞𝚜𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚝𝚎́𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚒𝚊 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊, 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚎́ 𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚏𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚘, 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚎́ 𝚏𝚘𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚗𝚘 𝚊𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚐𝚘. 𝚄𝚖𝚊 𝚊𝚞𝚜𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚟𝚊𝚒 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚒𝚗𝚞𝚊𝚛 𝚙𝚘𝚛 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘𝚜 𝚊𝚗𝚘𝚜, 𝚍𝚎𝚟𝚒𝚍𝚘 𝚊 𝚍𝚒𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚏𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚎 𝙵𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚎 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚗𝚒𝚗𝚐𝚞𝚎́𝚖 𝚝𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚋𝚕𝚘𝚚𝚞𝚎𝚊𝚛, 𝚊𝚙𝚎𝚜𝚊𝚛 𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚊𝚕𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚊𝚌̧𝚘̃𝚎𝚜 𝚜𝚞𝚋𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚘 𝚍𝚎𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚖𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚎𝚕𝚊 𝚐𝚞𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚊.

𝙴, 𝚙𝚘𝚛 𝚘𝚞𝚝𝚛𝚘 𝚕𝚊𝚍𝚘, 𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚛𝚒𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚙𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚍𝚒𝚛𝚒𝚐𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚘́𝚛𝚐𝚊̃𝚘𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚒𝚝𝚊́𝚛𝚒𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚘𝚞𝚌𝚘 𝚘𝚞 𝚗𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊̃𝚘 𝚎𝚖𝚙𝚎𝚗𝚑𝚊𝚍𝚘𝚜 𝚗𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚊 𝚜𝚒𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘, 𝚙𝚘𝚒𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚘 𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚛𝚎𝚟𝚒𝚊 𝚑𝚊́ 𝚍𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚘 “𝙴𝚕 𝙼𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚘/𝙼𝚊𝚍𝚛𝚒𝚍”, 𝚄𝚛𝚜𝚞𝚕𝚊 𝚟𝚘𝚗 𝚍𝚎𝚛 𝙻𝚎𝚢𝚎𝚗, 𝙲𝚑𝚊𝚛𝚕𝚎𝚜 𝙼𝚒𝚌𝚑𝚎𝚕 𝚎 𝙹𝚘𝚜𝚎𝚙𝚑 𝙱𝚘𝚛𝚛𝚎𝚕𝚕 𝚍𝚎𝚍𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚖-𝚜𝚎 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚜 “𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚙𝚎𝚝𝚒𝚛 𝚎𝚖 𝚏𝚊𝚣𝚎𝚛 𝚊𝚗𝚞́𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚘𝚜 𝚎 𝚛𝚎𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚛 𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊 𝚗𝚘 𝚎𝚡𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚒𝚘𝚛”. 𝙾 “𝙲𝚘𝚞𝚛𝚛𝚒𝚎𝚛 𝙸𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚗𝚊𝚌𝚒𝚘𝚗𝚊𝚕” 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚗𝚘𝚝𝚒́𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚘 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚜𝚊𝚋𝚘𝚛𝚘𝚜𝚊 𝚊𝚗𝚊́𝚕𝚒𝚜𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝚐𝚞𝚎𝚛𝚛𝚊 𝚍𝚘 𝚎𝚐𝚘 𝚎𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚎𝚞.

𝟹. 𝚅𝚘𝚕𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚊̀ 𝚛𝚊𝚒𝚣 𝚍𝚊 𝚝𝚎𝚖𝚊́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊 𝚎𝚖 𝚊𝚗𝚊́𝚕𝚒𝚜𝚎, 𝚊 𝚊𝚞𝚜𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚝𝚎́𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚊 𝚄𝙴.

𝙰 𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚜𝚒𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊́ 𝚗𝚊 𝚘𝚛𝚍𝚎𝚖 𝚍𝚘 𝚍𝚒𝚊 – 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚖𝚘𝚜 𝚎𝚖 𝚙𝚕𝚎𝚗𝚊 𝙲𝙾𝙿𝟸𝟽 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚙𝚘𝚞𝚌𝚘 𝚟𝚊𝚒 𝚊𝚌𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚛, 𝚊𝚝𝚎́ 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚊 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘 𝚏𝚛𝚊𝚐𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚣𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚘 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚐𝚖𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊́ 𝚊 𝚏𝚊𝚣𝚎𝚛 𝚝𝚞𝚍𝚘 𝚊𝚘 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚊́𝚛𝚒𝚘 𝚍𝚘 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚍𝚎𝚏𝚎𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚞 𝚗𝚊 𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚒𝚘𝚛 (𝚊𝚌𝚝𝚒𝚟𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚌𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚊 𝚌𝚊𝚛𝚟𝚊̃𝚘, 𝚑𝚒𝚙𝚘́𝚝𝚎𝚜𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚡𝚙𝚕𝚘𝚛𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚘 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚡𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚘 𝚗𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊 𝚎 𝚊𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚊 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘𝚜 𝚎𝚖 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 𝚗𝚊𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚊𝚕 𝚏𝚘𝚛𝚊 𝚍𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊) – 𝚝𝚎𝚖 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚘 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊𝚍𝚒𝚐𝚖𝚊 𝚊 𝚜𝚞𝚋𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚝𝚞𝚒𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚊 𝚙𝚛𝚊𝚣𝚘 𝚍𝚊𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚘𝚛𝚒𝚐𝚎𝚖 𝚏𝚘́𝚜𝚜𝚒𝚕, 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚊 𝚛𝚎𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚖 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚘𝚝𝚊 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘 𝚎𝚕𝚎𝚟𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚍𝚘 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚞𝚖𝚘 𝚗𝚘 𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚑𝚘𝚓𝚎 (𝟽𝟻%), 𝚙𝚘𝚛 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚏𝚘́𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚒𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚋𝚊𝚒𝚡𝚊 𝚎𝚖𝚒𝚜𝚜𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚐𝚊́𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚏𝚎𝚒𝚝𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚞𝚏𝚊 (𝙶𝙴𝙴). 𝙴́ 𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚌𝚒𝚜𝚘 𝚞𝚖 𝚙𝚛𝚊𝚣𝚘 𝚛𝚘𝚋𝚞𝚜𝚝𝚘 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚘𝚜 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘𝚜 𝚜𝚎 𝚛𝚎𝚊𝚕𝚒𝚣𝚎𝚖 (𝟹𝟶/𝟺𝟶 𝚊𝚗𝚘𝚜), 𝚙𝚎𝚛𝚒́𝚘𝚍𝚘 𝚎𝚖 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚟𝚊̃𝚘 𝚌𝚘𝚎𝚡𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚘𝚜 𝚍𝚘𝚒𝚜 𝚝𝚒𝚙𝚘𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊.

𝙴 𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚘 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚝𝚛𝚒𝚙𝚕𝚊 𝚏𝚒𝚗𝚊𝚕𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎: 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚙𝚘𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚛 𝚊𝚘 𝚊𝚞𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚞𝚖𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚘 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚎𝚗𝚟𝚘𝚕𝚟𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘 𝚜𝚘𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚕 𝚛𝚎𝚚𝚞𝚎𝚛, 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚌𝚊𝚛𝚋𝚘𝚗𝚒𝚣𝚊𝚛 𝚊𝚜 𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚘𝚖𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚙𝚘𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚛 𝚊̀ 𝚌𝚛𝚒𝚜𝚎 𝚌𝚕𝚒𝚖𝚊́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊 𝚎, 𝚖𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚘 𝚒𝚖𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎, 𝚙𝚎𝚛𝚖𝚒𝚝𝚒𝚛 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊 𝚄𝙴 𝚐𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚎 𝚊𝚞𝚝𝚘𝚗𝚘𝚖𝚒𝚊 𝚏𝚊𝚌𝚎 𝚊̀𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚏𝚘́𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚒𝚜, 𝚍𝚎 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚝𝚎𝚖 𝚏𝚛𝚊𝚌𝚘𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚌𝚞𝚛𝚜𝚘𝚜, 𝚎 𝚊𝚘𝚜 𝚘𝚞𝚝𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚎𝚜𝚙𝚊𝚌̧𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚘𝚕𝚒́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚘-𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚘́𝚖𝚒𝚌𝚘𝚜. 𝙶𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊𝚛 𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚙𝚘𝚜𝚒𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚙𝚛𝚘́𝚙𝚛𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚖 𝚍𝚘𝚖𝚒́𝚗𝚒𝚘 𝚒́𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝚜𝚘𝚋𝚎𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚒𝚊 𝚎́ 𝚏𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚊𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚕 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚘𝚕𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚘 𝚙𝚘𝚝𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚒𝚊𝚕. 𝙴 𝚜𝚎𝚖 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊 𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚜𝚏𝚘𝚛𝚖𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚊𝚍𝚚𝚞𝚒𝚛𝚎 𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚊 𝚌𝚊𝚙𝚊𝚌𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎.

𝙲𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚐𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘𝚜 𝚌𝚞𝚕𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚎 𝚒𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚐𝚛𝚞𝚙𝚘𝚜 𝚎𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚘́𝚖𝚒𝚌𝚘𝚜 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊̃𝚘 𝚊 𝚋𝚕𝚘𝚚𝚞𝚎𝚊𝚛 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚎 𝚌𝚊𝚖𝚒𝚗𝚑𝚘 𝚎 𝚊 𝚊𝚝𝚛𝚊𝚜𝚊𝚛, 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚙𝚛𝚎𝚓𝚞𝚒́𝚣𝚘, 𝚊 𝚎𝚕𝚊𝚋𝚘𝚛𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚞𝚖 𝚙𝚕𝚊𝚗𝚘 𝚊̀ 𝚊𝚕𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚊. 𝙴𝚒𝚜 𝚊 𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚎 𝚚𝚞𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊̃𝚘. 𝙴 𝚊𝚚𝚞𝚒 𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚒𝚍𝚎𝚖 𝚊𝚜 𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚜 𝚍𝚒𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚒𝚖𝚙𝚎𝚍𝚎𝚖, 𝚗𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊, 𝚋𝚊𝚜𝚎𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚜 𝚌𝚘𝚖𝚞𝚗𝚜.

𝙰 𝚜𝚘𝚕𝚞𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚜𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚎 𝚎𝚖 𝚊𝚛𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚞𝚕𝚊𝚛 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚌𝚕𝚎𝚊𝚛 𝚎 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚗𝚘𝚟𝚊́𝚟𝚎𝚒𝚜.

𝙰 𝙵𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚊 𝚎 𝚊 𝙰𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚊, 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚘 𝚖𝚘𝚟𝚒𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚘 𝚍𝚘𝚜 𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚍𝚎𝚜 𝚌𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚒𝚍𝚘. 𝙷𝚊́ 𝚘𝚜 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊𝚌𝚎𝚒𝚝𝚊𝚖 𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚟𝚎𝚣 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚌𝚕𝚎𝚊𝚛, 𝚗𝚘𝚖𝚎𝚊𝚍𝚊𝚖𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎 𝚏𝚊𝚌𝚎 𝚊𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚐𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚘𝚜 𝚝𝚎𝚌𝚗𝚘𝚕𝚘́𝚐𝚒𝚌𝚘𝚜 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚝𝚎̂𝚖 𝚛𝚎𝚍𝚞𝚣𝚒𝚍𝚘 𝚘 𝚛𝚒𝚜𝚌𝚘, 𝚎 𝚊 𝚊𝚕𝚊 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚒𝚗𝚞𝚊 𝚗𝚊 𝚜𝚞𝚊 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚗𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘. 𝙼𝚞𝚒𝚝𝚊 𝚒𝚗𝚌𝚘𝚎𝚛𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚒𝚜𝚝𝚘, 𝚊𝚝𝚎́ 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊 𝚛𝚎𝚗𝚘𝚟𝚊́𝚟𝚎𝚕 𝚎𝚘́𝚕𝚒𝚌𝚊 𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚊́ 𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚏𝚛𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚛 𝚜𝚎́𝚛𝚒𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚋𝚕𝚎𝚖𝚊𝚜 𝚍𝚎 𝚟𝚒𝚊𝚋𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚍𝚊𝚍𝚎. 𝙰𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚗𝚘𝚟𝚊́𝚟𝚎𝚒𝚜 𝚙𝚎𝚛 𝚜𝚒, 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚍𝚎 𝚙𝚛𝚘𝚍𝚞𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚒𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚖𝚒𝚝𝚎𝚗𝚝𝚎, 𝚗𝚞𝚗𝚌𝚊 𝚍𝚎𝚒𝚡𝚊𝚛𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚊𝚛 𝚘𝚞 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚊𝚜 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊𝚜 𝚏𝚘́𝚜𝚜𝚎𝚒𝚜 𝚘𝚞 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚌𝚕𝚎𝚊𝚛.

𝙰 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚌𝚕𝚎𝚊𝚛, 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚘𝚜 𝚊𝚟𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚘𝚜 𝚝𝚎𝚌𝚗𝚘𝚕𝚘́𝚐𝚒𝚌𝚘𝚜 𝚎 𝚌𝚘𝚖 𝚊 𝚍𝚒𝚟𝚎𝚛𝚜𝚒𝚏𝚒𝚌𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚎𝚖 𝚌𝚞𝚛𝚜𝚘, 𝚝𝚎𝚛𝚊́ 𝚗𝚘 𝚏𝚞𝚝𝚞𝚛𝚘 𝚞𝚖 𝚙𝚊𝚙𝚎𝚕 𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝚟𝚎𝚣 𝚖𝚊𝚒𝚜 𝚒𝚖𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚝𝚊𝚗𝚝𝚎, 𝚊𝚝𝚎́ 𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚘𝚜 𝚛𝚎𝚊𝚌𝚝𝚘𝚛𝚎𝚜, 𝚜𝚘𝚋𝚛𝚎𝚝𝚞𝚍𝚘 𝚘𝚜 𝚂𝙼𝚁, 𝚙𝚘𝚍𝚎𝚛𝚊̃𝚘 𝚟𝚒𝚛 𝚊 𝚝𝚎𝚛 𝚞𝚖 𝚙𝚊𝚙𝚎𝚕 𝚌𝚛𝚞𝚌𝚒𝚊𝚕 𝚗𝚊 𝚍𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚊𝚕𝚒𝚗𝚒𝚣𝚊𝚌̧𝚊̃𝚘 𝚍𝚊 𝚊́𝚐𝚞𝚊.

𝙷𝚊́ 𝚊𝚜𝚜𝚒𝚖 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚊𝚟𝚊𝚗𝚌̧𝚊𝚛 𝚗𝚞𝚖𝚊 𝚕𝚒𝚗𝚑𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚏𝚞𝚗𝚍𝚘, 𝚛𝚎𝚞𝚗𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚌𝚕𝚎𝚊𝚛 𝚎 𝚛𝚎𝚗𝚘𝚟𝚊́𝚟𝚎𝚒𝚜 𝚗𝚞𝚖 𝚖𝚒𝚡 𝚚𝚞𝚎 𝚌𝚊𝚍𝚊 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚊𝚍𝚘-𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘 𝚜𝚊𝚋𝚎𝚛𝚊́ 𝚚𝚞𝚊𝚕 𝚘 𝚖𝚎𝚕𝚑𝚘𝚛 𝚙𝚊𝚛𝚊 𝚜𝚒, 𝚘𝚞 𝚖𝚎𝚜𝚖𝚘 𝚗𝚊̃𝚘 𝚒𝚗𝚟𝚎𝚜𝚝𝚒𝚛 𝚗𝚊 𝚗𝚞𝚌𝚕𝚎𝚊𝚛 𝚎 𝚒𝚖𝚙𝚘𝚛𝚝𝚊𝚛 𝚚𝚞𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚘 𝚗𝚎𝚌𝚎𝚜𝚜𝚊́𝚛𝚒𝚊 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚒𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚘𝚞𝚝𝚛𝚘𝚜 𝚙𝚊𝚒́𝚜𝚎𝚜 𝚖𝚎𝚖𝚋𝚛𝚘𝚜. 𝙴𝚜𝚝𝚎 𝚎́ 𝚘 𝚌𝚊𝚖𝚒𝚗𝚑𝚘 𝚚𝚞𝚎, 𝚗𝚘 𝚊𝚌𝚝𝚞𝚊𝚕 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚝𝚎𝚡𝚝𝚘 𝚝𝚎𝚌𝚗𝚘𝚕𝚘́𝚐𝚒𝚌𝚘, 𝚙𝚘𝚍𝚎𝚛𝚊́ 𝚍𝚘𝚝𝚊𝚛 𝚊 𝙴𝚞𝚛𝚘𝚙𝚊 𝚍𝚎 𝚐𝚛𝚊𝚗𝚍𝚎 𝚒𝚗𝚍𝚎𝚙𝚎𝚗𝚍𝚎̂𝚗𝚌𝚒𝚊 𝚗𝚘 𝚜𝚎𝚌𝚝𝚘𝚛 𝚎𝚗𝚎𝚛𝚐𝚎́𝚝𝚒𝚌𝚘.

* Economista

IN "O JORNAL ECONÓMICO" - 14/11/22 .